

AN APPROACH TO A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

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NEW YORK

JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

LONDON: CHAPMAN & HALL, LIMITED

1938

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

In this book I have tried to sketch something of what may be called, in the current phrase, an adventure in ideas. That adventure takes the form of two successive undertakings. The first, outlined in Part One, deals with the problem of discovering and formulating a suggestive ordering of values in life. The second, outlined in Part Two, deals with some general bearings of the suggested ordering upon education designed to make life as useful and as meaningful as may be.

The undertaking in Part One starts from the assumption that the idea of life itself contains the keys to its values. The chief content of this part, then, has to do with examination of the nature of life. This examination represents a search for clues to value as they appear from three standpoints: (1) from the biological standpoint, (2) from the psychological standpoint, and (3) from the social standpoint. In outcome of each phase of the examination a roughly suggestive order of values appears: (*a*) An order by the scale of utility or biological success; (*b*) an order by the scale of personality and character; (*c*) an order by the scale of social stability and progress.

The undertaking in Part Two starts with the notion that education is a purposeful human undertaking. It rests on the further premise that *good* education aims at the better rather than the worse. It proceeds, accordingly, to certain generalizations concerning the character (1) of education

designed to ends in useful living, (2) of education designed to develop spiritual manhood, (3) of education designed to forward consistent social progress.

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IRVINGDALE, N. Y.

April, 1938

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My colleagues, Professors M. F. Henry, E. N. Ferriss, and C. B. Moore, have given generously of their time to variously extensive readings of the manuscript. For this effort, as well as for helpful criticism and encouragement in the undertaking of the book, I gratefully acknowledge my debt to them.

I owe to the Macmillan Company a courteous permission to quote here and there a word or phrase from that admirable textbook, *The Evolution of Educational Theory*, by Sir John Adams. To them also I owe permission to quote briefly from Whitehead's *Aims of Education and Other Essays*. D. C. Heath and Company have allowed me to use an illuminating phrase from the book, *The Concepts of Sociology*, by E. E. Eubank. Professor Edward L. Thorndike, to whom I, as a student of Education, am indebted for much, has allowed me to quote a statement made by him in a letter to me.

THEODORE H. EATON

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PART ONE
BACKGROUNDS OF AIM IN EDUCATION

AN APPROACH TO A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

CHAPTER I

A MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT

I

Life is a process of give and take. That is a familiar saying; and the statement is literally true. Every 'activity,' as we call it, of a man's life, from breathing to theorizing, appears as an interchange between two terms, a subject and an object. The subject, a man, is active at one pole of the process and the object, his environment at the moment, is active at the other. The man affects in one way or another the environment with which he deals; the environment affects the man. We can say of the man, for instance, that he changes his position, his doings, his understanding, his attitude, with reference to an object; of the object, that it changes its position, its form, its meaning, with reference to the man. Each exerts an influence upon the other effective in the relation between them.

The interchange is often evident at a glance. A man picks up a ball, tosses it in the air, catches it. The influence of the man upon the ball and of the ball upon the man is plain to see from beginning to end of the activity. Often, however, the two-way give and take is not so easy to follow. The man is lying quiet on a couch. A bell rings. The bell affects the man, he hears it; that is plain enough. But does the man affect the bell? The clapper swings and the vibra-

tions spread in quite the same fashion, whether the man hears them or not. But in a sense not physical the bell is changed; it remains no mere vibrating source of sound waves, but becomes a-thing-heard, a perception. It has taken on from the man who hears it a meaning which it did not have before. And that meaning, in its turn, exerts an influence upon the man, causing him, perhaps, to rise from the couch and gather his books and move away.

We can, if we will, set apart a ball or a bell from a man, and conceive of it as existing independently of the man's existence. But we cannot separate a sound heard from the man who hears it; nor, if man-catches-ball, can we separate the ball from the man in the case. To isolate a man's act from that which he acts upon, or that which he influences from that which influences him, is as impossible as to remove one pole from a magnet, leaving the other behind. But distinction between a man and the objects with which he deals is quite as possible as is distinction of pole from pole in the magnet, and quite as necessary to understanding.

II

The ancients gave to a man the name animal. The name stood for a material and organic structure, or body, 'informed' with life and made active by immaterial spirit—*anima*. This body, as they saw it, serves as vessel and instrument for a spiritual entity which governs its behavior, and through that behavior gives expression to the essential and imperishable reality, a man. When and so long as a man-soul inspires a man-body, then and so long a man lives on earth.

Modern scientists and philosophers still hold with the ancients that a man is an animal. But they incline, in

general, to the notion that spirit and body, in this world at least, must be regarded as aspects of one and the same thing. A man is no less body than soul. Some have gone so far, indeed, as to declare that priority, if any there be, lies with body, which in its physical behavior develops properties called spiritual—feeling, knowing, willing, and the like. Choose, as you will, the older or the newer conception; yet any view of man, not manifestly partial and one-sided, must take into account both the physical and the spiritual in his nature.

A man, as we can know him, then, is a psychophysical organism. From the physical standpoint he appears to be a physiochemical mechanism active in response to the stimuli of a physical world. In every interaction with that world he plays his part by discharge of energy in a form and through a focus determined by the structure of his organs. He is, so to speak, a self-stoking, self-building, self-renewing engine, flexibly sensitive to all manner of pressures upon its controls, and so kept running for a short time or a long by the incidence of circumstances. His behavior, like that of any simpler machine, is to be accounted for by the laws of physical causation. From the psychical standpoint he appears even more mysterious. He is an entity aware of himself and a world about him, a conscious continuum of feeling and knowing; he is self, active in terms of causes not yet to be discerned as purely physical, or, in the ultimate, external to him. Looked at from this standpoint a man appears not as a brain-governed organism, responsive to stimulus, but as a mind-governed organism reactive to meaning with meaning.

III

If a man is a psychophysical organism, it follows, that his environment is likewise psychophysical; it has properties both physical and spiritual, or, if you prefer, two aspects, the one physical, the other psychical. One must include in environment, then, both energy-stimuli and meaningful objects.

Whatever in a man's surroundings influences the behavior of that man belongs to his environment. That is a 'common sense sort' of definition. It proceeds from the customary distinction of outer from inner by way of which, willy-nilly, we must think of many matters. It assigns to environment the outer pole of life process, and to man the inner pole; it points stimulating impulse toward the man in the case, and responding impulse toward environment. Use of the word 'surroundings' suggests, nevertheless, a spatial separation between man and environment that is difficult to maintain. Consider from the physical side stimulus to sight. Light waves from a lake are in origin spatially external to the man who looks upon the rippled waters. Chemical changes in the rods and cones of his retinae are, on the contrary, internal to the bodily man. Stimulus to retinal change comes no doubt from the solar reflection, but stimulus to sight of the sparkling waves comes from the retinal chemistry. That to which the seeing man responds is, therefore, as surely within him as without. When we turn to the psychical side, it is quite as certain that a man reacts to *what* he sees as that he responds to the effects of light upon his retinal tract. Whatever he sees in looking at the lake is, to be sure, an outcome of his response of seeing; but it becomes, in turn, an object active to influence his further behavior. His perception shifts, as it were, instantly, to the

environmental pole of the seeing process. But to say that the perception thus becomes spatially external to the man is patently absurd. Accordingly, things-seen, things-heard, things-felt, and so on, are quite as readily—and as necessarily—admissible to environment as are the data of external surroundings which fling the impacts of physical energy upon the sense organs, or the immediate physiochemical sensations of those organs. A perception is as genuinely an influence upon behavior as is any physical stimulus to perceiving, external or peripheral. Again, if we pass beyond material objects and 'the data of sense,' it appears beyond question that ideas too influence a man. The subject-object relation still holds between the thinker and that which he thinks upon. Here, obviously, spatial separation of outer from inner is quite impossible. Ideas as objective notions to be dealt with cannot be excluded from the domain of environment. A man's environment thus includes all things and events of the world sensed or perceived by that man and all ideas to which he reacts or responds by doing, feeling, knowing, and thinking.

An illustration is, perhaps, called for to clothe the abstract statement just made. A flower before my eyes belongs to my environment because it evokes in the retinae a physiochemical response. It belongs to my environment again when I have perceived it *as* a flower; that is to say, just as soon as it has taken on meaning in anywise effective to determine my further dealings with it. Beyond that, the notion of a flower upon which I reflect in the flowerless darkness of my chamber belongs to my environment, no less. Though it is not a flower, the retinal image of a flower, or the perception of a flower, but an idea only, it still finds a place as changing object in the alternating current of my reflections. That despite the fact that the current was set

in flow, no doubt, by some first physical stimulus and consequent perception.

What we choose to call a particular thing, event, perception, or idea can never be, of course, all the environment of a man. In the examples offered—the ball, the bell, the flower—each particular named represents only a central point of influence toward which, at the moment, the man's activity directs its focus. The temperature of the air, the wind, the light of the sun, the sleeve he wears, the idea of grace in movement, and a thousand other particulars may influence the man in catching the ball. But the moving ball is the central influence. We can limit no man's environment, even for an instant, to just one namable thing, event, perception, or idea.

Yet environment is never all-inclusive, either. To use an analogy, the rays of a lamp shining on a wall may illumine a small area or a large one. But within the area, whatever its size, they do not light every part with an equal brilliance. From a central point the brightness of illumination diminishes on all sides; between the lighted and the dark areas stands no sharp boundary—the one fades into the other. The details of the area thus variously illuminated may be past counting, but never within it are all details that might be lighted, say by moving the lamp up or down or farther away from the wall. The picture suggests a restriction to the notion of environment. Always, if you will, a man's environment includes many particulars, each contributing an influence toward the effect of the whole; but never does it include all the particulars that might contribute an influence. Thus it is that only those things, events, perceptions, and ideas which are active *now*—during the period under consideration—to influence a man, belong to his environment. Nevertheless, though environment must be taken to

be, in the ultimate, active, we cannot escape the necessity of looking upon it also as both historic and potential; and we may use the word to denote influences not present. The teacher, for instance, may have in mind influences past and prospective when he speaks of 'the home and community environment' of his pupils.

In common speech we refer frequently to *the physical environment* of a man. Doing so we mean to include therein the air he breathes, the water he drinks, the soil upon which he walks, the food he eats, the clothes he wears, the buildings that give him shelter, the tools he uses, the machines he operates, the weapons he wields, and so on through ten thousand 'kinds of things' and 'particular things' innumerable. We include also in the physical environment 'the acts and properties' of things—their movements, the sounds they make, the odors they diffuse, the warmth or coolness of them, their weight—in short, all the phenomena of sense that 'belong' to them. The book upon my desk is a physical thing, the flutter of its leaves in the draft is a physical event; the one as well as the other belongs to my physical environment. Against such details of environment we are wont to set off others not material, and belonging to an *environment* called *spiritual*—or, sometimes, *mental*. These factors of influence are intangible. They cannot be seen or heard or touched or smelled or tasted or moved about; but they are objects of attention provocative of feeling and thinking and action. These are the perceptual meanings of things and events and ideas, which, if not 'the stuff of mind,' are, figuratively at least, stuff upon which mind acts. I can smell a flower or the odor of a flower, but I cannot smell a flower-smelled, or the idea of a flower. But I can and do respond to perception or idea. I row a boat but I cannot row the meaning of

that boat; yet I react to the meaning when I undertake to row the boat.

Like most distinctions, that between a physical environment and a spiritual environment is relative.* The relation between the two may be suggested, perhaps, by an analogy. Let black represent the physical properties, and white the spiritual properties. The area of environment for the life of a man then appears as a field of grey lying between margins of black and white, a field dark almost to blackness here, light almost to whiteness there.

Summary. Human life appears in particular always as an interchange between polar opposites, the one a man, the other that man's environment. The man affects his environment in some measure, great or small; the environment affects the man, and so, through every moment, the relation between them. What a man is or does can be described only by reference to his environment; what his environment is, only by reference to the man. A man may be defined as a subject-entity responsive in terms of behavior to the influence of all objects whatever, material or imma-

*The closest approach to a purely physical influence appears probably when the direct stimulus furnished by a material thing or event is mechanical, chemical, thermal, or electrical, and the immediate response thereto one of the reflex order. For example, the influence exerted by a rut into which one stumbles in the dark; that of a drink of bright but unexpectedly bitter water; that of a sudden deposit of snow inside one's collar; or that of a sparkplug in a revolving motor which, inadvertently, one touches with a damp finger. In cases of the sort, that to which the man responds commands no preliminary attention and has, in the moment at least, but the vaguest perceptual meaning—he does not 'know', as we say, what it is that stimulates his sudden response.

Near the other extreme may be placed the influence of a symbol—a physical object which stands, so to speak, for what it is not. Take, for instance, the written word 'dog.' It has no slightest resemblance to 'the thing for which it stands.' But the accustomed reader catches its meaning instantly, and reacts thereto in a manner quite distinguishable from a mere sensing of black marks against a white background. The psychical influence of the written word is altogether dominant over its physical influence.

terial, with which in life he has to deal. The environment of that man may be defined to comprehend every material thing and event directive of stimulus to his recipient senses, every perception which affects, as it were from the periphery inward, his behavior, and every idea that he 'holds before his mind' to affect in any way his feeling, his thinking, or his action. In the large and potentially, then, the scope of a man's environment corresponds to his capacities for sensing, perceiving, and otherwise behaving throughout the course of his life; in the small and actually, the scope is limited to those objects, physical and meaningful, which do *now*, at the moment, affect his behavior.

CHAPTER II

SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AND SOCIETIES

I

Men live largely by way of society. They live, that is to say, *together* in a sense at once physical and spiritual. They join their activities; so joined they form societies, associations, or unions in fellowship. When the sociologist looks at the forming and operation of a society, he sees there the activity of "a human plurel." * Looking at the same phenomenon, the psychologist sees it not as one, but as many, and gives his attention to the activities, severally, of A and B and the rest who join to form and work together as the society. In the first view behavior appears as collective; in the second view, as the social behavior of individual men. Collective behavior finds its source in the social behavior of individuals, which serves thereto much as springs serve to the forming and flow of a river. And, as there are springs which do not join to make a river, so sometimes a man behaves socially without by that behavior joining a society.

One who cooperates both in spirit and action with others exemplifies in his part the properties of social behavior. He is moved by a purpose comprehending some service to another, or others, than himself; he performs an act, or series of acts, which owes its form, in a measure, if not wholly, to his consideration of others. An otherward refer-

* Eubank, E. E.: *The Concepts of Sociology*. Heath. Boston, 1932.

ence is present throughout the course of his behavior—in its motive and in its direction.

Most of us are unwilling to deny that a brick is a brick simply because it happens not to be laid up with other bricks in a wall or a chimney. We are ready to allow, even, that properties of brick may still reside in a shard or broken piece not fit for a place in a structure of bricks. There is, then, no startling perversion of good sense in the assertions: (1) 'That a man's behavior may be, in a given instance, essentially social throughout, though by way of it he takes no part in any society; and (2) that a man's behavior may lack completeness in its other-serving reference, yet still retain a social quality. For example:

(1) Mrs. K., an early riser, spies in the dawn light towels left overnight to dry by Mrs. S. who has, during her absence, moved in next door. She notes that one has dropped from the line. She steps into her rubbers, marches across the strip of dewy lawn between the houses, and restores the fallen towel to the line. Then, 'feeling better,' she returns to her kitchen and 'her own work.' She has been moved by a purpose to gratify her own 'sense of tidiness,' perhaps, but, at the same time, 'to help the stranger next door.' She has acted in accord with that purpose, and has, in attaining her end, served her new neighbor. But in doing all this she has joined with no one either in intercourse or collective enterprise. Still, the behavior of Mrs. K. appears clearly social by the measure of an otherward reference in purpose and in action.

(2a) A strides along the crowded walk, keeping to the right and colliding with no one. By doing so he serves others as well as himself. But he does so mechanically and of habit, with no more of 'conscious consideration for the other fellow' than has, presumably, the milkman's faithful

horse, which, without a driver, never fails to give a share of the road to an approaching vehicle.

(2*b*) B reads in the newspaper an account of flood and disaster in a near-by town. He is moved to pity for the unfortunates; he is aware of their needs and of how he might help to meet them, say by driving over there with a load of food and clothing, or by sending a check to the Red Cross. But he *does* nothing. In terms of action he fails of social behavior. Yet as to feeling and understanding his reaction to the newspaper account has still a social quality.

The social behavior of individuals may be classed under two general heads. Under the head of *social conduct* may be placed all social behaviors of which action to the service of others is a part. Such doings may be *participative*, that is to say, of the sort whereof societies are builded; or they may be one-way affairs in which the actor serves, or moves to serve, others, without necessary return, direct or indirect, of service from them. Under the head of *social appreciation* may be entered such beginnings of social behavior as are not in all cases completed by acts of service. These are, on the one side, responses of feeling, 'emotional set,' attitude, such as we name love, kindness, sympathy, pity, generosity, tolerance, even submissiveness or condescension, and the like; on the other, those less aesthetic and more intellectual reactions of social insight and understanding, wherethrough a man sees, so to speak, the interests of others, and often, too, means and resources usable to service of those interests.

You and I know that in our lives social appreciation goes with social conduct more often than not, but we are aware also that social appreciation is sometimes evoked in us which finds no expression in social conduct. Since men can be effective to serve one another only by what they *do* with and for one another, and not by what they feel and think about

one another, the distinction between social conduct and social appreciation has a considerable import in human affairs.

NOTE. The conception of social behavior here suggested is rather a logical than an ethical conception. The ethical, however, prevails over the logical view in everyday classifications of human behavior. Most Americans, for instance, are committed to a vaguely humanitarian and quantitative ethics. They will declare almost unanimously that the conduct of a gunman who, earnestly cooperating with his fellow gangsters, shoots down a bank watchman, is 'anti-social'—meaning thereby, presumably, the exact opposite of social conduct. In gentler tones they will maintain the conduct is anti-social, too, of a father who leaps to death from a bridge that his sickly wife and undernourished children may benefit from his life insurance. But under the logical conception just set forth, both the acts described belong to the category of social conduct. The question dealt with here is what behavior is social, not what social behavior is good or bad.

II

A society, from the physical standpoint, appears as a collective mechanism formed and used by men to the service of certain ends. So regarded, a society exhibits an *organization* of members behaving as one, after the fashion more or less of a living organism. Every member is a *constituent* of the structure of the society, and a *participant* in its functioning.

Organization is the means by which men harness their individual activities together. It distinguishes a society from a mere aggregation of men; joins a plurality of doings into a whole of collective behavior. Organization, however loose or rigid, is a property of every society, whether ephemeral or persistent. The elements of it appear, for instance, even in the casual conversation of two strangers. Each

must take and hold, however briefly, a position to hear and to be heard by the other. The first speaks, the second listens; the second speaks, the first listens. What the second says fits, in a measure at least, with what the first has said. The result is a *conversation*, a joint activity, and not two monologues staggered by chance the one against the other. Such a conversation, most likely, follows not at all the pattern of a forensic debate; but the beginnings of orderly participation are there. In contrast, clearly defined structure and systematic advance in function are patent in the case of two men at a game of cribbage, of a football team at play, of a concern manufacturing shoes, or of a state at war.

The simpler forms of organization by way of which men work together are probably those in which every member of a society stands in like relation to the next, and makes the same sort of contribution to the collective undertaking. A crew rowing a boat, a gang digging a ditch, 'the cheering section' at a football game, these fairly exemplify societies of the kind. In them men work together like teams of mules. Conversely, organization tends to become complex much in proportion as the members of society play their parts differently. A baseball team, an orchestra, a college staff, a publishing house, these are societies relatively complex in organization. They are characterized by 'division of labor,' or distributive specialization among their members.

Organization appears as a mode of union, but lacks, as such, the quality of fellowship which distinguishes a society of men from a structural and functional union of parts in a machine, such as a watch or a motor car. Some principle of psychical linkage must enter to make of an organization of men a society. 'Community of purpose,' perhaps, or a statement of similar tenor, most aptly suggests this principle. In its functioning a human society moves, so to speak, from

certain needs, wants, or desires of men toward their fulfillment. These it may meet either in the process or in the outcome or in both. The members of a baseball team, for example, may play 'for the fun of playing'; they may 'play to win,' and find the game worth while only if they do win; or, as is more often the case, they may play because they like to play and wish to win. The game, as a game, meets their desires in part; having an outcome in victory it fills their desires more completely. In any event, whether in work or play, the requirements of men, toward the fulfillment of which a collective process moves, represent, as they are met, the *ends* of the society which acts.

The ends of a society, looked at in prospect, are often called the *purposes* of the society. Sometimes, taken together—as made one by the joint function which serves them—they are called the end or purpose of the society. The usage is both familiar and legitimate enough. But such usage may assign 'purpose' to a regiment and to every soldier in it quite as it assigns 'purpose' to a machine gun and its several parts. It overlooks the subjective character proper to human purpose. A stricter usage, pointing to that character, suggests that men, not their machines, have purposes. Men look forward to ends, desire, and seek them; machines do not. In this sense a society, like any other man-made machine, serves purposes of men and finds therein its psychological sanction.

Men unite their purposes by way of acts to which those purposes lend motive and direction. Joint action appears as one property of a society and joint purpose as another. A society thus becomes a mechanism imbued with intelligence as no externally operated machine can be. The members supply the parts of collective purpose in the same way as they supply the parts of collective function. By the same

token they share in that purpose in a manner similar to the manner in which they share in that function. With such supplying and sharing goes the uniting that gives meaning to the phrase 'community of purpose.'

Community of purpose, then, does not require 'identical purposes' among men.* Just as the participant acts proper to a joint function may differ, so may the individual purposes of those acts differ. For union it is necessary only that individual purposes shall harmonize so far, at least, that an advance toward fulfillment of one shall not spell complete defeat for another. In a society of men every member's purpose or purposes must seek fulfillment of some need, want, or desire not peculiarly his own.

The principle of cooperation lies at the core of a human society. The chief difficulty with the conception would seem at first sight to be that it forbids, in the name of fellowship, competition among men. But the conclusion receives rather an apparent than a logical support from the premise. Some sorts of competition are surely proper to union; others, whatever their worth and justification, are not. Competition implies more or less conflict in purposes and acts. But something of conflict inheres in many collective undertakings. To illustrate: In a baseball game the members of each team cooperate in effort to defeat the other. But the two teams work together, nevertheless, and in a fashion to exemplify both intercontributory actions and harmony of purposes. In the undertaking called a ball game the two teams unite as one society to play the game. Even in a set of singles

* Men may, and do, hold purposes closely similar, but an exact coincidence in detail of purposes, if such be possible, is often rather more likely to defeat joint action than to promote it. Suppose that ten thousand men hold each firmly to the high resolve to leave a stadium at the same moment through the same narrow gate. The consequence, certainly, will be an aggregation of men, but one having no more the character of a union in fellowship than has a pack of starved dogs fighting for a bone.

at tennis the two opponents play *with* one another by playing against one another.

In other societies internal competition between those who participate in similar fashion is often useful, though not indispensable, for increasing the effectiveness of the collective mechanism. The salesmen of a firm, for instance, acting as eager rivals in the attempt to secure the most numerous and the largest 'orders,' thereby increase the effectiveness of their organization as a machine for 'bringing in business.' In a society of societies, such as 'the Ford companies and affiliates,' one concern may compete with another making 'the same parts'—say wheels or batteries—to the advantage of the whole which produces motor cars. Competition between individuals and between groups is a familiar feature of economic societies.

Competition 'works well' in many societies, especially, perhaps, among those which serve recreational and material ends. But it is likely to prove detrimental to collective efficiency much in proportion as the resources of a society are limited with respect to the accomplishment of its ends. To use an illustration somewhat 'out of date': Suppose two village fire companies, each operating a 'hand-tub,' are called to fight a fire. They respond promptly and enthusiastically. They take their places at opposite corners of the burning building and go to work together to extinguish the fire. But the traditional rivalry prevails; each company sets out to prove that it can outpump the other. The result is a magnificent fire-fighting machine—so long as the water holds out. But the water supply is limited; there is enough to put out the fire, if it were properly distributed, but not enough to flood the building. One set of strong and ardent pumpers drowns its sector with twice the water needed; in consequence their weaker rivals lack enough to quell the fire over

there. Hoses suck dry, and the fire still burns. Competition unrestrained has prevented the cooperating companies from accomplishing a task which they were quite capable of accomplishing with the resources at hand. In this is suggested a chief reason why Mr. Ford assigns a definite 'territory' to every 'Ford dealer'; why governments so often are called upon to 'regulate competition' for the sake of cooperative successes. A collective function so energized, or 'speeded up,' by competition that it fails to fulfill its major ends is surely not efficient, though⁶ every member work at the top of his bent.

Competition, whether of individuals or of societies, grades from union in rivalry of players at tennis or baseball to 'joined battle' between men, armies, or states, wherein conflict so dominates that the last tenuous threads of human fellowship tend to break. 'It takes two to make a fight,' of course; but when one man, or one society, acts to defeat the characteristic purpose and destroy the characteristic function of another, it is no less than mockery to assert that one works in society with the other. When a man gouges out the eye of his opponent and himself loses a finger in the struggle, the fight is no demonstration of fellowship between the two; when one army disperses in rout the soldiers of another, the battle foregoing, however 'fiercely joined,' is not a joint undertaking of the two; when each of two firms works to put the other 'out of business,' the relation of the two is wholly non-cooperative, and they do not join together to make one society.

There are degrees in society. In some societies fellowship is more complete than in others; on the one side, in terms of organized efficiency, on the other, in harmony of purposes. When 'Detroit meets Saint Louis in the World's Series,' one may safely assume that closer fellowship pre-

vails within the teams as such than in the joint society of teams which 'plays the series.' Union in action and union in purpose are not always, however, strictly commensurate. A gang of sternly disciplined prisoners at work on a 'construction job' may exhibit notable unity, by the measure of collective efficiency, but the harmony is almost certainly a harmony projected upon them. They supply the collective purpose vicariously, as it were, and share therein by virtue of its parcelling out in 'orders from above.' In contrast, a 'prayer meeting' may find its sanction in an extraordinary unity of purposes among its members, yet exhibit but the loosest sort of organization. From the extreme of 'perfect organization' sanctioned by 'perfect harmony' of purposes, the associative groupings of men range downward to the vanishing point of the cooperative principle, whereat society ceases, and the bonds which make them a group are no longer those that make them a society.

A society, as a self-operating mechanism, must aim, obviously, toward some fulfillment of purposes proper to its members; but it may, nevertheless, serve needs other than those of its members. By the scale of aims societies range from those which serve needs predominantly external to those which serve needs exclusively internal. In terms of purpose the first point to service, primarily, of 'non-members or outsiders'; the second to service wholly of members.

Conspicuous among societies near the first extreme are agencies of government, such as an army, a police force, a tax bureau, and many industrial concerns of the present day. An army may serve, as so often an army has served, to forward the ambitions of a despot, or it may serve genuinely for the protection of a people. But it is not established and maintained for the sake of the soldiers who compose it. The success of a manufacturing concern is meas-

ured rather by its production of utilities than by what it does for the good of employees. Such societies may be called agential to ends external to themselves.

A prudent mechanic keeps his tools cleaned, sharpened, oiled, under cover, not for the good of the tools themselves, but in order that they may be ready for his uses. At the same time he is not unwilling to bend or break this tool or that, if occasion demands. The welfare of tools and machines is not the final standard that determines his care of them. Similarly, an army must be kept 'in good shape,' soldiers sufficiently fed, clothed, armed, trained, so that they can fight effectively; but, for all that, they are properly to be used as 'cannon fodder' if need be. A soldier is a good soldier precisely as he fits the requirements of the army; but the army is not a good army exactly in the measure that it provides for the welfare of men called soldiers. The worth of an agential society is to be measured by 'what it gets done' instead of by the effect of the doing upon its members.

At the other extreme stand societies of the self-serving kind, organized with reference to the interests of members and either indifferent to 'outside interests,' or but incidentally regardful of them. Societies of the sort are exemplified variously in students' fraternities, country clubs, literary societies, and other collective undertakings toward ends in leisure enjoyments. Societies of like stamp are to be found, too, even in the economic field; for example, in certain manufacturers' associations, farmers' cooperatives, and their kind. The success of such societies is measured commonly by what they 'do for their members,' not by any good they do outsiders. But they are rarely without effects harmful or advantageous to non-members. Some are predatory, such as gangs of thieves, and others of less unsavory designation; some are 'defensive,' as is, in general, a labor union; others confer

benefit or injury quite incidentally upon those who have no part in them. A convention of philatelists is welcome in most cities, because it is assumed to 'bring in business' to the merchants there; a golf club may shut 'the public' off from a beach, prevent the extension of a needed highway, or even in times of scarcity 'keep the best land of the community out of productive use.'

There are societies in which external ends and internal ends appear the one no less important than the other. Orchestras, institutes of research, dramatic clubs, and theatrical companies offer examples here and there. They serve the needs of non-members and of members equally, as it were. Some colleges are dedicated to service of students and staff and public, and prove in like measure effective in all those directions. Commercial and industrial concerns are said to exist which exploit neither members, nor investors, nor consumers of their goods. Such societies, stand, so to speak, midway between the political, military, or economic machine, of which the members are but useful parts, and the 'exclusive club,' for which the member and his satisfaction furnish every end.

NOTE. Most powerful among the 'cohesive aggregates' of men, and, in general, most widely pervasive in their effects, are those known as states. When students of political science speak of the functions of the state they refer, as a rule, quite clearly to the doings of a society. When they define a state they are not always so clear. Not uncommonly they appear to have in mind something over and above a society. By common consent, however, they grant to a state its foundation, at least, in a community. Where men are 'gathered together in one habitation' in mingled groups and societies, which make use in one degree or another of the same resources, the aggregate is called a *community*. When this 'community of persons living within certain limits of territory' is made cohesive 'under a permanent organization' it becomes a state—a civil and self-governing

community.' This organization aiming at the ends implied in 'justice by self-imposed law' is plainly no more and no less than a society—a governing society regulative of some, if not of all, human relations and social affairs within the community. But it appears with almost equal clearness that 'the body politic' *under* this organization is by no necessity all one with the governing society. The most casual survey of existent states shows that it is seldom or never so. Membership in the governing society is restricted to certain individuals belonging to the community—a minority, as a rule, a majority sometimes—and is not a prerogative of all. Membership is most widely confined to adults. It is limited most often to male adults; in many cases to property-holding adults; sometimes to adults of a given race; and so on. The community, on the other hand, includes men, women, and children, and frequently those of more than one race. What the state does is what the governing society does; what the people of the community variously do is another matter. Yet some define the community as 'political body or state,' and call all who belong to it citizens of the state.

Thus it comes about that one man may be a citizen in the sense that he 'owes allegiance to the state,' and at the same time is a member of the governing society, a participant, actual or potential, in its functions, say as voter or elector, as juryman, legislator, judge, governor, policeman or other administrative officer or subordinate executant. On the other side, a man may be a citizen who owes, to be sure, allegiance to the state, but has no part in the framing, the sanction, the enforcement, or the interpretation of any law or ordinance proper to that 'system of law and order' with which he is held to conform. The state as a society is one thing; an organization of individuals belonging to the community. The community as a 'body politic' is something else; not a society, but an aggregate of individuals and societies subject to an order of living determined by a governing society within it. The duties of certain citizens, then, include both those of obedience to the state, and of membership in it. The 'civic obligations' of others are only those required by a proper subjection to the control of a society in which they have no part.

A state, conceived as a functioning whole, seems thus most clearly to be a society within a community active to the government of that community. The work of the state is to perform certain services to 'the community at large,' and to hold in an order proper to the

'good of the whole' the doings of individuals and the undertakings of other societies within the community. The ends which so it acts to serve, directly or indirectly, may be summed up under such heads as "the public interest" (*res publicae*) or the "common weal." *

So far the notion of the state presents no great difficulty. But when one passes from connotation to denotation he enters a realm of confusion. What activities within 'the body politic' belong to the province of the functioning state? The question is answered variously in practice; hardly less variously in the theories of 'political scientists.' The state in practice takes to its province whatever and as much as the directing purposers choose to take and the strength of the organization permits them to take. In theory service to the common weal extends—at one extreme of view—not beyond 'protection and defense' of the individual, a phrase interpreted by some to mean no more than the provision of a reasonable security of life and property; at the other extreme, no need can be looked upon as a matter of concern peculiar to any individual, to any class, or to any society of the community other than the state itself. Every act and undertaking within the community must be taken to bear in one degree or another on the welfare of the whole. Thus it enters the field of 'the public interest' and becomes a concern of the state. Nothing is private to a man but his thoughts and his feelings and his dreams. The state, if it could, has full right to control even those for his good as an organ of a body politic, 'one and indivisible' physically and psychically, like a living and conscious organism. Near the first extreme stand the 'libertarian' conceptions of such men as Thomas Jefferson, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith—statesmen, philosophers, and economists in the Anglo-Saxon tradition; and those conceptions still command a wide, if vague, respect in parts of the western world. Various close to the other extreme lie the conceptions of the 'totalitarians' used now, familiarly, to give rational sanction to the more than Spartan comprehensiveness of political authority for states spawned in Europe by 'the Great War' and the treaty of Versailles. *

The history of states, we are told, is a history of conflict; not of harmonious purposing and cooperation for the common weal. Class strives with class, organized group with organized group, man with man, for advantage, and state again with state. Then, under pres-

*Hobbes, T.: *Leviathan*. 1651.

sure of necessity men devise expedients for the easing of stresses. These expedients appear in laws and institutions; and laws and institutions represent in their growth no more than a succession of compromises. But the tale itself confirms the notion of purposeful organization toward the welfare of the whole. Every devising implies purpose, else it is not a devising; every compromise is a move toward cooperation. Go the whole way, if you will, with 'the economic determinists,' and still the state shows, however faintly, a pattern of intelligence. The interadjustments within the body politic are not, like the cracks and heapings, the grindings and slippings, of an icepack driven by the tide against the wind, mere resultants of blind forces. They are purposeful, and, in the long run, probably useful. They bring men together in action. They are adjustments of synthesis; and they make a pattern of organization, not a picture of circumstances.

Summary. (I) Collective behavior is a product of the *social behavior* of individuals, much as a word is the product of the letters that compose it—a whole that is more than the sum of its parts. As a letter disjoined from others may still have meaning, so may the behavior of an individual be social, though unjoined with that of another.

A man's behavior is social in the degree that it is governed by 'consideration' of others. One who deals with others as human beings like himself, and not as instruments only—or obstacles—to his own ends, behaves socially. In full pattern social behavior carries a motive and an action to supply in some way needs, wants, or desires not peculiar to the actor himself. Yet behavior may still retain, as it were, a social quality, which lacks the other-serving reference in motive or in action, but lacks it not altogether.

On the side of action and effect, social behavior appears as *social conduct*; on the side of motive, feeling, understanding, it appears as *social appreciation*. But social conduct and social appreciation are not always strictly commensurate. A man may act effectively to serve others, albeit with little

of desire to serve them, little of sympathy for them or tolerance toward them, little of understanding of their needs or of the implications of his act. He may, on the contrary, be sympathetic, tolerant, 'well disposed,' having clear insight as to needs, opportunities, implications, yet do little or nothing of a helpful sort.

(II) Society among men is a process whereby they join and are active together in fellowship. Those collective wholes, produced by society, through which men carry on so largely the business of living, are called *societies*.

A human society, as distinguished from a mere aggregate of men, is characterized, in the physical view, by *organization*, loose or rigid, simple or complex, passing or persistent. Organization appears in a structural pattern proper to intercourse or collective enterprise; by way of it the participant activities of individuals are ordered to complement one another, and made intercontributory to a joint function. Psychically a society is characterized by some measure of harmony in effective purposes among its members. The psychical product of this harmony may be called *community of purpose*.

All societies must serve to meet some needs, at least, of their members. Societies, however, differ greatly in the direction of their serviceability. Many operate primarily to serve outsiders rather than members, and so reduce the member toward the status of a mere 'cog or pinion' in the social machinery. Others operate characteristically to serve their members, carrying on with little or no regard to the needs of outsiders. Between extremes of the sort a great number of human societies work to serve both members and outsiders, indifferent to neither, and with little or no exploiting of the one at the expense of the other.

CHAPTER III

A BIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO VALUES: UTILITY

I

Biologists today are not so ready to look upon man as 'Nature's last word' as were the 'naturalists' of a hundred years ago. But they still regard man as 'the highest form of life,' because he is of all living things the most versatile in behavior. With the worth of man, however, they profess to have no concern. Science, they say, may place Il Duce above the flea which bites him, on the scale of evolution, but it does not assert that Il Duce is of more worth than the flea. Yet, for all their professed unconcern with ethics, biologists, like the rest of us, sometimes pass judgment on what they deal with in terms of the better and the worse. Their standards for judgment of worth in living things are standards of *success*. The first standard is success for the organismal type. Comparing genus with genus, species with species, race with race, or breed with breed, they judge that one the better which more widely and persistently maintains itself through the vicissitudes of time and circumstance. By that measure the fox has proved itself a better type of organism than the mastodon; by that measure the Norway rat appears a better rat than the black rat; and the white man seems well on the way to proving himself a better man than the red man.

From this standpoint the individual man is to be regarded as a merely passing and particular exhibit of the general

form which is, or makes, the species, race, or breed. This individual is a vehicle of the germ plasm wherein the potentials of his kind inhere, to become actualized over and over and over again in the particular and mortal specimens called men. He is an instrument to the success of the species, race, or breed of which he is a specimen. Though the biologist assures us that 'Nature cares nothing for the individual,' yet he makes it plain that 'Nature' charges men with the destiny of man. That the individual man is vehicle and instrument to the perpetuation and spread of his kind on earth may be taken, then, for the first premise of an argument pointing to a biological scale of worth in men, and in the kinds and details of environment with which, as living things, they deal.

A second premise derives from scientific examination of 'man, the behaving organism,' as such, and without regard to his vehicular and instrumental functions. So examined the man animal appears as a self-serving mechanism which does this under these circumstances and that under those. He becomes known for what he really is in the degree that the scientist becomes able to 'predict his responses' under given conditions.

Here again the biologist uses success for the measuring of values. Some behaviors he takes to be of more worth than others, because, as he says, 'they serve the organism better.' He takes it for truth that every behaving has as its end the establishment or recovery of a balance between the forces of influence and reaction—a state of affairs called variously 'equilibrium,'* 'complacency,' or 'satisfaction.' Accordingly

* By taking 'equilibrium' to mean success in adjustment, the scientist does not commit himself to a measure of worth by consciousness. A successful or satisfying reaction on my part, for instance, need not be one wherein, or in consequence of which, I am aware of pleasure or increase in comfort or relief from pain. The satisfaction of equilibrium is, rather, 'a state of affairs' which

he treats all behaviors as attempts at 'adjustment.' Some are more successful than others; and the more successful behaviors are better behaviors than the less successful.

A third premise* in success is suggested by the familiar statement that 'self-preservation is the first law of life.' The end of behavior for the man organism, as for any other, is to keep on living. By that measure those behaviors which serve or favor the continuance of his existence hold high rank on a scale of values for the activities of life.

Although scientists are more doubtful than were their predecessors that 'the law of self-preservation' does in the individual man naturally prevail over 'the law of adjustment' to the requirements of equilibrium, yet the former law probably takes precedence over the latter as a ground for determining relative values among the doings of men. To preserve his species, race, or breed, and to forward its

an organism like an amoeba, no less than an organism like man conscious in and of much of his behavior, seeks, 'by the law of its nature' to maintain—much as, in the old saying, 'water seeks its own level.' Feeling, of course, is one side of much behaving, and a satisfied feeling belongs with most successes, just as its opposite, a dissatisfied feeling, belongs with most failures. But the feeling is no more essential to the behavior of the man than is a green color to the behavior of the water. In effect, nevertheless, the scientist by his commitment to a need for equilibrium as the motive, and an accomplished equilibrium as the proper end of all behaving, makes the man animal a hedonist. What is good for a man is that which gives him pleasure, comfort, freedom from pain or annoyance. He acts to promote his own well-being in that sense; and, achieving it, shows himself to be a good organism in so far forth. The 'findings' of modern science lend support to the first assumption of the utilitarian philosophers and the classical economists; e.g., Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith, William Graham Sumner.

*Direct conclusion from this premise has been made familiar to students of education in the famous essay of Herbert Spencer, "What Knowledge Is of Most Worth?" In that essay Spencer undertook "to classify, in the order of their importance, the leading kinds of activity which constitute human life." Among them he placed first "those activities which directly minister to self-preservation," and second, those "which, by securing the necessities of life, indirectly minister to self-preservation." Below these two he placed all other kinds of human behavior.

success on earth, the individual man must, in general, obviously, remain alive for some years at least, even though to do so means to forego a multitude of immediate satisfactions. At the base, then, of an argument toward a scale of values in the life of the man animal, the three premises may be placed in the following order:

1. The individual man is a vehicle for perpetuating and an instrument to success for the man-type which he represents.
2. The individual man is an organism properly active to the preservation of his own existence.
3. The individual man is an organism active to ends in equilibrium with his environment.

The three premises point to three general categories of human activity, and the order of the premises to an order of values among them.

1. At the top of the scale may be placed those activities which contribute to the perpetuation and spread of species, race, or breed. Most manifestly significant among these are:
 - a. Activities of procreation.
 - b. "Those activities which have for their end the rearing and discipline of offspring." *
2. At the second level of worth may be placed those activities which serve toward the end of survival for men as individuals. These again fall roughly into two groups:
 - a. Those activities which serve to protect men from injury, disease, and death.

* Spencer, H.: "What Knowledge Is of Most Worth?"

- b. Those activities which provide men with the resources of subsistence.
3. Third in order of biological worth appear those activities which find fulfillment in the satisfaction of individual men.

(1) From the first premise one moves easily to a conclusion that the highest duty of man is to perform properly the functions of parenthood. The biblical injunction, "Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth," seems to state the first commandment in 'the law of Nature.' But the conclusion needs qualification and amplification. The success of a biological type depends not upon numbers only, but also upon the fitness of individuals to survive and play in turn their part in reproduction. When germinal variants appear which clearly endanger the persistence and spread on earth of species, race, or breed, then, in the interests of the highest biological success those who carry the seeds of such defects should produce no offspring. Men and women whose children are destined by heredity to imbecility, to blindness, to long disabling disease or early death, and the like, these men and women must not mate. Only the fit should propagate.

Neither the fit man nor the fit woman, however, fulfills the entire obligation by mating properly; duty in respect of procreation extends further. Each must play a part, if need be, to make possible the procreative function among other fit men and women; to help, for instance, in the removal of obstacles to the fruitful marriage of others whose seed is sound. And, if so happen, men and women survive who carry in germ defects not early manifest, they too, though unfit to mate, have a like duty to promote the propagation of the fit.

As to nurture for offspring, the obligations of parents are not exhausted in caring for their own children. They have responsibilities direct and indirect toward the children of others, so far, at least, as those children are the fit children of fit parents. No man can, as a good servant of his kind, stand idly by to see the child of friend or stranger killed, maimed, exposed to disease, or starved, while he has power to save, protect, or feed that child. Indirectly, too, his obligations hold in such matters. If the parents of a child, either or both, shall die, become incapacitated, or otherwise lack resource to provide a proper nurture for the child, then others, parents or not, must take over the parental functions, or act to supplement the deficiencies of resource to a point at which the essentials of protection and subsistence shall be provided for that child.

Thus derives from the first biological premise an imperative to social behavior. But there comes from it a sterner conclusion also. If, to the misfortune of species, race, or breed, there be born children clearly unfit to play their part in service to their kind—idiots, cripples, and the like—then no man can be held responsible to protect them and maintain them. They have, by the primary measure of biological success, no worth at all.

NOTE. Practical recognition of ethical imperatives to behavior of a sort useful to success of the type appears variously but persistently in the religions, laws, and customs of men. The symbols of sex have been from time immemorial conspicuous and influential religious symbols among primitive peoples; the religious rites and ceremonials of savages centre largely about the procreative theme. Tribal law or custom makes early marriage virtually compulsory. To be fruitful is to be honored among men; to be sterile or barren is to earn the penalty of contempt, if not of punishment more severe. Solicitude for children is a virtue; the orphan is adopted and cherished, either by his immediate relatives, or by the tribe. Infants physically unfit are exposed to die, or put to death outright. And so on.

Among civilized peoples sex symbolism in religion is less conspicuous; but marriage is sanctified and fruitfulness approved. Religion lays, in general, less emphasis upon parental obligations than upon filial piety; but law steps in to sanction and enforce those obligations. In some 'advanced and progressive states of the West' law imposes penalties upon the bachelor and the spinster, and grants, in contrast, exemptions, bonuses, and pensions to the highly prolific. Law provides, too, that 'the mentally defective' shall not breed; it segregates the imbecile and the feeble-minded from the rest of the population—though not yet anywhere does it sanction the lethal chamber for those unfit to propagate and serve their kind. In any part of the world a man sexually impotent 'wears the badge of shame—he lacks that which, as a modern novelist puts it, 'makes a man a man.' The barren woman is an object of pity at best; even in 'generous America' the 'old maid' is a subject of variously harsh, but popular jokes. On the other hand, a mother of ten is a laudable woman, and the father of twenty or more earns both publicity for his feat and wide approval. Kings, dictators, presidents urge upon the people the duty of large families, and reward those who fulfill this quantitative obligation most notably with gifts, decorations, and praise. Orphans, again, are adopted by the kindly or taken in charge by the state. Laws and ordinances provide special protective measures for children at the public expense—school physicians and nurses, special policemen at 'school crossings,' and so forth. It is, in the common view, a greater sin to run down a child than to kill or maim in like accidental fashion an old man or a blind one. But enough of examples; there is no lack of them for one who will pause to look about him.

NOTE. Since race belongs to species, and breed, the narrower kinship group, to race, it may be argued that one who acts to maintain the type and increase the numbers of 'the brotherhood in blood' to which he belongs, does by that very fact promote the success of his race, and through that success the highest success of *Homo sapiens* on earth. But the logic is a bit shaky which leads to this conclusion. Races are but variants of the species, breeds of the race. Among these variants some, no doubt, are more fit to inherit the earth than others; some races within the species will, in the long run, come to predominate over others, some will vanish from the earth; within a

race, white, black, or yellow, some breeds will come to the fore, and others will disappear. But 'Nature's law' gives few clues in any age as to which race, and which breed or nation of that race, is most fit to represent mankind in 'the long struggle for existence.' One, therefore, who acts to promote the success of the white man as against the yellow, or of the Latin as against the Anglo-Saxon, may serve best thereby the biological advance of mankind, or he may hinder it; no one knows for certain which. Yet men are widely confirmed in the belief that tribal (or national) obligation stands superior to racial obligation, and that racial obligation ranks above obligation to the man-species at large. And the evolutionary pattern gives a cloudy sanction to that belief. It seems no less 'natural' that tribe shall compete with tribe for a place in the sun, and race with race, than that the species man must act to maintain itself superior to the wolf. All of which is to say that the prevalent ethics of nationalism finds some support as a corollary to the biological theorem. By the criterion of success for mankind it appears right that men and women of 'a chosen people' should mate with their kind and not with others, should protect and forward the increase of those in whose veins flows the pure blood of the tribe rather than the blood of an alien tribe, or an alien race.

(2) From the biologist's standpoint a man succeeds in life in the very measure that he moves toward 'equilibrium' in this or that respect, albeit momentarily. If time and duration be taken into account, obviously a man's life cannot be fulfilled, then, by any present adjustment, but only in a continuing succession of proximate adjustments to conditions that change within him and without; within him as accompaniments and consequences of his behavior and without by way of causes known or unknown, in the operation of which he plays but a secondary part, or none. He is a changing thing in a changing world, and therefore no successful behavior can be for him final and complete adjustment. His life is, of necessity, a continual reconstruction in the patterns of relation between him and his environment.

All this the scientist is at pains to point out. He looks upon a man not as a timeless reality, but as a temporal phenomenon, and finds duration an essential attribute to life. He finds that 'under the laws of Nature' every living thing must die; but not that the ends of life are fulfilled in death.* Quite the contrary. The ends of life are fulfilled in living, and living means persistence in behaving as a man. For that reason one who acts to preserve his life, and not to destroy it, acts in accord with the law of his nature, and, in so far forth, rightly. Thus those 'activities which, as Spencer put it, "directly" or "indirectly minister to self-preservation," find their sanction in the nature of the individual man.

But, as has been noted, self-preservation has another and a higher biological sanction. For the germinally fit, at least, and for those who can be useful otherwise than in procreation to forward the success of species, race, or breed, self-preservation becomes a duty not imposed by self. To act, within limits, to protect his own life, and to gather and use 'the necessities' for his own subsistence, these are prime obligations upon the individual man. By meeting them he makes possible his further service to his kind.

It seems clear, too, that the principle of self-preservation

* To die is, of course, to achieve an equilibrium of sorts—indeed, one so perfect that no possibility of further 'maladjustment' remains. The accomplished equilibrium of death, however, represents for the organism no final and complete success. It is 'a static equilibrium' which, as achieved, brings to cessation that interplay of the forces of influence and reaction peculiar to life; brings what was a man into a relation with the world like that of rock to its bed. Any equilibrium of life is, in contrast, 'a dynamic equilibrium,' more like the relation of the sodium and the chlorine ions in a salt solution than like the relation of the rock to the earth upon which it rests. Grant, as the physicists hold, that no matter is inert; that all matter is not a scene only, but a very form and manifestation of energy; and still the dead thing does not live. Look upon life as purely a physical phenomenon, and still no man can say just where the line shall be drawn between the thing which lives and the thing which does not live. And yet, for all that, to assert that the equilibrium of death is static, and that the equilibria of life are, in contrast, 'dynamic,' is not to speak in meaningless terms.

extends to include more than this man and that, each acting in a fashion to keep himself alive. It is evident that merely to keep himself alive a man must act, in the main, to keep other men alive also. If his kind is to continue, it is clearly imperative that he act in a manner not to prevent, but to make possible, the concurrent existence of other men on earth besides himself. Even the most rigid 'individualists' in philosophy and economics subscribe to the doctrine 'live and let live.' Extremists among them, to be sure, go so far as to declare that a man has in his relations with others no rights except such as he can make and maintain for himself, and no duties except those that other men can impose upon him.* But they, like all the rest, grant promptly enough that collective action for security and subsistence is at once the natural outcome of 'enlightened self-interest' and a proved necessary means to the success of mankind in the evolutionary struggle. Because it is natural and necessary it is right. But men cannot band together in any undertaking, be it fighting off wolves or drawing a seine, without some assumption of mutual responsibilities, of rights and duties in their relations with one another. The sternest and most coldly logical advocate of *laissez faire* never fails to allow that men must unite in undertakings for mutual defense, mutual security, mutual subsistence; in short, unite in certain matters of self-preservation. The doctrine 'live and let live' may limit the responsibilities of men toward one another, but it makes a man's obligations to himself necessarily include some duties toward others.

NOTE. Rules, beliefs, and practices variously in accord with an inclusive conception of self-preservation are widespread. The man who slays or maims one of his family, tribe, or nation is almost everywhere a sinner, and hardly less often, a criminal too. Suicide and

* Summer, W. G.: *Folkways*. Ginn. Boston, 1906.

self-maiming are sins less widely recognized. In countries of the Orient still, with the early Romans, for instance, and among primitive peoples rather widely, both may be, on occasion, praiseworthy acts. But in certain countries of the West such acts are looked upon as violations both of the moral and the civil law. To leave an alien prey to beasts, to freeze, to starve, may be no sin in the eyes of savages; but the obligation to save the life of a human being endangered by fire, flood, storm, earthquake, or even, in these days, disease is one which every man of the western world is expected to meet if he can; and, in spectacular cases of affliction, at least, we are wont to join numerously to relieve it. Again, though 'we moderns' have never been surpassed in wholesale killing, maiming, and destruction of resources for subsistence, yet even in the fury of 'civilized warfare' we accept without question the duty to treat the wounds of prisoners and to feed, clothe, and shelter unmaimed captives as well. Men, by and large, accord to the life of a man, as against the life of any creature not human, the higher value, and act to preserve it, even at the cost of many lesser lives. As between tribe and race, or race and species, on the other hand, their laws and customs all over the world express a sense of prior obligation to the first of the two.

Preferential preservation appears, again, within the tribe and the race, at all levels of culture. 'Women and children first' in the crisis of shipwreck is a rule widely recognized and observed on all the seven seas. 'Unwritten law' requires of the midwife and the obstetric physician that they save the life of the child, even at the cost of the mother's. When starvation threatens, the man must give way to the woman, the woman to the child, the aged to the young. One who acts to save his own life at the expense of lives believed by the many to be of greater value rarely finds for his act the sanction of approval.

Since the human infant is born and remains for some years incapable of surviving in sole dependence on his own resources, it is clearly impossible to grant a higher worth to procreation than to the nurture of children. Man, unlike the herring, cannot serve his kind in full by spawning abundantly. He must act to rear his offspring to a self-sustaining maturity. Otherwise the procreative function is quite useless

to success of the species, race, or breed. By the same token—and despite the authority of Herbert Spencer—it is not possible to rate the activities of protecting oneself and one's kind from injury, disease, and death above those which provide 'the necessities' for subsistence. One who flings himself and his child from the path of an avalanche does not meet the requirements of self-preservation at a higher level than one who makes bread for his child and himself. We may, for convenience, divide the obligations to self-preservation into the categories of "direct" and "indirect," but we do not thereby place the one above the other on the biological scale of values.

(3) With the individual man, as the biologist sees him, all behavior finds its end and justification in his own satisfaction. His behavior, nevertheless, is preferential; not only does he prefer success to failure, but his satisfaction in some achievements is greater than in others. According to these preferences he may behave, then, in a manner favorable to the biological success of his kind, or in a manner inimical to it, or in a manner quite irrelevant to that success. The same may be said of his behavior in its bearing upon self-preservation.

Men, with rarely possible exceptions, have certain 'original tendencies' toward behavior appropriate to the higher level of biological success—success for the species, race, or breed. Notable among these are the co-called sex and maternal 'instincts.' To gratify either of these men in general are ready to forego many lesser satisfactions. A man in pursuit of amatory adventure makes little of the discomforts of loss of sleep, of fatigue, of chill waiting, even of the derision of his fellows, and holds, despite them, to the path of his pursuit. A mother will undergo for the love of her child—that is to say, for the sake of her satisfaction in possessing and

cherishing that child—pain, terror, abuse, disdain, and countless minor annoyances.

Men have, beyond these, deeply stamped hereditary dispositions toward acts favorable to self-preservation; dispositions to dodge, flee, hide, and the like, in the face of situations which carry for them the threat of real or imagined danger; dispositions to hunger and thirst which move them to seek, possess, and consume food and drink essential to subsistence. In face of a perceived threat of death or painful injury a man will often go for a long time without sleep or food, will hide in the cold and dark, albeit he finds little resembling a feeling of satisfaction in weary wakefulness, in the pangs of hunger, in shivering with the cold, or in the lonely darkness.

Against 'natural preferences' of the sort may be set others not of advantage to the preservation of himself and his kind. In the normal course of events a man prefers immediate to deferred successes; he inclines to "take the cash and let the credit go." When preference of the sort controls his acts he is likely, of course, to suffer in the long run. Feasting today may mean starving tomorrow; to scratch his itching skin may mean to suffer worse itching shortly, or even infection manifest tomorrow, and death within the month. The 'urge of sex,' under this principle of preference for the immediate over the deferred satisfaction, points to incontinence and all its multitudinous effects in weakness, suffering, disease, both among the living and the misbegotten offspring of licentious union. But the point may not be labored. One who lives for the moment only, is destined, in most instances, to a short life and not a merry one; destined to be in some measure a drag and hindrance to the successful living of others, and, at best, much less of an aid than he might be to the success of his kind on earth.

A man has by 'original nature,' too, tendencies to behavior which, as gratified, militate against the success of his kind or his own continuing existence. Some of these are powerful, and yield to him in their gratification satisfactions preferable to those which behavior more useful to his kind and to himself is likely to yield. The tendency to torment and abuse others of less strength or present power, however gratifying to the bully, tends, on the whole, to endanger the success and security of his kind, and, by way of retributive consequences also, to endanger the bully himself. The tendency to 'blind outbursts of anger' is hardly less detrimental. There are also other tendencies to behavior which, either directly or indirectly, are out of line with the interests of species, race, or breed, and with the demands of self-preservation.

It must be granted that, on the whole, men have preferred the satisfactions which come with behavior useful to the species above those which belong with behavior harmful to it. The man-species has persisted, increased in numbers, and spread over the earth in successful competition with other mammalian species, at least. For all that, many breeds and not a few races of men have perished because of failure on the part of the many to behave predominantly in a fashion useful to their kind. There are still in human nature tendencies which, if not restrained and subordinated to others, would shortly close the career of *Homo sapiens*; and these, so far as they are manifest at all, may be looked upon as properly inimical to the welfare of mankind and men, in the long view of life and success for either.

On the other hand, the man who sings in his bath does nothing thereby of significant advantage to his kind, or of disadvantage. By singing he does nothing likely to increase the probability of his own survival, and—unless he sings too

badly—nothing likely to bring about his own destruction. Useful and harmful, of course, are relative terms; but there are numerous presently gratifying activities of the man animal which point to no consequence good or bad in respect of his tribe, his race, his species, or in respect of his own success in keeping alive beyond the moment of his gratification. These we may call, as we choose, useless or harmless, in reference to the higher biological successes. Such activities are not merely numerous; they are, taken in particular, quite innumerable, and an attempt to classify them here would be profitless. Suffice it to say that every man may have abundant room in life to gratify his “tastes and feelings” without violation of the first articles of a biological code of ethics.

The nature of the individual man, for all that, carries within it elements of possible conflict with the requirements of success for his kind, and for self-preservation. But there is a saving clause, as it were, in the law of his nature. Man *learns*. It is no less inherent in his nature that he should be modified by his activities than that he should be active in the first place, or variously satisfied or dissatisfied in and by way of his activities. The effect of learning may well be to reform the patterns and to reorder the scale of his preferences. By guidance of his learning a man may be led to prefer behavior useful to his kind, and, in the long view, to himself, over that which has no justification beyond the immediate satisfaction it produces. The individual carries within his own nature a resource for bringing his satisfactions into line with the demands of the higher biological successes. It is this which makes education, from the biological standpoint, both a possible and a useful enterprise.

II

"That is, and ever will be," declared Socrates, "the best of sayings, that 'the useful is the noble, and the hurtful is the base.'"^{*} This, as a statement of utilitarian ethics, can hardly be surpassed. The great Athenian 'master of common sense' was, to be sure, no utilitarian, in the modern sense; he did not accept as the measure of utility mere biological success. But those who proceed from that measure to an order of values in human life can hardly state their position better. Those goods, said Socrates, have highest worth "which he who would be happy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results."[†] The utilitarian argument points to that conclusion also. He who would be happy is, in the biological sense, he who seeks to achieve success in the fullest possible measure. He does things which make for the success of his breed, race, or species, and for self-preservation, not because in such outcome only they are useful, but because also they fulfill on the way, so to speak, his own more immediate ends. He finds, that is to say, works of service desirable both for the sake of the good which comes from them, and for the good that is in doing them. A man's behavior is of fullest worth when he does what counts at the same time toward his own present satisfaction, toward his own continuing existence, and toward the persistence and spread of his kind on earth. So, his doings are good by all the measures of usefulness, the low, the middle, and the high.

Moderation, prudence, and thrift are 'virtues' of men approved widely, if not universally, throughout history. These find their justification in the logic of utility by striking a

^{*} Plato. Republic. v.

[†] *Ibid.* ii.

balance of sorts between the several demands of biological success.

A man cannot indulge very long or very frequently in the gratification of an appetite or desire, however useful in general or harmless it may be, without some loss of other possible gratifications, and without some risk of failure in service to the higher ends of animal life. Nature provides, be it granted, a sort of guard against excess, through outcomes in satiation or fatigue. She rules, as it were, against long-sustained satisfaction in particular 'modes of adjustment'; what now gratifies becomes, if continued, distasteful, or impossible of further continuance. Even the greedy child will reach his 'saturation point' in consumption of candy—a point below, as a rule, that established by the volume capacity of his stomach; even the most enthusiastic dancer must, soon or late, give over—he cannot maintain further his delightful exercise. Nerves and muscles can sustain any particular form of 'equilibrium achieved' within narrow limits only. Narrow though they are, however, the limits set by nature are both broad enough and elastic enough generally to permit of some excess. The man who persists in a given activity, quitting only when he becomes 'sick and tired of it,' commits, as a rule, an excess therein. He has harmed himself either by closing the door to other and superior gratifications, or by diminishing his chances of survival, or by both together; he has harmed his kind by restriction or cessation of his serviceability to them. By prolonging my feasting I shut myself off, for the time at least, from other enjoyments, from the performance of service to my family or nation; by stuffing myself I open the way to illness and incapacity, or I may come, in final consequence of my greed, to death. And there are few indulgences in which a parallel to this may not be drawn. Hence, modera-

tion, or *temperance*, in the gratification of desires, becomes a virtue of considerable merit from the utilitarian standpoint.

A man is prudent as he guides his actions with reference to the long view of success, whether in terms of future satisfactions, of self-preservation, or of service to his kind. *Prudence* points in a way to moderation, but prudent conduct is not all one with temperate conduct; the latter makes necessary allowance for present gratifications, and the former does not. The man of moderation 'enjoys himself now,' but temperately, and with an eye to proportion in matters of success. The prudent man, 'looking ahead,' often denies himself presently useful or harmless satisfactions; he strikes no balance of values between present and future, but surrenders the present for the sake of the future. Thus prudence is often regarded as 'a cold and calculating virtue,' when it means the giving up of present satisfactions as a price paid for those which may come later to the giver. Prudence, on the other hand, is commonly looked upon as a sacrificial virtue when the prudent man denies himself for the sake of service to his family, his tribe, his race, or to mankind. But, whether it be manifest in selfish caution, or in notably heroic unselfishness, prudent behavior does count toward achievement of the higher biological successes. It is, in the broad sense and the narrow, a very useful virtue.

Thrift may appear as a result of prudence; it may go along with moderation. Its use lies, however, in service of security, either for the thrifty one, for his kind, or for both together. Men, as animals, live by way of consumption of material goods. The consumption of those goods means, at once or ultimately, the destruction of them. One cannot eat his cake and have it too; tools, however well used, wear out. Men cannot long continue to serve their kind and their own security by taking what is ready to hand and consuming it.

They must produce enough, at least, to replace what they have consumed; and this they cannot do unless they abstain from using up completely the resources which made it consumable. The tribe which eats the whole harvest of grain lacks seed for a second crop. If a nation by producing and saving replaces continually all that from year to year it consumes it can, plainly enough, maintain without increase of population the same standards of security—on the material side. But no less clearly, if it fails to enlarge its resources, it can neither increase in numbers nor spread in mastery of the earth. Continuity of life for individuals demands thrift to the point of replacement; success for breed, race, or species, as the case may be, demands thrift effective beyond that point. Men, be it individually or collectively, must by thrift maintain a margin of excess in the utilities of protection and subsistence over goods of the sort consumed. Without such margin the door to biological success in the long view is blocked.

Moderation, prudence, and thrift are *practical* virtues. Behavior that is temperate, prudent, or thrifty derives its worth from its consequences in success; it is, therefore, essentially characterized by action, and consists in what a man *does*, rather than in what he feels and understands. Put in another way, these virtues generally have no merit in themselves, but only in their uses. The principle of utility carries in the same fashion to all the activities of the man animal. These are good or not good according to what they accomplish, not according to what they are.

A man may feel, to be sure, satisfied in this matter or that; but the feeling of satisfaction resides in his success—it does not produce the success. The success wherein he feels satisfied is, instead, an outcome of what he has done. In the same way a man may be satisfied when and as he 'arrives at

an understanding' of this or that; but the thing-understood, which represents his satisfaction in the case, is a consequence of observing, manipulating, testing, and the like, and not of his mere present understanding as such. To feeling and knowing can be granted, of course, that unmediated value which belongs with 'successful adjustment' for the actor himself; they may furnish, as it were, a secondary measure of usefulness in what a man does, but they are in themselves of no use, even here. As to success on the higher scale, they have no such value; for the measure of success in self-preservation lies ahead of all present satisfactions, and the measure of service to kind lies outside and beyond the individual himself. A man's acts, by these measures, are good if they serve to self-preservation or to the persistence and spread of his kind; but they are not good merely because he performs them, and happens therewith to arrive at present satisfaction for himself.

Feeling, knowing, and the like, thus appear to have, by the principle of utility, no worth except as products of action and attributes of success achieved in individual satisfaction. In another sense, however, they may be looked upon as useful. If by feeling and understanding we refer to 'inner' tendencies and activities which determine or eventuate in action, we may consider them useful in the degree that the actions they determine are themselves useful. The position may be made clearer, perhaps, by a brief examination of thinking.

It is commonly taken for granted that the superior versatility of the man animal over all others in dealing with the multitudinous and changing conditions of this material world is due, at bottom, not to his marvelous hands, but to his power to think. The literature of men repeats abundantly the boast of man's ability by reason to direct his do-

ings profitably to his own ends as can no other living thing. This ability it is which sets him above even the noblest beast, and makes him the destined master of the earth.

Skeptics arise from time to time. Man, they point out, is not the only thinker; he is not even the best of thinkers, for, if success be the measure of good thinking, then humbler creatures, not a few, appear to think more aptly than does man. Some—with tongue in cheek, perhaps—have dared to assert that a power to reason is a badge of inferiority, not of superiority. Bees and ants, for example, which ‘act wholly by instinct,’ make their adjustments, by and large, not less, but more successfully than men. Such ‘bundles of instinct’ have come ‘from the hand of the Creator,’ or from the mill of evolution, more perfect than man; and the sign of their perfection is—they *do not think*. Man, in his imperfection, is endowed with intellect.* He *must* think, if he is to keep pace, even briefly, with those more fortunate creatures which have no need to think in order to succeed.

The modern biologist, if he does not smile, will shake his head. At best he will assent to the Scottish verdict only, ‘not proven.’ Man, the thinker, has not lost the race as yet; if he cannot be ranked with certainty first in success, yet he does beyond question surpass all other living things in the versatility of his intelligence. The groundwork of that versatility, nevertheless, is probably his capacity to learn, rather than his power to reason. If ‘impulse from within’ does control in anywise the doings of men, then thinking manifestly counts far less to move them than does feeling; the ‘drives’ in human nature are of the emotions, not of the intellect. Thinking, indeed, may point the way to action for fulfillment of desire, but it does no more than that.

* Boas, G.: *The Happy Beast*. The Johns Hopkins Press. Baltimore, 1933.

The modern scientist looks upon thinking, as he does upon all phenomena, from the standpoint of the external observer; looks at it, that is to say, in its physical aspect. From that standpoint he sees it as a physiological process not essentially different in kind from sneezing or coughing, though less readily subject to 'objective measurement.' It is, like those 'reflexes,' a 'response to stimulus,' involving the physiochemical interaction of body cells and organs, nerves, glands, and muscles, in a focus of concatenation which finds its final discharge in some form of action. Much as the stimulus of pepper in the nose 'sets up' a situation which 'sets off' a 'chain' of interactions which culminate, or come to momentary completion in what we call a sneeze, so certain stimuli set up situations which set off the complicated series of cellular and organic interactions called thinking. In thinking, however, as distinguished from the reflex type of response, made ready by instinct or established habit, the 'end response' in action suffers delay, more or less prolonged. What a man *does* as the culminating act of the process of thinking comes not *instantly*, as it were, with the stimulus; it follows, rather, seconds, minutes, or hours after the impact of stimulus. The judge at law, for instance, renders his decision by a nod, by signing his name, by a spoken or written declaration. He *does* something as the outcome and completion of his thinking on the case; but his act of decision follows the question presented only after a lapse of time greater than that between the alighting of pepper flecks upon the membrane of the nasal passage and the violent expulsive contraction of the sneeze. 'Quick as thought' suggests, in the popular view, a speed incomprehensible, like that of light. But the man who acts on the instant, without pause or delay, is, in the same view, suspect of 'giving no

thought' to the matter in hand. He is, as the biologist sees it, rightly suspect.

The occasion for thinking is a 'difficulty,' a 'situation of the problematic order,' that is to say, one produced by the failure of habitual or otherwise established modes of response to yield satisfaction in the face of conditions presented. The difficulty is a source of dissatisfaction, and the response of thinking represents, so to speak, the man's search for a way out. Put in another fashion: 'The difficulty' means a considerable 'disturbance of equilibrium'—a 'maladjustment'—and thinking means an attempt to reach equilibrium by way of such cortical preliminaries of response as make ready for an action whereby the difficulty shall be at length resolved. Thinking leads up to and culminates, we have said, in action of some sort. The action, if the proper one, brings relief; if not the proper one, then the man animal must 'try something else,' or 'think some more.'

Thinking, in this view of it, is a mode of response to stimulus useful just so far as the action in which it culminates is successful. It is, however, as a prolonged process, relatively unsatisfying. The man remains in some measure 'unadjusted' all the way from the originally disturbing difficulty to the point of its resolution in the final act. He does not think, therefore, for the sake of thinking; he thinks because he has to think. When he can, by more direct and speedier routes of habit or instinct, make his adjustments successfully, he prefers those modes of response. He does not think until they fail, and he resorts to them often repeatedly—like a cat in a cage—before thinking, because, even in failure, they carry with them a penalty in dissatisfaction less prolonged than that which goes with thinking. The biologist's findings lend some support to the cynic's remark that "A man will resort to any expedient to avoid the necessity of think-

ing." On this ground, too, the skeptic's notion that in thinking man does not display his highest powers, but makes of reason a virtue of necessity, finds a certain validity. By the same token one possessed of habits fit for direct adjustment with the requirements of present satisfaction, of self-preservation, and of service to his kind, and seldom reduced to the ordeal of thinking, is a better man—and by the measure of success more intelligent—than one who must often pause, and come to delayed success, through that uncomfortable process.

In sum: Thinking is useful if it be completed in action that is useful. Thinking without such a conclusion is a merely useless compromise with difficulty, hardly, if at all, more satisfying than the first failure in adjustment which set it *en train*. In other words, thinking is useful, and useful only, in the measure that its outcome is *practical*; that it 'gets results' in success or approach thereto. The biological argument and 'hard common sense' point to the same conclusion. 'Theorizing,' speculating, and similar ventures in thinking incompleted in practice are vain employments at best, and, not seldom, obstacles to the prosecution of undertakings of a profitable sort.

NOTE. For an elaborate discussion of the nature of thinking, from a point of view close to that of the strict behaviorist, see Rignano: *The Psychology of Reasoning*. Harcourt, Brace. N. Y. 1927.

A man can make his adjustments with his environment by way of habit very much in proportion as the environment does not change. So he may come to possess a repertoire of responses resembling more or less those which heredity gives the ant and the bee—fixed, unhesitant, direct. In the degree that he becomes thus fit to deal with 'the conditions of life' the necessity for thinking, of course, diminishes. And toward this happy state the material progress which so often

we identify with civilization has moved us not a little. Life has become for the run of men in the 'civilized West' longer, more secure, and distinctly easier in many respects than it was for their forebears. In matters of subsistence and bodily comfort, even safety—despite the automobile—the present-day American does 'get along' with very little thinking upon matters of vital concern to his pioneer ancestors. All this has been accomplished by a mastery of certain physical conditions which makes them, as compared with former days, fixed, 'fool-proof,' and dependable. The progress of which we boast is chiefly a progress in stabilizing the conditions of a material environment. So we 'progress' almost, if not exactly, *pari passu* with a decreasing demand for thinking on the part of 'the ordinary man' in affairs most essential to biological success.

It may be held, reasonably enough, that a lifting of the burden of thinking in these matters from the many means only a shifting of the burden to the few; some men must think more upon them as the many need think less. This may be granted, so far as the present argument is concerned. But beyond that it may be held self-evident that occasions for thinking to ends in his own satisfaction, in self-preservation, and in service to his kind do still appear in the life of the humblest citizen of the most thoroughly 'socialized' and 'regulated' state. Not yet have the brains of Stalin and his kommissars, of Der Führer and his satellites, even of the magnificent Mussolini and his Fascist leaders, removed all necessity for thinking usefully from the lives of 'the peasants and workers' of Russia, of Germany, of Italy. These men, like other heads of government and industry, aiming at 'efficiency,' are working toward this end. But for some time to come, at any rate, the run of men must bear a burden of thinking, now and then.

Men are by nature fit to assume the burden, however it be distributed, with varying degrees of success. They differ in their capacity for useful thinking over a wide range, from the imbecile who can probably not think at all to 'the inventive genius' who has done so much to forward mastery of the material world, and to relieve the multitude from the necessity for thinking on many matters. They differ similarly in capacity to learn. The one capacity is of little account without the other. Out of the junction of the two comes the possibility of raising thinking to a level of preference above that which belongs naturally to a prolonged and unsatisfying process. Men are born with a capacity for thirst, but not with a preference for slaking thirst with whiskey. Quite the contrary. The child drinks milk eagerly, but rejects whiskey with violent distaste. Yet, as we know, he may learn in time to accept the whiskey eagerly and to reject the milk. No one will believe, of course, that men by original nature rate useful thinking so low on the scale of their likes as whiskey. But wherever thinking may stand on that scale, it can be raised to a higher place by learning. By facing difficulties—not evading them—and by repeated success in resolution of them, men do come numerously to welcome the challenge of a problem. So they become in rarer instances seekers of problems, and find, for a time at least, something akin to pleasure in solving them. What was at first an activity enforced by necessity, and not in itself agreeable, becomes more and more tolerable, and finally one elevated to the heights of preference. Just as by learning the urges of enmity, jealousy, and lust may become subordinate to those of friendliness, tolerance, and love in the direction of men's doings, so can thinking come, at times, to rise as a determinant of action above the easier determinants of habit. Thus feeling and thinking,

despite their secondary character as modes of behavior, may come to high standing on the scale of biological utility.

Thinking that governs practice rates, by the principle of utility, above thinking that does not. But practical thinking varies in worth through the whole range of biological values. A man determines his moves in chess by thinking, and so, whether he wins or not, proceeds to a harmless enjoyment of present satisfactions. But his thinking in this case rates low on the scale. One moves on a higher plane who plans the cropping system of a farm—provided, of course, that his is 'a working and a workable' plan, which guides the practice of cropping on that farm. The thinking of Goethals, manifest in Panama, ranks on a plane still higher. That of an imagined eugenist, whose plans should control the propagation of a race to its gain in strength and intelligence, would rate again above the thinking of 'the sanitary engineer.' The measure of utility applies to thinking in the same way as to all other human behavior. Thinking is not a form of activity justified in its own right; it is to be measured by the standards of biological success, the high, the middle, and the low.

III

At whatever level we take them the doings of men count unequally in contribution toward success. Some things that a man does count more to the success of his kind than others; some count much toward his self-preservation, some little, some not at all; some acts yield to him satisfaction superior to that produced by others. Though no man is wise enough to order exactly all his doings or those of any one else on the scale of utility, yet we do not lack objective guidance altogether. In the matter of improving the chances of our kind on earth we act, if we act at all, on faith mainly;

but some men, at least, have understanding sufficient to suggest an order of preference more intelligent by far than that to which, by custom and convention, most of us subscribe. If, in mating among themselves, for example, men gave anything like the same attention to 'known laws of heredity' that they give to them in their breeding of animals, our posterity would, in a few generations advance further in strength and intelligence than man has advanced—if he has advanced—since the death of Moses. On the side of nurture for offspring men have, without question, moved ahead; but what is known of proper means far outruns the practice of most parents. To the end of bringing children to maturity and effective participation in service to their kind we can say with assurance that the acts of parents have unequal value; that some are greatly more useful than others. To prevent injury and disease, to promote growth and strength, 'physical and mental,' any committee of competent physicians and educators can list in order of usefulness acts of parents in protecting, in feeding, in sheltering, and in 'disciplining' the child—an order in each case pointing toward an ethics of utility in those matters much more intelligent than that which parents are prone to follow.

Proof is not lacking, too, that certain activities are more effective to self-preservation than others. Those who wear the same underclothes day and night, who bathe only in warm weather, who keep their bedroom windows fast shut in winter in order to 'avoid the danger of colds and pneumonia' are less successful in doing so than those who change their clothes, bathe, and open their windows. Those who wait at the corner and 'walk with the light' to cross the street are less frequently run down by passing cars than are those whose practice it is to 'duck across on the run so as to avoid being hit.' Among the means which more or less

"directly minister to self-preservation" there are ways of meeting specific requirements, known well enough by some men, to offer standards of useful practice much more intelligent than those which commonly prevail. On the side of subsistence there is undoubted advance; but 'available knowledge' of methods in production, consumption, and conservation enables again the ordering of men's doings by a scale of useful practices more accurate than those which custom and 'the trial and error of everyday experience' provide for most. Our behavior in matters of self-preservation is, in general, not nearly so effective to that end as it might be. We have not to wait upon new discoveries to do much better than we do.

When it comes to utility by the measure of satisfaction, no objective scale can be established. Science has little to contribute. It is safe to maintain, perhaps, that the gratification of 'the basic urges' satisfies most; though which of the gratifications is 'most fundamentally satisfying' remains obscure. 'Circumstances alter cases,' and the scientist cannot be sure always which 'basic' is most 'basic.' Learning enters to change the order of preferences. No man behaves as he does purely in terms of unmodified hereditary equipment. The assertion that men do most frequently that which they most prefer to do is quite unconvincing. Since the frequency of a response is proportionate to the frequency of its correlate stimulus; since the presence of the stimulus lies more often than not, probably, beyond the control of the man in the case, a 'statistical curve of frequencies' in the particulars of a man's behavior gives no certain clue to his preferences. One might show thus, perhaps, that Smith sneezes more often than he drinks, drinks more often than he eats, and rises as often as he sits; but he would hardly so convince us that said Smith prefers sneezing to drinking, drinking to eating, and attains to exactly the same level of satisfaction in

getting up as in sitting down. *De gustibus non disputandum*. What I like I like; what I dislike I dislike. I like *a* more than *b*; I dislike *c* less than I dislike *d*. No external observer has any evidence to enable him to decide in such matters. But even I can set up no fixed and final order of my preferences. I may declare with full assurance that I prefer *a* to *b*, and still confess readily that sometimes I find *b* preferable to *a*. An ethics of utility by the measure of organismal satisfaction is individual and variable.

Nothing like a universal scale of utility is possible without reference to success in the long view. But the statement of Socrates still has its application. By way of learning a man's preferences can be brought somewhat into line with the more objective requirements of success for the man-type, and success in self-preservation. In so far as that is done the doings of men become most fully useful; they serve to success, under the laws of nature, at all major levels, the high, the middle, and the low.

A man is a good man, by biological standards, so far as he behaves usefully, and no further. He is measured for worth by what he achieves; the worth of his undertakings is proportionate to the success of their outcomes. Activity, except such as is part and parcel of a 'dynamic equilibrium,' appears thus always as means to an end, and not as an end in itself. And yet, of two modes of behavior arriving at the same end, one may be considered of more worth than the other, as we have seen. Here enters the principle of *efficiency*. Suppose that foods *a*, *f*, and *m* represent in combination the meal most appropriate to satisfying my tastes, allaying my hunger, and fortifying me for the performance of useful functions that lie ahead. Suppose that I pass before the counter of a cafeteria whereon are displayed not foods *a*, *f*, and *m* only, but a score of other foods as well. If, by way of habit, I respond at once preferentially to *a* and *f*

and *m*, picking those dishes from the counter and passing all others by, then I have my meal. If, instead, I face at the counter a problem of choosing the proper foods to make my meal, if I 'examine, compare, and weigh,' by a sort of 'inward dramatic rehearsal,' this food and that, this combination and that, and so come at length to place on my tray foods *a*, *f*, and *m*, I have exactly the same meal. By the measure of mere achievement the thinking is exactly as useful a form of behavior as the more direct 'selection' by habit. The main difference seems to be that I have my meal more promptly in the first case than in the second. But there is more than that. In solving the problem of the meal I have not only 'wasted' time that might be put to other uses, but also, despite my final success, I have suffered those relative—and unnecessary—discomforts called sometimes 'the pangs of indecision.' Thinking, in this instance, is inferior to habit on both grounds. By thinking I have been denied opportunity for more extended usefulness, and I have maintained a dissatisfying maladjustment both for a time and in a fashion uncalled for on the part of a more intelligent man animal. The more intelligent such an animal is, that is to say, the more effective in dealing successfully with the requirements of his environment, the more directly he moves to adjustment with it. He wastes no time, wastes no effort, brings upon himself no unnecessary discomfort; in short, he is *efficient*, reaching his end as speedily, accurately, and easily as the conditions and his resources allow. The more efficient means is the better means to any end in success. The more efficient man is the better man, when two or more seek the same end. He who is more efficient can do more useful things, or do what useful things he does, better than the man less efficient.

What a man can do—and how well he can do it—depend

very much upon the condition of the machinery of his bodily organism. In the measure that all his organs and all his stores of energy are severally and jointly in 'the best of working order,' ready to give full scope, within the limits set by native endowment and learning, to his every function, in that measure we declare the man is *healthy*. He may, to be sure, be less strong, less enduring, less vigorous, less resistant to disease, and so on, than another man; but, apart from what he has still to acquire by growth and learning, he could not be more fit than now he is. Under this definition health is relative; a new-born infant may be healthy, and so may an unschooled and adolescent moron, or a college president approaching retirement. Every one of them may fall short of an ideal of health, or even of a statistically established norm thereof, but he is just as 'hale, sound, or whole, in body' as *he* can be.

By the higher criteria of utility, health, or organic soundness, is in the main simply a resource. It is of no worth in itself, but is to be valued by the measure of what it makes possible in the way of useful behavior on the part of him who has it. In another sense, however, health is an achievement; in itself a dynamic equilibrium of sorts, not of 'metabolic balance' only, but of the whole man in interaction with his physical world. With it goes, too, a satisfaction felt: What the Greeks called *euphoria*, an 'apprehension without attention' of well-being, a 'subliminal' *joie de vivre*, such as, at its acme, seems to echo from the words of Pippa's Song.*

* Browning, R.

"The year's at the spring
And day's at the morn;
Morning's at seven;
The hillside's dew-pearled;
The lark's on the wing;
The snail's on the thorn;
God's in his heaven—
All's right with the world!"

In this sense health is, for the man animal, an end to be sought for its own sweet sake.

A man's brain may be called an organ, from the biological standpoint, but his mind cannot. The 'mental health' of a man animal, then, points to a condition of health in the physical machinery of the living body. Injuries, lesions, glandular disturbances, and the like, account for 'mental defects' and weaknesses; 'psychoses' and similar effects of 'conditioning' do not. A man can be 'mentally sound' despite quirks and peculiarities which set him off as variant from 'the normal.' So long as we look upon man as a physical mechanism we must look upon health as a physical condition. When the physical machinery is at the peak of working order the man is healthy, 'mentally' and otherwise. And 'the glow of health,' it may be noted, is not inevitably manifest in a 'Pollyanna complex.' Comfortable though he be, the man whose 'sound mind' reflects the soundness of his body is by no inherent necessity ready either to accept the world as he finds it, calmly undisturbed, with Mr. Lippman's sane philosophy,* or to rejoice with Pippa in God's perfect attention to His business. A gloomy football coach or a pessimistic reporter on 'world affairs' may be quite sane.

By the principle of utility the activities of men are valued according to the ends they serve; of activities which serve like ends the more efficient have the greater worth. On these grounds collective undertakings are, in general, of higher value than individual enterprises. As to biological success at all three levels, men working together can achieve it in most cases more certainly and with less waste than men working each by himself. A number of men 'acting as one' can often accomplish, also, what is impossible to them acting singly. Man and woman must mate to propagate. They

* Lippman, W.: *A Preface to Morals*. Macmillan. N. Y., 1931.

can, too, with marked advantage act jointly in many matters of marital and parental concern. The child, for example, is far more likely to reach a sound and useful maturity when father and mother join in service to his protection, his nurture, and his 'discipline,' than when either assumes the whole burden. 'Division of labor' between them, beyond that point which sex distinction makes necessary, is a notable advantage to the child. Though the mother alone might rear him successfully, and the father more rarely do so, yet the two together, one taking over this responsibility, the other that, and neither all, will bring him to competent manhood more efficiently than either alone could do, or the two without cooperation.

Activities which 'minister to self-preservation' are generally carried out more effectively and economically when men work together than when they do not. Organized into political societies, for instance, they achieve security, organized into economic societies they achieve subsistence, as they cannot when every one undertakes to provide wholly for his own protection, defense, and subsistence. The characteristic undertakings of a state, of a food-producing concern, of any industry organized to supply 'the necessities of life' thus tend to take precedence as to worth over the doings of any individual working to similar ends.

Even at the lower level of success represented by present satisfactions, collective undertakings are more useful over a wide area, and more efficient, than non-cooperative behavior. At any rate, the man who seeks, so far as possible, his own pleasure in his own way only, disregarding all help from others and giving no help to them, denies himself a vast range of possible satisfactions. Sports furnish an example. The man who would enjoy the satisfactions they afford must join most often with others, play a part in a social function,

making contribution thereby to the pleasure of others, and gaining pleasure from their contributions.' There are, to be sure, solitary sports which one can pursue in relative independence of others, but the number of them is small in comparison with the number of the opportunities afforded by 'group' games and sports. The latter offer too, if incidentally, such satisfactions as come from the mere presence of other human beings, from winning notice, from rivalry, and the like, which are largely, if not altogether, impossible to the man who follows his own 'interests in his own way exclusively. The satisfactions made possible by collective enterprise are certainly more abundant than those to be gained by independent means. At this lower level of success, then, it is safe to say that collective doings rank, by and large, above those purely individual.

Men have by nature social capacities, just as they have capacities for learning and thinking, and they differ in these too. But if man appears to be 'a social animal,' it is rather because he must be social than because he is born, like an ant, to cooperate with his fellows. He does, quite clearly, possess tendencies of varying strength to attend preferentially to men as objects in his environment, to find a certain sheep-like satisfaction in being among them, in gaining their approval, in consorting with the opposite sex, and so on; but there seems to be no getting past the conclusion of Socrates that the major societies of men, at least, spring from their necessities, and not from a choice that is native. Such societies are not merely comfortable appurtenances, but quite essential means to success for the man-species, race, or breed; to prolonged survival for the individual man; and to the provision for him of a multitude of satisfactions. If, so be, they are truly outgrowths and expressions of man's nature, they are so more as his houses are and his machines, than

as are his protruding ears and his five-toed feet. They are rather man-made acquisitions than the inescapable products of heredity. Men make societies, adopt them, change them, reject them, much as they do their other tools. Above all other tools, perhaps, they find them useful. Men by the thousand live well without tonsils, without feet, even without eyes; by hundreds of thousands they live successfully without railroads, printing presses, and motor cars. But nowhere do they attain to any large measure of biological success without a state of sorts and some system of collective economy.

The superior efficiency and effectiveness of collective undertakings derive from two sources: (1) the advantages that come from 'division of labor'; (2) those that come from the summation of powers.

What is called 'the division of labor' appears most plainly, perhaps, in the making of joint products of a material sort—as, for example, houses and shoes. But it is hardly less characteristic nowadays of many undertakings to the end of direct service—as in the operation of a passenger train or a hotel. The pioneer woodsman was likely to build his own cabin entire, performing every operation and making every part of which the whole was constituted; performing all operations from felling the trees and peeling the logs to laying on the 'split shingles' of the roof, and wedging, pegging, or nailing them in place; making all the parts from the log sills to the rafters, shingles, door posts, door, door latch, and latch string. The Indian squaw performed every operation in making moccasins from 'hide to wearer,' made every part from the leather soles and uppers to the thread which held them together. The rickshaw coolie performs every service offered his passenger, helps him to his seat, wraps him in if the weather be cool, delivers him to his destination, helps

him out again, and collects the fare. The village innkeeper in parts of the world still attends to all the needs of his guest—welcomes him, carries in his baggage, makes his bed, cleans his room, prepares his meals and serves them, presents the bill, and takes the money.

Not so as a rule with the civilized man. His house is a joint product, and his shoes; the service of transportation rendered him by the railroad is a joint service, and the service he receives as guest at the modern hotel. In building his house excavators, masons, carpenters, roofers, plumbers, painters share, each contributing a part to the completion of the whole. Not every one of them, either, does every job in the allotted field of his trade. Each mason has a 'tender,' who mixes mortar, carries brick, fetches tools, etc.; one mason lays bricks for the chimney and builds the fireplace, another lays tiles for the bathroom and the hearth; others are plasterers. The carpenters, no less, are likely to divide their labors. Some lay floors, some are lathers, another is builder of the staircase. And so on. The pair of shoes that comes from the factory is built up of the particular contributions of a hundred or more men and women, each of whom has made one particular part, or performed one particular operation—stamping out the soles, stitching in the tongues. The passenger who rides in a Pullman makes his journey from city to city in comfort and safety by virtue of the services of porter, conductor, fireman, engineman, brakemen, all members of 'the crew' of the train, to say nothing of signalmen, switchmen, trackmen, dispatchers, telegraphers, and the rest concerned with promoting speed and security for his journey. At the city hotel the guest's needs are dealt with by doorman, bell-hop, desk clerk, elevator boy, chambermaid, waiter, chef, barman, barber, valet, cashier, and other visible members of the hotel staff, and also, if less di-

rectly, by the manager and house detective, and by such variously inconspicuous ministers to comfort and convenience as telephone girls, electricians, furnacemen, dishwashers, laundry workers, and window cleaners.

The making of a useful whole, like a house or a pair of shoes, the service of a set of needs like those of the railroad passenger and the hotel guest, involve dealing piecemeal, as it were, with a range of differing situations, rather than at one stroke with the whole situation. For example, one may suggest the whole situation in a case above thus: A-pair-of-number-eight-men's-shoes-to-be-made. One who deals successfully with that situation must, in doing so, deal successfully with a series of detailed component situations, such as leather-to-be-selected-for-soles, soles-to-be-cut, welts-to-be-stitched, eyelets-to-be-inserted, linings-to-be-fitted, and so on and so on, to an extent represented by no less than one hundred and thirty-five particular process-requirements in analyses already made of 'the job of making shoes.' Division of labor begins when A is assigned to deal with certain of those details, and B with the rest. It proceeds as a third man is called in to deal with some assigned to A, and a fourth to take on parts of the job assigned to B. And from there it may be carried to a point realized in certain modern factories whereat a different man or woman deals with one, and one only, of the hundred and more details of the shoemaker's job. Thus, with division of labor, two men may make a pair of shoes, or four, or a small army may engage in making them. And the trend is, as we know, toward producing shoes, and thousands of other utilities, by dividing the work among scores and hundreds, no one of whom makes the whole, but every one a part. By this means, as we know too, a hundred men working together will produce in a given time more, and generally better, shoes, or shirts, or

motor cars, than the same hundred each engaged in making entire a pair of shoes, a shirt, or a motor car. The hundred working together are more efficient than the hundred working separately. That is the demonstrated fact in a multitude of cases. Joint production attains a greater success than individualized production. But why is this so?

A part is less than the whole. To isolate any part of 'a whole situation' and to treat that part as a situation by itself, is to limit the range of 'effective stimuli' and to narrow the area requiring attention. In short, to select a part to be dealt with from a whole is to substitute a simpler situation for one more complex. Any man is likely to be more apt in dealing successfully with a simpler situation than with one more complex.

The division of labor in a joint undertaking carries, nevertheless, no necessary advantage, if we consider a single product-whole only. Suppose five men of similar competence, each capable, working by himself, of building a cabin. If the five, dividing their labors, join to build a cabin, they can, presumably, complete it in about one-fifth of the time that one man alone must use to build it. Were a storm in prospect, making the need to finish the cabin quickly imperative, then, obviously, the joint undertaking has a distinct advantage over a one-man undertaking. But as to total of energy expended, and of 'man-hours' used, the joint has no advantage over the single enterprise. Sixty hours of labor, let us say, are required to build a cabin. That 'amount of labor' is by no means necessarily reduced because five men share it; no labor is saved, it is distributed only. If there be no demand for speed, one man can build the cabin as efficiently as five.

On the other hand, whenever demand for the same or a similar whole product recurs again and again, the division

of labor does carry advantage. Five men working together can build fifty cabins more speedily and with less waste of energy and materials than the same five working individually, each to build as many of the fifty as he can. The effect of continuing demand is to stabilize the whole situation and its parts. Repeated successful dealing with it, or with them, makes for habituation, increase of speed and accuracy, and an easing of effort; and this gain is more or less proportionate to the number of successful repetitions. Suppose, to take the case of the cabins again, that the 'jobs' involved in building one be represented by *a, b, c, d, e*. Five men build fifty cabins—each man assigned to the building of ten. Every man thus becomes measurably habituated to jobs *a, b, c, d, e*, and builds the last cabin with greater speed, fewer errors, and less effort than he built the first—he has done each job ten times. Five men build fifty cabins cooperatively, dividing their labors so that one is responsible for job *a* in every cabin, a second for job *b*, a third for job *c*, and so on. Though no man of the lot has built a cabin, yet every one has done *his* job at cabin building fifty times. He is, in consequence, more expert at *that* job than if he had done it but ten times. As to the last forty cabins, at least, all five jobs of construction are done, so far as practice counts to make perfect, more expertly under division of labor than without it. The fifty cabins in the last case, therefore, are built in less time, with less waste of materials, and with less effort than in the first case. Each man is a *specialist* at his work. In general, the simpler his part, the more specialized his job, the sooner and more surely he becomes expert, and the more expert he becomes in it. That because he succeeds sooner, more surely, and more often than if his job were more complex. The 'laws of habit formation' operate to favor the division of labor in cooperative undertakings to supply a standardized

and recurrent demand. Evidence is not lacking that men tend to work together as cooperating specialists very much in proportion as demand for this or that product becomes standardized and persistent.

Collective undertakings do not here exhaust their advantages over individual enterprises; nor is their advantage confined to the production of standardized utilities. Without specialization men can achieve together what they cannot achieve separately. Two men lifting or pushing together can move what one man cannot move, and ten men can move what the two cannot. Mere summation of forces counts toward superiority in many collective enterprises. Often, too, the additive advantage supplements the advantages of specialization. In building a modern house, for instance, as distinguished from a cabin, success is due hardly less to the united strength of numbers in moving and placing quickly materials of the structure which one man alone could not move, or could move and place only by prolonged and exhausting effort, than to the special expertness of masons, carpenters, plumbers, and the rest who join their labors to build it.*

The advantages of the division of labor would still hold, were all men alike in capacity and aptitudes. One need not

* A further advantage may be worth the noting. Power machines play a larger part in collective than in individual enterprises, especially in the production of material utilities. A power machine combines, as a rule, the advantages of a special skill and united strength; it is, indeed, seldom more than a substitute for some man's expertness, on the one hand, and for multiple man-power, on the other. The machine does not come into existence until the efficiency of the one and the effectiveness of the other have been demonstrated by collective enterprise. Machinery, in the main, is the outcome and complement of social undertakings, rather than—as some have asserted—the base and condition upon which they rest, and to which they owe their efficiency and effectiveness. There is no doubt, however, that machinery has widely increased the advantage of cooperative over individual enterprise—both in the arts of war and the arts of peace.

accept the Socratic dictum, "one man can do one thing well, and not many," to argue the superiority of cooperation on that principle. Allow that a man can do a number of things well, and it is yet true that he can do any one of them better if he specialize therein. If we were all 'like as two peas in a pod' we could still, with advantage, act to accomplish many ends by organizing to deal as specialists, severally, with the parts of a whole, and to join those parts in the whole by cooperation.

It is past dispute, however, that men do differ in strength, in capacity to learn, in the preferential direction of their aptitudes. The fact makes possible further advantage in division of labor. The efficiency of a collective enterprise may be increased very nearly in the measure that every man in that enterprise shall take the part which he is most fit to fill. Every man engaged thus does not only do what he can do well, but what he can do best to advance the enterprise toward success. If in a factory, for example, the manager is a man better fit to manage than any other there, every foreman a man better fit to direct the work of his particular department than any other among the hundred or the thousand employees, every workman placed at the sort of job which he can do better than others, then, within the limits of equipment and personnel available, that collective enterprise functions at highest efficiency, with reference, at least, to the end product which it is organized to produce.

The superior efficiency of collective enterprise in such cases comes, we have argued, from the strengthening and refining of habits of directly effective action, by limiting and stabilizing those environmental conditions with which each man has to deal. It is possible to imagine an organization so perfectly patterned, and so completely routinized in every part, that the men engaged therein might proceed, like ants,

to success in detail and *in toto*, without any least necessity for thinking. But no such organization of men exists, or is likely to exist. Someone must do some thinking in the most efficient of societies. That thinking, to be sure, may be largely initial; once the plan is laid out and the routine mastered, the whole may proceed in its reiterate functioning after the fashion of an inhuman and brainless machine. Once launched, it carries on by its own momentum, so long as neither friction nor obstacle acts to check it. But friction does occur and obstacles do intêrvêne; the machine must slow down or stop if they are not removed, or the machine guided in a manner to avoid them. To maintain constancy, or something close to it, in the relation of interdependent factors, calls for flexibility much in proportion as the factors are variables—as men always are; as the variables are many and the system of their interdependencies complex, the need for flexibility increases.

First, the 'whole situation' is initially difficult very much according to the number of different factors involved. Thinking, therefore, is required at the start. In order to set up an organization proper to deal with the whole situation someone must analyze that situation into its parts, systematize the relations between them and act to objectify the parts and the system. Merely to launch a collective undertaking some man must see the whole process and its end, and make explicit the main features, at least, of its detail. He must 'think the thing through,' and 'lay out plans' for the structure and operation of the enterprise. Then, if the factors are invariable, and 'stay put,' the task of thinking is over, and the work can proceed 'according to plan.' There is no longer need that any one shall be concerned with 'the situation as a whole.' If, on the contrary, the factors vary, and will not 'stay put,' someone must continue to deal with the

changing whole. As the whole changes the parts change, so that in respect of the larger and more comprehensive parts, at any rate, those who deal with them are likely to face difficulties, and thus to be called upon, in some measure, to think.

Consequently, the more comprehensive the organization, the more appropriately does it take form of hierarchy, an order of descent from those who think most, through those who think less, to those who think least. This form characterizes the most efficient of collective enterprises devoted to producing a standardized product. Take, for example, a cotton gin factory. The superintendent is 'the directing head'; he deals with the whole, and has more thinking to do than his foremen. The foremen, in turn, are charged each with directing the work of producing some fairly comprehensive part of the gin, and so are called upon to do more thinking than the mechanics and machine operatives whom they direct. The mechanic at his lathe, again, has a job more comprehensive of detail than has the stamp machine operator, and so, as the factors vary, has more frequent occasions for thinking. A hierarchy of the sort is implied, of course, only as factors vary. Ants and bees divide their labor but they have no superintendents and no foremen, no generals, colonels, and captains, or similar administrators and 'executives' to plan and direct the work of the colony. They succeed without them, so long as the conditions of life remain relatively fixed. Because they do not have them, perhaps, they suffer very often disasters such as have few parallels in the affairs of men. Men themselves are the most important and uncontrollable variables in collective enterprise. Like ants they differ—if not so greatly—in native equipment; unlike ants they change from hour to hour and from day to day. They change by growth and

they change by learning—and that willy-nilly. They are, therefore, inconstant as determinants of demand. Any collective enterprise organized to supply a demand can succeed for long only as it is flexible enough to adjust to changes in demand for its products—changes in demand as to quantity, form, quality, etc. Men as participants in collective enterprise are variables no less. However expert and dependable in their several parts, they vary in performance inevitably. 'The human factor' is the cause of more difficulties—the occasion for more troubled and troublesome thinking—in social undertakings than any other.

But other factors are variables too. Even in cases where light, heat, moisture, ventilation, and the like are fairly controlled and stable, changes in weather and season have large effects upon demand for a given service or commodity. They have likewise notable effects upon the enterprise itself. 'Raw materials and supplies' vary in quantity, quality, and accessibility; tools, machinery, impedimenta wear out, and so on. Just as no army can proceed in total disregard of changes in terrain and weather, in the condition of its own men and equipment, in the doings of the enemy, so can no other collective enterprise go forward to success unchanged in the face of changes within and without. No factory, bank, mercantile establishment, hotel, hospital, or even school, can function steadily at highest efficiency by pursuing inflexibly the same course day after day, summer and winter, year after year. The tides of time and change do flow, and though, perhaps, sometimes we would not have it so, their process moves to change the situations which we face. As habit cannot keep pace, the need for thinking comes; comes even in the most admirably planned, systematized, and routinized of undertakings.

For all that, the expertness which comes of habit formed

lies close to the base of efficiency in many a collective enterprise. By division of labor we cannot do away with the need for thinking altogether; we may lessen the need and shift the burden about, so that the few must carry the major part, and the many are lightly laden. Even so, the definition and allocation of responsibility to any man for the resolving of difficulties in the conduct of an enterprise, or any part of it, make for his special expertness in doing so, and that expertness comes from the forming of habits. Problems are never, for the same man at any rate, exactly the same. If they were the same they would soon cease to be problems. If he solves the first, the second will be for him less difficult; having solved that the third is less difficult, until repetition has strengthened habit to the point at which it suffices, and thinking is no longer called for. But, if problems are never the same, they may be, nevertheless, more or less alike, calling for modes of response in the pattern or details of which the same elements recur. In the measure that they are alike, dealing with a succession of them makes for habituation in those elements, a more direct or less roundabout solution, and, correspondingly, a growing expertness. By division of labor the problems of every man who must think to succeed in his job are thrown into classes; that is to say, they are gathered and concentrated into an area of responsibility in accord with their similarities. The problems of the factory manager may be more numerous, and possibly more difficult, than those of the foreman; the problems of the foreman more numerous and difficult than those of the mechanic, and so on. But, after all, each man in the organization who faces problems at all, faces problems of a certain *kind*, and not all the problems of producing the final product. By dealing with the problems of the same class—similar problems—the manager becomes expert in respect

of one class, the foreman in respect of another class, the mechanic in respect of a third class. Each one, too, becomes expert largely in proportion to his habituation in those 'modes of attack' which are applicable alike to problems variant in detail and content. Each one must still think in solving his every problem, but, having learned by repeated practice the 'way to go at' a problem of this kind, he has reduced the scope of thinking required, shortened the process of solution, and become, so to speak, a specialist in a certain sort of thinking. In thinking, as in manipulative skill, habit formed lies close to the base of efficiency in co-operative enterprise.

Man's needs in respect of security, subsistence, and the basic comforts consistent therewith, are sufficiently alike to allow throughout wide areas fairly definite standardization of specific demands. The wide spread of custom in matters of food, clothing, shelter, furniture, etc., is evidence of the fact. Cooperation of specialists to supply needs of the sort has a high biological significance. At the lower level of luxury, that is to say, within the area of 'gratifications' not essential to survival of the individual, or to the propagation and spread of his kind, standardization of wants has gone far, and will doubtless go farther, so that collective enterprise, with its superior efficiency, may supplant still more widely than now it does purely individual undertakings. But the wants of men at every level are, and are bound to be, often widely diverse in particular, and sometimes peculiar. Hence collective action cannot always be superior to individual acts in meeting requirements of biological success.

The cooperative principle has its limits. Many things men can do individually which they cannot do collectively. Many things they can do better severally than by joining together.

The final acts of consumption, for example, are individual acts for the most part. Every man must swallow his own food, wear his own clothes, sleep in his own bed; nobody can share with him the doing of these things. He can, as a rule too, feed himself more efficiently than he can be fed by cooperating with another in the use of fork, knife, and spoon. On the side of production, again, there are many whole-products more efficiently made by individual than by collective activity. This is notably true when the want to be served is peculiar and rarely recurrent, or immediately exigent. The custom shoemaker can make shoes for the man who wears 'size fourteen' to better advantage than can the shoe factory. When the curtains catch fire a man can save his house by acting at once to extinguish the flames more effectively than by summoning a fire company to do so. The point needs no laboring. Cases wherein a man must serve his own need, or that of another, by individual action, if it is to be served at all, or can serve it better than any cooperative action can serve it, are past all counting. The superiority of individual to collective enterprise covers, perhaps, the major part of life's demands. But because within the fields of success most significant biologically the requirements are *common*, and so amenable to a relative standardization, collective enterprise is, by and large, there the more useful of the two.

IV

A complicated structure of standing parts may be called, for convenience, an automobile; as a thing-ready-to-go it is *potentially* an automobile. But only when that potential becomes *actual*, when the car, so called, begins to move under its own power, is it *really* an automobile. In the same way, as we have seen, the scientist looks upon the man ani-

mal. The man body is no man; the man is that body in action. A man, then, is what he does. From the same standpoint a society is no mere structural aggregate of individuals, but such a 'collect' in action; a number of men working together as one. It is real not in the pattern of relations it exhibits—such as the diagram of a football 'formation' depicts—but in the operation of the collective whole so patterned; e.g., as when the play diagrammed is carried through on the gridiron by eleven men in that 'formation.'

Again, we have seen, the worth of a man is to be measured by the success of his doings; that of any particular doing by its effect of usefulness to the man or his kind. By the same token, the worth of a society is to be measured by the success of the joint undertaking which in actuality it is. A society has worth in proportion to the useful effects of the collective action upon the welfare of men. The criteria of success are the same in the one case as in the other: at the lowest level the satisfaction of individuals; at the middle level, their continuance in living; at the highest level, the persistence and spread of their kind on earth.

Societies, therefore, may be ranked as to worth, one above another or below, first by their comparative effectiveness and second by their comparative efficiency. A society which serves any biologically significant end is, in so far forth, a good society; if, as it moves toward that end it leaves in its wake, so to speak, consequences useful to biological success, then it is, by so much the more, a good society. Thus, if society A is more beneficial to men in the long run than society B, it is the better society. Of two societies having, by the measure of effect, an equal value, that one is the better which moves to its ends with greater directness and precision. Society A, if more efficient than A₁ in producing the same effects, is the better of the two societies.

Judgment by effect permits of certain generalizations in the matter of societal values. Societies which serve to the propagation of fit offspring and their rearing operate to promote the highest of biological successes, and stand somewhere, accordingly, on the highest level of worth. Societies through which men work to the preservation of themselves or others of their kind should find their place at mid-level somewhere. At the lower level should stand societies which operate to supply goods beyond those essential to the middle and higher successes. Among them any which yield 'substantial comforts' hold a higher place on the scale than such as merely titillate and gratify for the moment.

Societies which serve no useful end and have no useful by-effects, and societies which, however useful the ends they seek, fail of their ends entirely, and in their failure leave no trace of good, these are of no worth at all. Through societies utterly without use are, perhaps, fictions of logic rather than existent facts, yet, beyond all doubt, societies do exist which may be rated worse than useless. When all effects of them are added up, the sum is negative. They obstruct the way to success for useful undertakings; they destroy the fruits of useful endeavor. If, on the scale of worth, they find a place, that place lies below 'the zero mark' of uselessness. By the standards of biological success they are evil and not good, and the more efficient they happen to be, the worse they are, by those standards.

Following the argument it appears that societies of the sort called *families* must rank near the top on the scale. The one biologically essential society, for man, as for any other animal, is the mating pair. That pair becomes a nuclear family the moment the two join in service of protection and nurture for their offspring. The offspring themselves become members of the family *pari passu* with their entrance

upon participant actions of service to those ends, cooperating with the parents and one with another in a joint function.* In this fashion evolves an organization useful in some degree to biological success at all three levels, the propagative, the preservative, and the satisfying; but characterized by its contribution toward renewal of the species, race, or breed.

The efficiency of families varies more with the aptitudes and abilities of the members than with any set pattern of relations between them. There is, possibly, some minor evidence in the evolution of family patterns for the superiority of monogamous over polygamous forms, and for paternal headship over maternal headship. But the evidence is not conclusive; so that a ranking of families by the measure of efficiency can be made only on the basis of factual and particular knowledge.

A state, in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, is conceived to be an organization of men for protection of their lives and of the resources necessary to pursuit of other useful activities among them. Under that conception it may be argued, with some show of reason, that the aboriginal family is itself a state. Certainly the mated pair and their offspring have often united, and still unite, for mutual protection and defense, the very end which "that great Leviathan," the state, was built by men to serve. The tribal state, so called, is characteristically the union of kindred for the sake of security among families of the same stock. Despite the fact that the members of a family may act to constitute their own state, and that the great societies called states have evolved from family groups so acting, the family in its characteristic and distinguishing function is not a state, and the state in

* Here, of course, the word 'member' is used in the social, rather than in the hereditary sense.

its characteristic function is not a family expanded. The family is distinguished by its propagative function; the state by its protective function.

The state, so conceived, stands on the second level of worth.* There it stands, however, above all other societies but that to which it owes its origin. This for the reason that the state more than any other society promotes the success of men at all levels. So far as a state is effective to protect the lives and resources of its members, it makes for propagative success, for productive success in provision of subsistence, and for success in attainment of 'substantial comforts' to an extent altogether surpassing what men can accomplish acting singly or in self-dependent family groups.

Among states, at any period of history, marked differences appear in 'the maintenance of law and order' useful to the safety and security of citizens, a function and an end which, however vaguely phrased, are accepted as common and proper to every state. No state of modern times has sur-

* If the state be conceived as a 'superorganic and all-inclusive social whole,' or under the still more fanciful notion of a huge organism endowed with life in its own right, a life from which men derive what they are pleased to call their individual lives, then obviously the state must come first in value, on the principle that the whole is superior to the parts. Under such a notion families no less than armies, legislatures, courts, hospitals, schools, farmers' cooperatives, manufacturing concerns, banks, transportation companies, labor unions, hotels, baseball leagues, theatrical troupes, orchestras, and the rest, are organs of the state, serving no ends of their own or of their members as such, but only the good of Italy, or the Reich, or whatever the living state may choose to call itself. But though 'totalitarian' conceptions simplify the problem of ethics, summing up all the obligations of any man and every man under the head of 'good citizenship,' yet they remain not quite convincing to the student of biology. By the evolutionary principle the most fundamentally significant of human societies should appear first and persist longest. The evidences of archaeology and history leave little doubt that the family was here first, and, in spite of wails concerning its decadence, we have but to look about to note that still everywhere it is with us. The logic of evolution, and the facts as we know them, are against a conclusion that the state, however loosely or grandly conceived, has a higher biological worth than the family.

passed the Prussian monarchy of 'pre-war days' in these matters, or in respect, either, of the much abused—and to the species often harmful—function called 'defense of the realm.' For years a Prussianized Germany was held up to the world as the supreme protagonist of civic and military efficiency, and still serves, albeit without bruit or trumpeting, as a model for 'the new Reich,' for modern Italy, and somewhat, too, for communistic Russia; even a little perhaps for states called democratic. 'Life and property' are safer in England than in the United States; safer in the United States than in Mexico or Venezuela, and so on.

Differences as to efficiency in states are due, no doubt, more to the mores and the education of people than to any other factors. Tradition counts, too, for political and military efficiency, or against them. But on this side the compactness and simplicity of the machinery of government counts for much. So far as the needs of the people are, or can be, standardized in matters of bodily and material security—and that is far—an organization in terms of centralized, authoritative, and directly operative government shows, or seems to show, advantages. By the measure of animal security those peoples who have made a state of the sort, 'unified,' regimented, headed, and controlled by unquestionable authority of one man or an oligarchy, are certainly not less successful than those more loosely or complexly organized to their own 'protection and defense.' No such people has, as yet, mastered the earth, as some have aspired to do, but most, if not all of them have won 'a place in the sun'—a place, from the biological standpoint, much to be desired.

Like the state, societies of the class called *economic* are offshoots of the family. They have taken over and refined or expanded variously parts of functions once performed by members of the family group acting together or singly.

Those of them concerned to provide "the necessities of life"—food, shelter, clothing—so far as such utilities are 'substantial' rather than 'ornamental' and luxurious—must be ranked only below the state itself. Men might subsist themselves, if properly secure, without organizations specially directed to provide these things, but they cannot do so with the same assurance of prosperity as when so organized. Thus many 'concerns and industries,' both as producers and purveyors of 'the necessities,' may be placed, fairly enough, on the second level of worth. Along with them go certain 'social agencies' functional to the service of 'the public health,' societies organized to maintain sanitation, medical societies, clinics, hospitals, and the like. Beside them, too, may stand such 'agencies' as have taken over in part, and expanded, the functions of the family group in 'child rearing and discipline'; such as nursery schools, elementary schools, orphanages, and certain others that once rejoiced in the title 'eleemosynary.'

In the matter of efficiency all these again differ. But so far as the wants they supply may be standardized, they tend, probably, to be superior as they organize on the industrial or army pattern, with a refined division of labor among specialists, and a directing 'executive authority' at the head. So the machinery tends to a routine directness favorable to avoidance of 'waste time and motion.' Of course, as the wants served cannot be standardized, the routinized, inflexible social machine is likely to be inferior to a society less 'closely patterned,' less dependent on fixed 'rules' and the thinking of a few, and more flexible in adjustment to particular requirements. Whereas, for instance, a hospital may follow a fixed routine in respect of beds, bedding, and clothes for patients, or in matters of laundry, cleaning, disin-

fection, etc., it must be more flexible in matters of feeding, bathing, nursing, 'treating' its various patients.

Within that area which we have called the lowest level of biological success, the area dimly defined by 'satisfactions' for the individual man, we could rank in order of value societies innumerable, large and small, persistent and ephemeral, if we knew all their effects in satisfaction upon those whom they affect, and the relative worth of those satisfactions to the men affected. But that we do not know in, perhaps, a single instance. Accordingly only a suggestion can be offered as to relative placements from top to bottom at this level.

Near the top, probably, may be put societies economic and other which supply comforts or pleasures of the sort called 'substantial.' As to what societies belong to this category judgments may differ. But the word 'substantial' is used here to connote such as are most predictably and widely desired by men. For example: Men 'got along' well enough for thousands of years with no more light at night than the campfire produced, and for thousands more with the lights of torches and candles. But one can predict quite safely that almost anywhere in the world electric lights would be welcomed in preference by most men to whom they might be offered. Running water in the house would be welcome widely over the world; tables to eat from; chairs to sit in; and so on through a considerable range of household conveniences. Electric light companies, bulb-manufacturing concerns, firms making plumbing fixtures, furniture factories, and many other factories represent societies useful to supply wants of a 'substantial sort,' yet of a sort, too, that need no supplying in order that men shall go on renewing their kind and keeping themselves alive from day to day.

The comfort or pleasure which comes from the presence of others and that which comes from winning their attention and approval are almost universally in demand among men. These satisfactions, one or both, may be had, obviously, in associations useful also to other ends. But men work together out of sight of one another; they work sometimes in company with no more than a bare tolerance for one another. Families there are, efficient to the main ends, in which little or no expression of love, kindness, praise, is vouchsafed by one to another of the members, in which communication between them passes little beyond the words and signs necessary to conduct some 'serious business' in hand. To become a member of this or that society which, whether otherwise useful or not, provides company and some meed of 'recognition' is a matter of first-rate importance to almost every man. Without it he cannot achieve pleasures and comforts which more surely than any others, perhaps, make life worth living *now* for him. So many societies are, or may be, useful in this fashion that admission of such criteria expands the class that minister to 'substantial comforts' to quite unmanageable size. But since judgment can be given intelligently only in particular cases and with reference to particular men, the implied difficulty is not wholly insuperable. This, at least, can be said of those societies which afford a man company, friendship, approval, and the like. Man's fundamental satisfactions therein do not increase proportionately to the number which he joins. The man who plays on ten teams, who belongs to twenty clubs, who has a hundred 'good friends,' is by no means ten times more successful in the matter of comfort and pleasure than if he played on one team, belonged to two clubs, and had ten good friends instead of a hundred. Organizations for the mere satisfaction of men are compara-

tively few that affect the 'substantial good' of any one man. Like the tenth orange of the economist, the tenth society to supply the same sort of want has nothing like the value of the first.

In whatever order one may proceed to value societies useful to "gratification of the tastes and feelings," those that serve to ends esoteric must rank near the bottom. For example, the joint undertaking of a group of mathematical physicists to compute the weight of the earth, or the rate of escape of electrons into the stellar spaces, would rate extremely low. But since 'the findings of pure science' prove not seldom unexpectedly useful, such an enterprise might still rate above the work of a school of speculative philosophers engaged to discover the nature of the spiritual reality of God. In the measure that the work of societies is rather academic than practical they approach the zero mark on the scale of biological utility.

NOTE. It is fairly obvious that many, if not most, societies may have value on more than one level. The case of the family has been cited, which may serve to success at all three levels, the high, the middle, and the low. A society like a canning club, a factory, or a hospital, may work effectively to ends at the second level, and at the same time afford to members or others incidental satisfactions of a more or less substantial sort. Contrariwise, a society organized to ends in satisfaction at a relatively low level of worth may have effects of benefits at a level much higher. The competitive sports of teams undertaken for 'the fun of playing' may affect beneficially the health of players, and so make for prolongation of life.

To offer the case of a society utterly useless and at the same time altogether harmless is impossible. But one need not fear that he will stand alone in a reasonable opinion that predatory gangs of vandals, thieves, and murderers, whether legally organized or not, should be rated generally worse

than useless, and inimical to biological success at any high level or on any large scale.

Societies looked upon as working wholes are built up of the social acts of individuals. An order of values for the social acts of any man will run, accordingly, not far from parallel with the order of worth among the societies in which he takes part. Acts proper to a father, for instance, meet a familial obligation, and so rate with the family at a level higher, as a rule, than the acts of the same man in his capacity as a citizen. Acts proper to the citizen meet the requirements of a successful state, and so have a value generally superior to the acts of the same man as member of an economic society producing useful goods. The man's part in an economic organization, again, rates most often above his part in a society devoted to present satisfactions, such as an orchestra, a basketball team, or a card club. Social obligations of the individual rank in order of biological utility roughly thus: family duties first, civic duties next, 'business duties' third, duties or obligations of leisure, last.

A second corollary to the proposition that collective functions have for the most part a higher value than individually made 'adjustments' is this: Whenever a man may serve a useful end as well or better by joining with others to attain it than by acting alone, it is his duty to join them. Since that is the case more often than not, on the higher levels of success at least, *social efficiency* becomes a major virtue of the man animal.

Social efficiency in the individual implies readiness to enter upon and to carry through dependably a proper part in whatever collective activities may open a way to superior usefulness for him. A man's social efficiency, however, is by no means exactly proportionate to the number of societies he may join and aid. It is rather to be measured by the

importance, or relative worth, of the societies he does enter and by his fitness for the parts he plays in them. When a man plays his part very well in a few, but very important, societies, his social efficiency may be rated higher than when he takes part only in a multitude of less important societies, even though he does so quite successfully. For example, one who is a proper husband and father, a sound and serviceable citizen, and a useful employee in a useful concern, albeit an 'unsociable stay-at-home,' is probably superior in social efficiency to another who, though 'a grand mixer' and a 'great joiner' is, nevertheless, a 'poor sort' as husband and father, a neglectful and law-breaking citizen, and 'too utterly unreliable' to hold 'a useful job' for any length of time. To be sociable is not all one with being socially efficient.

Social efficiency at its theoretical maximum might be represented by a man equipped to join and take part successfully in every sort of useful society—'lending his weight' to this, fitting into that, wherever and whenever occasion offers. But since no man in the modern world, at any rate, is capable of reaching the Miltonian ideal of proficiency in "all the offices of war and peace," social efficiency most often approaches its peak when the individual becomes a specialist in a relatively few useful parts, able to fit, under a division of labor, into this and that important collective enterprise, and, as for the rest, 'doing the best he can' without special expertness in the parts open to him. The 'generalist' is likely to count for less in the success of social undertakings than the man who has particular expertness in certain lines of usefulness.

A third, if less direct, corollary of the foregoing proposition is this: In the measure that the specialist's part is one which most men need not play, or one to which they cannot

readily turn their hands at need, he becomes identified with his specialty, and so distinguished by a class name; for example, judge, policeman, physician, aviator, fullback. Since the distinction is clearer, as a rule, in vocational than in other fields of specialization, men may be classed by their pursuits and valued accordingly. This, manifestly, yields no fair judgment of the man; for few men exhaust their social uses in their vocations, even when such are 'life careers.' It is quite possible that Mr. Capone has to his credit socially rendered services sufficient to raise him to an equality of worth with not a few men who have never occupied a penitentiary cell.

NOTE. Among peoples dominated by a materialistic philosophy one might expect a valuation of men by vocations to correspond with the biological utility of the vocations. In Russia, since the revolution, some such correspondence begins to appear. In America there are signs of it, but the order of values in popular esteem is still far from that to which logic points. Traditions of prestige built up in less materialistic times enter largely to determine it, for one thing, and the conception of success as an individual matter, objectively measurable by possession of wealth and power, for another. We rate the political executive high, for example, but perhaps no less on account of his power than of his usefulness. On the other hand, the physician and the engineer are rising in popular esteem because of their usefulness, and the lawyer, despite his traditional prestige, sinking. Against this recognition of usefulness may be set the comparatively low rating of the farmer and the teacher, the butcher and the baker, all of whom, despite their higher usefulness, have a 'lower social status' than the moving picture actor or director, whose usefulness, by biological standards, is low. Tradition accounts for a moderate dignity still in the professions of the sculptor, the painter, the musician, the novelist, the poet, the scholar, and even the preacher. But, by the measure of pecuniary reward, these rate almost as low, perhaps, as the most exacting logic would require; as low, indeed, in many cases, as the useful mechanic, carpenter, or miner, who, in Russia, hold a higher place.

V

A man, as animal, lives in interaction with a physical world. He is, as physical organism, responsive to physical stimulus. His environment is, in potential, what may stimulate him; in actuality, what does stimulate him. For convenience, and not too inaccurately, it may be said that stimuli come to a man from (1) material things, including men in the flesh, and (2) physical events, or happenings, in which, of course, men and other material objects play, as a rule, some part. Of these the physical environment of men consists.

Such an environment permits of successful living so far as men can, by adaptation to its requirements and mastery of the difficulties it presents, *use* it to perform or to forward the functions of propagation, of self-preservation, of gratification. Environment, then, is good in any case in the degree that it is readily to be dealt with in useful fashion; in short, in proportion to the *wealth* of available resources it offers. These resources fall again roughly into two classes: (a) 'natural resources' and (b) man-made resources. A given environment may be rich in natural resources and poor in man-made resources, or *vice versa*; rich in both, or poor in both; and so on in every combination from the extreme of easy abundance to the extreme of difficult poverty.

Parts of the earth are variously habitable. One resource of life only seems to be spread with quite impartial equality over its surface—air. Light, warmth, fresh water, salt, even 'standing room,' are unevenly distributed; the natural resources of food, shelter, clothing, fuel, and the rest still more so. "The Happy Isles," however, are few; earth is not widely Hesperian. Where men variously have succeeded they have won their way in some part or in most. If men

live, as it seems they do, more securely, more fruitfully, longer, and more comfortably in Scotland than in Ceylon, that is because they have there mastered earth more fully, producing wealth, making for themselves a world richer in essentials than 'Nature unaided' anywhere provides. The physical world for men is good largely as they have made it so. The child born in Boston—even, one may venture, in Chicago—is born into an environment potentially more favorable to biological success than the child born in Rarotonga.

For the man animal the physical world, natural and man-made, has meaning; meaning no doubt more richly various than it has for any other living thing. But its meaning for him differs from its meaning for the ant and the ape in scope only, not in kind. It has for him, as for them, meaning in detail and not *in toto*. Every fact and feature of environment is a *means*,* an instrument, a resource, a condition, or an obstacle, referable to him, his needs, his ends. Its value, then, like the value of his own doings, is not inherent, but derivative. What has no bearing on the success of man has no meaning; what is not useful to his ends has no worth. Environment for the man animal is subject to the same scale of values as is the man who deals with it.

The argument toward a biological ethics here advanced may have its flaws; the scale of values here suggested in dim and hesitant outline has, no doubt, many defects. But, apply the principle of utility as you will, and it is clear that no population of notable size, however well organized socially and however efficient individually, has ever yet met in full the major requirements, even, of success. No such aggregate of men has ever done all that could be done to ensure

*Dewey, J.: *How We Think*. Macmillan. N. Y. See Ch. IX., "The Meaning of Meaning."

the persistence and promote the spread of the man-species of any race or breed thereof; all that could be done to preserve the lives of its own or any other people severally; all that could be done to make the lives of all substantially comfortable.

The failure is not due to lack of capacity; rarely, if ever, in the modern world at least, to lack of material resources. Always and everywhere the failure is due chiefly to the native propensity of men toward setting their own and immediate satisfactions above all other ends in life. The population of the earth is far yet from reaching the famous 'limits of subsistence.' In no great country, either, crowded though it be, does a narrowing margin of material resources so press upon the people that they, working together and with other peoples, might not promptly and greatly expand it. But everywhere self-interest, individual and corporate, eagerly short-sighted, wastes and exploits the future for the sake of the present, seizes upon the near in disregard of the far. Men, born capable of becoming prudent, thrifty, efficient, social, like the ant of the fable, live, nevertheless, and mainly, like the grasshopper held up therein to derision. There is still abundant room for education in the promotion of biological success.

Summary. (1) The study of life in its physical aspect falls to the province of the biological sciences. Looked at from this standpoint life exhibits in sustained process a pattern of evolution. In this pattern nature reveals preferences, as it were, for some forms over others. The selective standard appears as *fitness to survive* under the varied and changing conditions of a physical world. By the measures of persistence, on the one hand, and of spread in mastery of conditions, on the other, the multitudinous forms of life succeed

or fail variously; and so appear one superior to another or inferior in fitness. Nature, whether purposeless or not, accords to them endowments and opportunities unequally.

Among forms relatively well endowed and successful is *Homo sapiens*. The species has, at least, survived for a long time, therein succeeding as well as many others. It has spread in mastery of changing conditions at a rate and to an extent unsurpassed by other species. Within the species races and breeds have persisted and spread unequally. Some have perished; some, it would seem, are on the way to perishing; some have maintained themselves regionally over long periods of time; others have spread widely and increased vastly in the number of their representatives on earth.

Man, in the long view and the large, succeeds better than men. The germinal type persists and spreads through the ages. The particular exhibits of its variant forms live as individuals but briefly, and master each but a limited range of conditions. Nature's preference goes to man over men. By her standards, success for the species, race, or breed, ranks higher than success for individuals. Man, nevertheless, lives through men and in men. The individual is a vehicle and instrument to the success of his kind; he is, too, in one degree or another, a specimen and actualization of man. He has, accordingly, value in both references. By way of what he does the success of man is promoted or hindered; in him man lives in particular and for the moment.

To contribute toward the success of his kind a man must act to promote (a) the *propagation of offspring* potentially fit to carry on the life of man, and (b) the *rearing of those offspring* to a maturity sufficient to enable them to meet, in their turn, the same responsibilities. In performing and in aiding others to perform the characteristic functions of par-

enthood the individual shows forth his primary usefulness and his highest worth as servant and representative of his kind. Those functions, however, he cannot perform or promote except he himself survive for a time sufficient to do so. Hence he must act in a fashion to favor his own survival for that time, and to permit, if not also to favor, the survival of others fit to play a part. He must act, then, to provide, be it directly or indirectly, *physical security* for himself and his fellows by way of (a) *protection and defense* as required, and by way of (b) supplying the materials of *subsistence*. So doing he has value as contributor to *self-preservation* among men.

The individual man, considered as a biological entity and apart from his serviceability to his kind, appears to be a physical organism which succeeds in the measure that it attains from moment to moment '*equilibrium*' with its physical environment. Under this conception the activities of a man have worth in proportion to their effectiveness in producing or maintaining the equilibrium. The means to 'adjustment' derive their worth from their outcomes. The doings of a man are good in the degree that they are useful to ends in his own '*satisfaction*.'

Nature in the individual again reveals preferences. To a man some successes in adjustment are superior in worth to others. Among his preferences are some for achievements useful to his kind as well as to himself, useful to his survival and that of his fellows, as well as useful to him in the present moment. Other preferences are 'out of line' with the higher biological successes. By and large, heredity disposes men preferentially to satisfactions useful to man; but they are readily disposed also to actions variously indifferent or hostile to their own survival and to usefulness to their kind: Men, however, learn; and through learning they

order and reorder their preferences. Since education can, in some measure, direct the processes of learning, it becomes an important means to determining the order of actional preferences among men, and so a possible agency for reconciling modes and ends of individual adjustment with the requirements of survival for the individual and of his serviceability to his species, race, or breed.

(II) A man, as animal, is most completely useful in those acts which count to serve at the same time toward success at all three levels. In an act of which the effect is useful both to his kind and to his own survival he displays a higher worth than in one which serves his kind, but not his own survival also. An act useful to survival and at the same time effective to the satisfaction of the actor ranks, *ceteris paribus*, above one which makes for preservation of life at the expense of present satisfaction. And so on. Under this principle the *practical virtues* of *moderation*, *prudence*, and *thrift* find their biological sanction.

The man animal is measured for worth by the worth of his achievements. Value in his activities is referable to their effects. Effects directly significant to success—both useful and harmful—are products of action. Activities preliminary and conditional to action have value, but a value secondary and accessory, referable to worth in the outcome of the action they determine. On this ground the direct routings of impulse to action, represented by habit and instinct, tend to rank higher than those less direct, represented, for example, by thinking. Since conditions neither are nor can be made in all cases stable, thinking becomes necessary on occasion. When that happens *thinking*, though a relatively uncomfortable process, is valuable in proportion as it is *practical*; that is to say, ultimately directive of useful action. A preference for thinking can be acquired by learning; and

this, so long as the preference is for practical rather than for useless thinking, and provided it leads to no substitutions of thinking for habits more directly useful to the same end, makes for the success of a man, and thus, in general, to the increase of his biological worth.

(III) Of two means to the same good end the more efficient is the better. *Efficiency* supplies a secondary measure of usefulness in behavior. The man who acts with speed and precision, without waste of effort, without waste of resources, to make his 'adjustments' and to render his contributions, does better—and therein *is* better—than one who is by comparison hesitant, slow, uncertain, albeit in the end successful in doing what is similarly useful to him, to his fellows, to his kind.

Health in the physical organism conditions efficiency. One who is organically unsound may do well at this or that, but he cannot do so well as if he were sound, and he can, perhaps, not do at all this or that which is useful. Health, accordingly, rates high as a resource to efficiency, and, through efficiency, as a means to biological success. Again, at the level of 'satisfaction' health is an achievement in itself. It represents a relatively sustained 'dynamic equilibrium' in the interaction of organism with environment at many points, and so has its own unmediated value.

By the measure of utility *collective undertakings* tend to rank superior to individual doings. This for two reasons: First, men together can achieve important successes which acting severally they cannot achieve; second, they can accomplish many ends more efficiently by joint action than by individual action. The basis of superiority for social over individual action is two-fold. That superiority rests sometimes on *summation of powers* to a total of power greater than that of an individual; sometimes on the advantages

of *division of labor*; sometimes on both together. Advantage in division of labor rests in turn upon the superior efficiency of specialization by individuals in selected parts of a whole joint function. This specialization leads to relative and particularized expertness among participants, each in his assigned or chosen part. At the base of this expertness lies *habit* formed by recurrent dealings with situations of the same kind. Efficiency in collective enterprise gains reinforcement as division of labor follows individual differences among men, so that each participant specializes in that part for which he is most fit.

For the meeting of certain major necessities and of many requirements at all levels of success, collective enterprise ranks higher in worth than individual action. But its superiority is not universal. At every level, and especially at the level of present satisfactions, the individual can do by himself many useful things which men acting together cannot do. He can, besides, do many useful things better 'on his own' than by joining with others to do them. Among the multitude of needs in successful living by far the greater number must be met, if met at all, by individual doing. But to success in the long run and at the higher levels collective action is variously superior in effect and in efficiency, so that its higher ranking on the scale of worth in human doings is justified in general under the principle of biological utility.

(IV) A man, in the physical view of him, is a man by virtue of what he does. Similarly, a society is in actuality a collective whole-process, rather than a structural aggregate. By the same token the worth of a society is to be measured against its effects upon the success of men. Of two societies equally useful by that measure that one is the better which is the more efficient. The more efficient is, perhaps more

often than not, the more 'highly patterned' and strictly regimented.

Societies may be rated as first in worth which serve efficiently at all major levels of success. But a society useful to the species, race, or breed, stands higher than one which serves not above the level of self-preservation; one useful to preservation of life ranks above another useful only to the gratification of men. The family, organized and effective to the propagation and rearing of fit offspring, thus ranks above the state operating to protect and defend the people of a community. Economic societies providing subsistence contribute an essential to security, and so stand close to the state in worth. At the lowest level of positive worth are societies useful only to the present satisfactions of their members or others. But among them those may be rated most useful which supply substantial comforts above the vague line of luxury. Of lowest worth are those which serve only to the passing gratification of a few.

No society, probably, lacks value altogether. But some societies are active to ends inimical to the welfare of man in the long view, to the survival of individuals, or to the satisfaction of most of those whom they affect. Among these are to be found the worst of societies.

The social duties of the individual follow an order of utility corresponding more or less closely to that of the societies which severally demand them. The specialist performs his duties, in most instances, better than 'the generalist'; he plays his part more efficiently, and so forwards, as the other cannot, efficiency in collective enterprise. But the social worth of a man cannot be judged fairly by reference to his part in one society, no matter what its worth may be.

(V) Man, as animal organism and germinal type, lives in a physical world. That world is for him a proper world

so far as it is amenable to his uses. It is thus amenable as it permits, on the one hand, a ready adaptation to its requirements and, on the other, a facile control of its varied particulars to ends in success for the individual and for his kind. The environment of a given man or population is therefore good in proportion to the *wealth* of its usable resources. Such wealth may be found in 'natural resources,' or in the cumulate material products of human enterprise. In the main over the earth man-made wealth affords the richer supply of resources immediately available to the uses of men. Whatever their wealth, however, no people has ever used it in a fashion to realize in full its biological worth. Nowhere on earth is a population that cannot, through the agency of education intelligently directed, be helped toward a success at any level greater than they have yet attained.

CHAPTER IV

A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO VALUES: MEANING

I

Every traveller knows that the journey from A to B is not all one with the journey from B to A, though he follow 'the same road' precisely. He sees, it may be, mainly the same things along the road on the return trip that he saw on the outgoing trip, but he sees them in a different order and perspective. This or that may look very much as it did before, but even so it does not stand in relation to things about just as it seemed to stand before. Similarly, one who shifts his view of human life from the 'outer' or physical aspects of it to the 'inner' or psychical aspects cannot conceive and value it just as he did before. It appears to him variously different, both in principle and in particular, and therefore different in the standards and details of its worth.

From the biological standpoint life appears to have its ends in success. The activities of life appear as *functions*, each a means to an end. All activities, then, have the value of causes; a value referable to the effects they produce. From the psychical standpoint the principle of valuation and the order of values appear more or less consistently turned about. The activities of life here reveal themselves as *experiences*,

not as functions, and the ends of life are to be found in experience, not in success.* Though conscious activities make for useful ends more often, perhaps, than not, yet any success so achieved has spiritual worth only as it affects the process of experience.

The physical man-pattern exhibited variously in the specimen organisms called men finds its psychical counterpart in

*In the popular view not all conscious behavior belongs to experience, but only part of it. That conception restricts experience to sensible dealings with things, men, and events: A man sees this, hears that, smells this other. The notion, of course, does not deny that men are consciously active in other ways than those which involve the senses; it denies only that in those other ways they have experience. Men think. In thinking they may analyze, compare, and contrast perceptions given by sense, and build of the elements therefrom ideas. But in dealing with ideas as objects they pass beyond the bounds of experience. The eye cannot see ideas, the ear cannot hear them, the tongue cannot taste them. By this standard conscious life divides into two areas. The first is the realm of experience; the second, the realm of imagination and reason. Thus, I pick and eat an apple. In doing so I have experience with the apple. I eat the apple, but I cannot think the apple; I can only think about the apple. In thinking about the apple I deal with meaning of the apple, and not with the apple itself. I am aware, then, of the apple in two ways: directly by way of my experience with it; indirectly by way of my thinking about it.

So long as mind is regarded as a sort of alimentary organ to digest the fruits of experience, a distinction between the life of experience and the life of imagination and reason is relatively easy. But for careful students of human behavior the distinction has become difficult to maintain. Since the time of Kant, at least, scholars have become increasingly wont to allow that the theorist exploring the concept of God lives, as he does so, in the realm of experience, just as truly as does the gourmet savoring a new sauce. From the scholar's standpoint experience may be taken to include, as the dictionary puts it, "the sum total of conscious events" in life.

The implication is plain that men have not experience only, but experiences. Experience moves on continuously in the life of a man, unless it be at intervals of complete unconsciousness. Within 'the stream of consciousness,' nevertheless, experience breaks up into "conscious events" which, considered in particular and in succession, we call *experiences*. They are, in one degree or another, several, whole, and definite according to the focus and duration of attention engaged in each case. They are, too, variously compounded of sensing, perceiving, apprehending, understanding, emotion, or other psychical factors active in dealing with this object, or that set of objects, in environment.

the principle of spiritual manhood * manifest in *personality* and *character*. The physical pattern makes the individual a man animal, who appears for what he is in what he does; the principle of spiritual manhood makes of him a man person having his being in what he experiences. Man, we know, resembles the ape, the dog, and other animals in certain structures and functions. Likewise, we can hardly doubt, he resembles other conscious beings in attributes of personality and character. On the other hand, man reveals physically differences from the beasts, and, on the psychical side, potentials not theirs. By these differences he is distinguished as man. Of all the traits that man possesses those that appear in his spiritual distinction are most certainly peculiar to him. We are accustomed to call them *humane*, and to look to them for the primary standards of spiritual manhood.

The humane in the nature of man is actualized, then, in activities peculiar to men. Other living things think, after a fashion, and they feel; they communicate with one another by sound and movement; they construct material forms serviceable to their uses. But man reasons as they cannot; his distinction lies not in the subtlety only, but in the data and conclusions of his thinking. Man feels as and what the beasts cannot feel; he is moved in ways impossible to them, and by influences that move them not at all. He communicates with his fellows by lingual and other signs not only far more variously than they, but also concerning matters that have, and can have, for them no significance whatever. He creates not only what they cannot create, but also creates

* The basic pattern or 'universal' which makes the particular man a person need not be taken for 'a changeless idea' of the Platonic order, or for an 'absolute' otherwise named. It may be regarded as a 'norm,' perhaps, which changes with the evolution of human experience much as the germinal form of the species, race, or breed changes with biological evolution.

to ends, as well, neither knowable nor desirable to them—ends, for example, in understanding of truth and in contemplation of beauty. The spiritual view of man shows forth his distinction more abundantly, if not more clearly, than does the physical view of him.

Nowhere, however, do human attributes reveal themselves as sharply segregate from such as man shares with the higher animals. No general form of awareness, probably, can be looked upon as an exclusive possession of man. It is doubtful, even, that man only has and acts upon ideas, that he only is moved to pity, to shame, or to amusement in perception of his world. As in his powers to act man differs from the beasts only in degree of capability, so too, presumably, he differs from them rather in the *scope* and *quality** of his experience than in the power consciously to discriminate and prefer. The individual man is capable of a greater range of experiences, even of the sort that beasts may have, than the individual of any other species. By the scope of his powers to experience he is distinguished; and beyond that by the humane quality, or refinement of discriminative and preferential judgment, that may enter his experiences.

The first property of experience is *meaning*; and meaning is of two sorts. Every experience has meaning, first, that is immediate and inherent in the 'conscious event' itself; it has meaning, second, derived of its bearings upon what lies beyond the moment. This secondary meaning flows, as it were, in to the moment of experience through the 'connect-

* I know that I am conscious. I know it, however, only because I am conscious. Every attempt to understand consciousness turns back upon itself; it can be described only in its own terms. Yet, as with other 'undefinables'—'energy,' for instance—we are quite able to talk about it and measurably to understand one another when we do so. To ascribe to experience, then, properties and functions is quite as legitimate—and as necessary—as to ascribe them to anything else.

tions' of the present 'conscious event' with other events of life, and may be called, in distinction from the immediate meaning of the experience, its *significance* or attached meaning. This significance, of course, depends both upon 'insight' and memory,* whereas, to make the distinction possibly clearer, it may be said that the immediate meaning depends not upon memory but upon sensibility and 'insight' only.

There is a sense, of course, in which meaning or significance in an activity has nothing to do with the experience of the actor therein. So, as the biologist sees it, an act of adjusting with environment carries its meaning in its use, but such meaning, like that of action in a machine, is quite independent of consciousness in the organism which makes the adjustment. Mechanic responses—dilation or contraction of the pupils, secretion of the thyroid gland, 'stepping up' of the pulse, and the like—thus have meaning as modes of adjustment, though rarely if ever do they have meaning as 'conscious events.' A vast range of useful activities, however, do have their conscious aspects, and their inward meanings are more or less in accord with their uses. Thus they enter the content of experience. But they do not altogether supply the content of experience. Some students, at least, see, or believe that they see, meanings in human experience other than the meanings of use. To them it appears that a man finds meaning in failing as surely as he does in succeeding, and a meaning, too, not always confined to 'the lesson of failure.' So, it would seem, a man often discovers

* If the position be sound, two conclusions of minor relevance follow. First, the earliest experiences of infancy have no meaning beyond the immediate; they lack for the infant a conscious significance. Second, we cannot be sure that experience ever lapses so long as life persists. The only ground I have for asserting that consciousness leaves me under anaesthesia, for example, is that I have no recollection of any events during the period of my subjection to it.

in his dealings with the physical world, and still more often in his dealings with images and ideas, both immediate meanings and significances not effective to promote or hinder his success—meaning in forms and relations, in likenesses and differences, and so on. If this be true, then, meaning in experience transcends utility, and the scope of experience comprehends more than the sum of particular conscious adjustments, or attempts at adjustment.

One, for example, who has read the preceding paragraph, be it slowly and attentively, or in cursory fashion, has found some meaning in it, whether the meaning intended or not. He may have achieved by the reading some satisfaction, say a gratification of his curiosity and his sense of humor in observing the quirks and gyrations of a professorial mind; he may possibly have discovered significances useful to the conduct of teaching. But it is quite conceivable that the reading has proved neither gratifying nor usefully suggestive. In either case, however, he has had an experience that no animal but a man could have. In the latter case he has had one not discernibly effective upon his biological welfare, or that of any one else, today, or in the generations to come.

The *scope* of a man's experience is commensurate with the range of its content—the extent and variety of his experiences; and can, of course, be known to him only in any direct sense. Others can know it only by implication. For all that, the relatively enormous scope of human experience is fairly demonstrated in the things that man has created to his use, and in his acts of production and utilization. Man makes and uses a far greater range of signs and artifacts than any other animal—more, it is safe to say, than all other animals together. The great scope of human experience is further evident in other 'externals' of man's culture—in his conventions, his institutions, and the objective rela-

tions of men with one another manifest in civilization. Though man makes things multitudinously, uses them, and acts in a fashion like other animals, yet in doing so he manifests a variety and discriminative refinement of conscious behavior altogether surpassing theirs.

The measure of *quality* in experience is ultimately a matter of feeling. Comparison of feeling as between man and man, or man and beast, can be never quite externalized. As a modern puts it: "A man feels as he feels; there is little more to be said." * But a man *can* compare within himself the qualities of his experiences, and so come to know that some are superior to others. Socrates made the point, saying that only the philosopher can truly know that search for truth and beauty is better than gratification of 'appetite,' because with him only experience has compassed both. For a predictive scale of quality in experience, then, we must go to the richly experienced.

Intensity of feeling, at any rate, is not the measure of quality in experience. Most of us, limited though we are in experience, know that. There is no wholly certain ground for determining that the pain of a wounded dog is less than the pain of a wounded man, or that the pleasure of the dog with his bone is less than that of the man at his feast. Some senses of the lower animals, indeed, appear to be more acute than ours. The scent of anise delights the hound as it does not the hunter.

The most intense emotions are not the most humane. Anger and grief fill and exhaust us as they do our mammalian confrères. But by way of them we do not scale the heights of spiritual manhood. Such emotions are 'blind emotions.' In them experience centers and is fulfilled in feeling, not qualified by it. In short, 'the great human emo-

* Edward L. Thorndike. From a letter to T. H. E. Quoted by permission.

tions' are uncritical, and so inferior in quality to others more coolly pervasive, such as humor, admiration, feeling for truth and beauty, and the love that transcends desire.

The measure of quality is not to be found in the affective comfort, or even pleasure, that goes with successful adjustment. By happiness of that sort we cannot measure the refinements of experience. If 'a sense of satisfaction' here is the measure of quality, that 'sense' is rather a sense of worth than a sense of sufficiency or attainment. With discontent, indeed, may go a nobler humanity than with contentment, with pain than with pleasure. That Socrates declared, and Jesus. Goethe suggests it in his tale of Faust, and Spinoza * makes it a doctrine. Not by achievement, he said, but, by *seeking* and *striving*, man approaches the heights of his humanity.

From the physical side the intelligence of a man, as we call it, appears in the selective character of his doings. A man is intelligent in the degree that he selects out of 'the repertoire of his responses' those most appropriate to the occasion; appropriate in that they are means best fitted to present successful adjustment, or to other ends in biological success. Intelligence, therefore, is most clearly to be judged in the man animal when he faces a situation potentially provocative of a variety of responses, but to be dealt with

* The notion of 'a conative principle' in life is familiar in philosophy from the Greeks to Bergson. In psychology it still holds a place. McDougall, for example, postulates the principle in his account of mind. Even pragmatists who, inclining to 'a behavioristic psychology,' must still account for consciousness, do so by explaining its 'rise' in terms of resistance to neural impulse along the paths of its discharge. The case appears somewhat analogous to that of a wire which grows hot in ratio with the resistance it offers to a current of electricity. Thinking, by this account, begins 'at a fork in the road.' By the same token, thinking is conscious activity. The argument that in seeking and striving man reveals more fully the spiritual side of his nature than in his readily successful adjustments has, then, a considerable basis of support. (McDougall, W.: *Outline of Psychology*. Scribner's, N. Y., 1923.)

successfully only by making certain of them and not others, and, in general too, by ordering those made into a pattern fit to the requirements of success. In other words, the intelligence of a man is determined for the outsider by what he does in 'a problematic situation' calling for discriminative selection of his acts (*analysis*), and, most often too, organization of those acts (*synthesis*) to the resolution of his difficulty. Evidence of thinking so manifest in doing is commonly taken to be the best evidence of intelligence in a man, an ape, a dog, or other animal not regulated wholly in its behavior by 'the tropisms of inherited instinct.'

From the subjective or psychical side preferential selectivity in behavior, or intelligence, appears in *appreciation*, the valuing in experience of experiences. In ordinary speech, however, the word appreciation signifies most often *an* appreciation of something—for example, of a meal set before one, of a dress, of a landscape, of a painting, of a poem, of a tool or the use of a tool, of a play, of a song, of an argument set forth, of the act or the need of another, and so on to every detail and combination of details perceptible or conceivable in the world of which man is conscious. Appreciation thus enters into every experience so far as it conditions the meaning of that experience.

Appreciation of particulars is commonly and conveniently classified under four heads: (1) Practical appreciation; (2) moral appreciation; (3) intellectual appreciation; (4) aesthetic appreciation. Practical appreciation is an assignment of values by the measure of utility. Moral appreciation values experiences, especially social conduct, against conceptions of 'right and wrong.' Intellectual appreciation qualifies experiences in which understanding plays the main part; it suggests insight into forms and relations, and the measuring of an object in terms of what it is, with no necessary re-

gard to its uses, its bearings on conduct, or its appeal to taste. Aesthetic appreciation signifies the assignment of worth to an object in terms of the feelings or emotions evoked by it.

The four forms are not severally discrete. Judgment that is intellectual and preference that is aesthetic enter into practical appreciations and into moral appreciations. The most passionless of intellectual judgments is never quite free from an aesthetic determinant. Even logicians now grant that 'an affective factor'* plays some part in every rational decision as to 'the correct conclusion' from any set of premises. Into aesthetic appreciation must enter something of intellectual discernment of that which the taste of the moment measures. But there are, nevertheless, appreciations dominantly practical, or dominantly moral, or dominantly intellectual, or dominantly aesthetic, as the case may be; and such dominance suffices generally to distinguish one form from another. In moral, in intellectual, and in aesthetic appreciation, if not always in practical appreciation,* perhaps, the personality of a man becomes actualized at a level transcending that of any beast.

Appreciation at a humane level—that is to say, as distinguished from sensory selection and the preference of 'satisfying adjustment'—runs the gamut between 'warmly' aesthetic judgments and 'coldly' intellectual judgments. Between the niceties of valuation by the painter, for instance, the poet, the musician, on the one hand, and the fine discriminations of the scientist, the scholar, and the philosopher, on the other, the humane in experience finds its most certain locus. As to which, the most purely aesthetic or the most purely intellectual, stands higher to distinguish the humanity of a man, philosophers differ. Some would have

* James, W.: *Psychology*. Holt. N. Y., 1890.

it that search for beauty reveals man in his purest spiritual manhood, others the search for good, others the search for truth. And many hold that the three are strivings toward the same end, since beauty and goodness and truth are ultimately one. But almost unanimously they assure us that the finer qualities of experience lie within this domain. The realization of a man's most humane potentials, then, cannot be gained, as the modern novelist would have us believe, by a course in libidinous and gustatory ecstasies.

All this is to say that fullness and richness of life reside in the quality, depth, and breadth of its inward meanings. By the measure of quality every man is judge of what is of most worth in *his* experience. But by the standard of personality he will find those among his experiences to be of highest worth which least resemble the experiences of other animals.

Some have found it convenient to distinguish in the spiritual man two general levels of experience—a superior and an inferior. They see in him 'two natures,' the one a humane, the other an 'animal'* or infracumane nature. The duality is familiar in philosophy, literature, and theological discussion. So long as the distinction implies gradation rather than separation, it follows the argument from quality.

In literature sometimes, and in theology as a rule, the line between 'the higher nature' and 'the lower' is drawn by fiat, as it were. More than that, whatever is 'animal' in man is *ipso facto* despicable. Thus, in the Puritan view, all that belongs to 'the flesh' is vile. Not so, however, in the more generous conceptions of humanity. Plato, for instance, finds in the man-idea a place for 'appetites'—the pattern is imperfect without them. The sensory pleasures and pains of man are not unworthy of him, but only subordinate to nobler types of experience. A good man does not cast out

* Among moderns, for example, Count Herman Keyserling.

all desires, but rules and holds them in proportion. He gives the flesh its due, no more, no less.

Beyond quality *depth* of experience enters as a measure of personal and inner life. This is exemplified by the man who 'gives his life' to an art or a science, humble or exalted, but seeks to master all its meaning. Within the scope of it he comes to full and fuller, deep and deeper appreciation. In that he is not human only, but humane. No animal but man commits himself thus to develop all the potentials of an interest. The specialist, 'narrow' though we call him, is deep, and being deep finds worth in life somewhat proportionate to his depth of experience.

Breadth also belongs to personality. Wide and varied experience makes for the 'many-sided interest' and 'all-round readiness' of appreciation wherein, as many see it, 'the humane and liberal spirit comes to flower.' So, to exemplify 'the broadly human,' we are wont to point to the gentleman well travelled, observant, urbane, who, in a long career at school and college, has never 'specialized,' but studied here a bit and there a bit in many fields, who reads the high-class magazines, keeps up with the reviewers' recommended books, attends the new plays, concerts, art showings, and the rest. But multitudinous variety of experiences counts, as such, to no more than a superficial humanity. As often as not 'the broadly cultured man of the world,' as he is called, who mingles well with any company, and finds something of interest wherever he goes, lives, for all that, close to the surface of things. He 'knows,' as we say, 'many things,' but of nothing does he know much. His tastes are 'catholic,' yet his powers of criticism in any field are soon exhausted; with all his breadth he remains a 'shallow' man.

It would seem now that a man moves to realize his potentials of personality much in proportion as his experienc-

ing becomes increasingly deep, broad, and humane in quality. But that is not quite all. The realization of personality is integral, not summative. Assume numerous varied appreciations, deep searchings here and there; include therewith experiences of high quality; and you have, so to speak, ingredients proper to the making of a man. But "the *style*" * of their union still determines whether or not the product shall represent the fullest advance toward manhood.

The conception of 'the universal man' represents no mere agglomeration of attributes. Not breadth alone makes experience whole, or depth, or quality, but an ordered discipline therein. Life, by the measure of its spiritual meaning, becomes integral in proportion as every experience fits, as it were, into place enlarged, deepened, enriched by those that have gone before. The principle of *integrity*, difficult as it is to grasp and to state, lies at the core of any conception of personality, character, or what you will, that can serve to the measure of a man. Idealists, taking as their starting point 'man perfect in idea,' name the principle *development*.† Experience advances toward actualization of the possible best in a man as it follows the synthesis of attributes revealed in an ideal that is not person, but personality. The pragmatist, taking as his starting point a notion of manhood not perfect, but changing, calls the principle *growth*. In either case integration stands for orderly progression in the direction of fulfillment of a pattern somehow general, not peculiar, and restricted to this man or this moment of his being. "

* Whitehead, A. N.: *The Aims of Education*. Macmillan, N. Y., 1929.

† Horne, H. H.: *The Democratic Philosophy of Education*. Macmillan, N. Y., 1932. Compare the conceptions therein set forth of Professor Horne, idealist, and Professor Dewey, pragmatist.

Put in words more familiar, if not more enlightening, the integrating principle of a life of spiritual meaning is what we call a man's 'philosophy of life.' This Chesterton and James,* among many, hold to be the key to humanity, more important than knowledge, skill, or conduct, because it is the inward and ultimate determinant of worth in any and all of these. It has been called sometimes 'the religion' of a man, whether theistic or not; that which supplies the measure of *rightness* for all that he feels and thinks and does.

A man's philosophy or 'outlook on life' is, we are told, an expression of temperament, which is variously accounted for by heredity, by glandular secretion, or by 'early conditioning of the organism.' But, if the general disposition called temperament which 'colors' a man's feelings, thoughts, and actions, is all one with the uniting principle in experience, there is very little distinctively human about it. Dogs, certainly, reveal 'central tendencies in behavior' quite like those of men. As a man is by general disposition gloomy or cheerful, so may a dog be surly and aloof, or happy-go-lucky and confiding. The dog, it would seem, has a temperament not very different from that of his master.

The dog and his master may not differ much. The one may be as 'naturally' a grouchy pessimist or a naive optimist as the other. On the other hand, they may differ greatly. The man's 'pessimism' or his 'optimism' is a product not of temperament alone, but of intellect as well. A temperamental tendency is blind; a philosophy of life is not so. The integrative principle, then, is not directive only, but a property of that which it directs—of experience. This property in human experience appears most clearly as *pur-*

* James, W.: *Psychology*. Holt. N. Y., 1890.

pose.* A man without purpose anywhere in life, if such a one could be called a man, might suffer pains and enjoy pleasures—as idiots, for instance, appear to do—but the scope of his experience would be small indeed, and the quality low. He would face few difficulties, and his reactions in the face of them would be mere efforts at escape or avoidance.

In proportion as a man strives toward an end-sought his experience takes direction; becomes intelligent, ordered within the area of activities involved. That is true of every special purpose. By the same token, experiences harmonize, integrate in the degree that the directing purposes within them belong as parts to one whole. The disciplinary principle of life, accordingly, must be no merely temperamental 'set,' but a general and controlling purpose, of which all other purposes in detail are subordinate and contributory parts. A philosophy of life, then, includes a notion of what life ought to be, and an active intention to make it what it ought to be.

At this point, of course, the idea of *freedom* † in the reali-

*Dewey, J.: *Democracy and Education*. Macmillan. N. Y., 1916. Or almost any other of his numerous works.

† Physical science gives an account of man and the world which, as it unfolds, appears to confirm more and more clearly the conclusion of materialistic philosophy that 'free will' and 'self-determination' among men name notions having no solid foundation in reality. Every detail of behavior on my part or yours is but the effect of endless series of causes converging for the moment to produce it; we are but determinate parts of a vast and undetermined whole, the universe. Among philosophers, too, who find the base of all existence in a spiritual, and not in a physical reality, some have come to a like conclusion. One of the most profound of all ethical philosophers has said that what man calls his freedom is exactly proportioned to his ignorance of the causes of his behavior. That for which he cannot find a cause beyond himself must, he assumes, have its cause in him. So far as he finds himself thus "the cause of things," he holds himself to be free and the determiner of his own doings. But though in fact he has no true freedom, yet he does have in many matters "the sense of freedom." In this "sense of freedom," and in this only, does what man calls freedom consist. (Spinoza: *Ethic*. The reference here is not to physical causation only but to rational causes, as well.)

zation of the potentials of spiritual manhood comes to the fore. A man's purposing is human and genuine in the measure that it enters experience as his own; in other words, as it is *free*, or filled with "the sense of freedom." So far as his purposing is not thus free the man is not truly seeking and striving. He is, rather, coerced, pushed, 'conditioned'; the 'drives' in his behavior represent not his own urges active, but 'the urge of things' upon him.

II

Another way of depicting the pattern of spiritual manhood is in terms of *character* or virtue (*vir-tus*). Character appears in traits of consistency revealed not in appreciation only, but manifest in conduct. It has thus an objectivity more definite than can be given the idea of personality. At any rate, the pronouncements of philosophy are more positive and the civilized peoples of the world are more clearly agreed as to the essentials of character than as to what belongs to personality. Every civilization has its catalogue of virtues, every religion and ethical philosophy its code of virtuous conduct. The major virtues approved overlap in striking fashion, differing not so much substantially as in order of emphasis and detail of content. Though by force of might and custom 'morals change when you cross the river,' yet certain attributes of character are recognized as properties of manhood in every age of the history of civilization. Whether such are essentially fixed and eternal, or products of evolutionary change, or even 'mere abstractions,' they are the 'universals' which make the particular man a man and furnish the measures against which men judge him to approach the man he ought to be.

Socrates, Plato, the Greeks of the Periclean Age in general, found manhood in the virtues of wisdom, courage, tem-

perance, justice. These measure what a man is, and what he does because of what he is. They appear inwardly in the appreciative aspects of experience; outwardly in its executive aspects, most notably, perhaps, in social conduct.

A man is wise according to his grasp of truth; wise by the measure of his discernment of good in the light of truth; wise proportionately to his disposition and ability to seek the good. Most of us still find little difficulty with this—whether we take truth to be absolute or relative makes no difference. We find little difficulty, that is to say, except at one point. Unlike Plato we are far from sure that understanding of the good ensures a preference for the good. Indeed, rather commonly we take for wise the man who is prudent, foresighted, sagacious, even crafty, one apt in the use of means to ends, whether good or evil. The wisdom of the serpent, as we see it, is not the wisdom of the virtuous, but it is wisdom, for all that. But we grant that to see the good and desire it is possible; so that wisdom may become a virtue, a man grow toward the stature of his manhood more or less proportionately to the growth of his understanding.

In the Greek view courage and temperance follow upon wisdom. Courage, however, is not mere bravery. The courage of the soldier is not always the courage of manhood; for courage is not disregardful of dangers, not blindly faithful to convention or external command. The courageous man, as he is brave, is brave because the brave course is that to which wisdom points. On the other side, courage is more than Job-like patience to endure "the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune"; it means a resolute persistence in a chosen course only if that course is wise. When wisdom shows a better way, then courage moves a man to change from the worse to the better course. Courage, there-

fore, resides no less in thinking than in speech and action; it is to be found in the laboratory and the study as well as on the battlefield or the rostrum. Courage, in short, is the positive will to follow the ways of wisdom.

Temperance, we have seen, counts for biological success. But temperance is a virtue of spirit also. To be moderate in all things is wise; for approach to truth discovers good not in extremes, but between them. There lies 'the golden mean' revealed by reason. This the Greeks maintained; and so potent is the conviction with us still that common sense, like common speech, makes the 'reasonable' one with the moderate. To talk reasonably, play reasonably, eat reasonably, is to hold a course between extremes in such matters. 'Nothing too much'; that is the keynote of moderation in the life that is proper to a man. Temperance differs from courage as self-control differs from self-reliance.

The inwardly sensed enjoyment that attends a wisely controlled gratification of 'bodily appetites' does not, however, fulfill the requirements of a tempered spiritual life. One can, without harm to the bodily organism and its usefulness, indulge in many things that spiritual moderation forbids. One may, for instance, boast like a prize fighter, shout like a demagogue, or write like certain modern 'poets,' yet remain, after all, a sound and efficient animal. Even the expression of self-restraint in conduct may fall short of the 'reasonableness' proper to manhood. One who 'boils inwardly with wrath,' while he 'maintains a calm exterior,' may show an admirable forbearance, but he still lacks moderation of spirit. One must be tempered in his emotions and in his intellectual pursuits, as well. The man who pursues a single interest, however far and deeply, as in a science or an art, or a game like chess or golf, violates the principle of the mean—he is *too* narrow. One, on the

other hand, who 'takes everything as it comes,' with a modicum of appreciation, wide in his interests, but following nothing beyond its more immediate meanings, lacks balance also—he is *too* shallow. The man who leads a temperate life maintains through all of it the balance of 'proportion.'

As to justice, many nowadays seldom look to the inner side of it. They take it for the practice of impartiality, of 'giving every man his due'—thus making it a merely social virtue. So, 'the good citizen' is just, dealing fairly with his fellows in all matters wherein the laws of the state and the customs and beliefs of the people set standards of right conduct. More broadly conceived, the good man acts to promote and sustain the principle of 'social justice'—an order of human relations that helps every man to make the best of himself, with most of benefit and least of harm to others. But, whether taken narrowly or broadly, justice still finds its seat in action. A man is just in and because of his just doings.

In the Greek view a man does justly because he is just. Justice, of course, belongs to his doings, but the seat and measure of the justice of conduct are spiritual, not overt and external. The notion includes, therefore, rightness of conduct in human relations; but it goes further to imply rightness of conduct in relations not human. The good man is just to his neighbor, and just to his dog. More than that he is just in his ideas and feelings, not as those go with acts only, but independently of action. He is, for example, a man of 'intellectual honesty,' never within the limits of his understanding deceiving himself. This for the just man is quite as imperative as that he be upright in trade, or honest in what he says. "The justice of a state," said Socrates, "reflects the justice of its citizens"; the justice of the citizen, in turn, reflects the justice of the man.

So, justice becomes the integrating principle of character. It is the discipline of wisdom at work in feeling and thinking and doing, the order of 'rightness' that gives to every experience and purposed act its proper place in the developing whole. It would seem to be, above all things, an ordering by values determined against the measure of truth. To every man, then, justice is possible in the degree that he can approach realization of the good that insight to truth reveals.

The pattern of *character* depicted by the classic virtues is, plainly enough, the pattern drawn by wisdom. Wisdom guides courage, and through courage moderation; it moves to fulfillment by the discipline of justice. A man, therefore, is a man by the measure of the wisdom that governs his life. But religious thinkers, notably those within the Christian fold, find the man virtuous by wisdom not quite whole. To be wise, courageous, temperate, just, to the full that one's capacities permit, is to be a man, but, withal a man, perhaps, 'cold' or 'hard,' and not all that a man may be and should be. The good man is charitable. He is charitable wisely, to be sure, but more humane in his charity than in his wisdom. Charity suffuses warmth through all the virtues; without it the others are less than wholly human. By the radiance of charity character expands to include more than wisdom can see and judge and order. Wisdom becomes the agent of man's love for men, not the dictator of it.

The exalting of that feeling which begins in kindness to the highest level proper to human personality appears again in the use of the word 'humane.' A man humane is a man kindly, sympathetic, tolerant, lenient in judgment of another, and, at best, of all others; and this, on the side of spirit, is the spring and measure of all charity. For charity

begins within a man. Lacking it there, no one, whatever his acts and his givings, is truly charitable. He may 'do good,' but he is not good in his doings while he lacks therein 'the spirit of charity.' One, for instance, who 'by force of 'a drive for charity' is impelled to 'give till it hurts' may relieve much suffering by his gift; but his gift may be testimony rather to the efficiency of 'a committee of go-getters' than to his charity.

Benefaction is charity whenever with it goes the motive of charity. But benefaction is more than almsgiving—the poor man's coin in the beggar's cup, or the rich man's monument in a hospital centre. To feed and clothe the poor, to aid the sick and the distressed, these are ends of charity. But charity, as good will bound with benefaction, does not end in the alleviation of suffering and misery. Charity goes farther when it aims to prevent poverty and sickness than when it steps in to rescue the poor and the sick. It goes farther when it aims to prevent the mistakes of ignorance than when it tolerates, forgives, and acts to remedy those mistakes. In either instance a friendly word or act may mean more in terms of charity than the writing of 'a check in five figures.' For charity is proportionate to the good of men that it comprehends, on the one hand, and to its involvement of the charitable person, on the other. Put in another way, charity in doing is measurable outwardly by the good it serves; inwardly, by its enrichment of experience. It is, if you will, outwardly the virtue of humane conduct; but inwardly it is the property of a self enlarging in its humanity by union with other selves.

Charity, wisdom, courage, temperance, justice; under these heads in detail may be summed up the major virtues to which the great philosophies of the west and the east give sanction. Sometimes one, sometimes another, rates at

the top to comprehend and order the rest. But a union of them still depicts for seekers after truth, more widely than any other conception, the frame and essence of the spiritual man.

Personality depicts manhood in one view; character in another. That is, in the main, a just conclusion from what has been set forth here. But the two conceptions, clearly, are not identical. Certainly the two have appeared at times not as distinct only, but as discrete and without relation. Such marked differences in the conceptions of personality and character as appeared during the period of the Renaissance are worth noting, not because of their historical interest only but also because of the persistence of tradition from them in the beliefs of educators and the practices of education.

The ideal of manhood among the humanists of the Italian Renaissance is said to have been an ideal of personality; that of the humanists of the Reformation, an ideal of character. More than one gentleman of the Florentine court lived in a fashion largely to realize his ideal as person, but doing so became not the man whom Luther, or the more generous Erasmus, could approve. The Reformers aimed at virtue, and not at wealth of experience. Character they took to be essentially moral, and, spiritually, the governor of conduct for the good of men's souls. Personality, on the contrary, admitted to manhood experiences amoral, even conduct immoral. The Italian nobleman often sought to live as became himself, not as becomes 'the universal man.' He held not always to the fore that universal in him particularized, whereby a man is a man and not a beast. Rather, in many cases, he held to the fore that in his nature most peculiar to him; that through the realization of which he might become distinct from other men, whether in human-

ity or bestiality, or both together. He lived thus, not seldom, to emphasize his divergence from the universal, not his approach to its realization. Though he professed to follow the Greek ideal, yet sometimes he mistook individuality for personality; followed the ideal in one direction, and departed from it in another, and so became spiritually a hybrid monster.* The tradition of discreteness abides with us here and there. Some, among educators, declare that 'a liberal culture' has nothing to do with morality. On the other side we find schools and curricula dedicated to the special task of 'character building.'

Distinction, not separation, between personality and character appears in the sketches just drawn of the two. But the distinction does not imply an exclusion of character from personality. Rather, as here depicted, personality is the larger conception, inclusive of character, much as the conception of life includes the conception of human life. If this be so, then the process of personal development or growth is also a process of moral growth or development. Personality represents an orderly expansion and enrichment of spiritual meaning in life. Every experience which, by this standard, is valuable is proper to personality, whether action enters to give expression to appreciation or not. Character, on the other hand, is not fulfilled by inward meanings, but involves outward meanings as well. A good conscience does not suffice to make a good man. A good conscience and good intentions, certainly, are proper to personality, but they do not, as such, meet all the requirements of virtue. Charity, we have noted, calls for action; justice largely calls for action—one must act justly as well as judge justly. No man is temperate who feels and thinks temper-

* For instances of the sort read Browning's *My Last Duchess*, or *The Autobiography of Benvenuto Cellini*.

ately, but acts not temperately too. And so on. With morality comes in a double reference. There must be motive or purpose, which is inner and personal; and there must be action of significance beyond the person who acts. By the measure of its consequences, as well as by the measure of its motive, an act is a good act, or not good. A man with good intent may act to cause evil, or with evil intent to cause good. But no act is completely moral, unless it be good both in motive and in effect.

In theory, then—if, unfortunately, not always in practice—no conflict holds between personality and character. As I have the personality of a man, so far, too, I have the character of a man; for to that extent I order my doings according to the value of them, as I see it. I see the end that is good, and seek it; I use in action the means within my powers that are best to that end. All this because there lies the way to express the person that I am. But exactly this, no more, no less, virtue requires of me. Harmony between personality and character is not only possible, but by the logic of the conceptions here presented imperative.

As between the old and the young, or between the intelligent and the stupid, we tend to accept the standards of right and wrong from the old and the intelligent. The custom agrees with the notion that fullness and richness of experience make for virtue. Thus the parent is supposed to stand superior to the child, and the teacher to the pupil, in judgment of right conduct, and to exercise a certain authority to guide him in the course proper to manhood. Though the practice too often demands a sacrifice of personality to the appearance of virtue, yet it has reason behind it.

It seems a bit old-fashioned, one must grant, to suggest that manhood has nothing to do with mass in the mascu-

line jaw; that personality has nothing to do with a pleasing appearance; that virtue is not summed up in an inhibition still to be found among women left in some Victorian eddy of 'the stream of modernity.' But approach to, truth is in nowise closely commensurate with the 'advance of modern ideas.' Plato, it may be, conceived the truth of manhood not less clearly than Mr. Bertrand Russell. One may venture to say that Kant looked as far into the nature of man as Freud has done. Science cannot assure us yet that Goethe was more a man than Francis of Assisi, or that either was a finer personality or a nobler character than this or that man or woman among the multitude of 'the forgotten millions.'

III

A monistic philosophy assumes life to be *one* process. That process looked upon, as it were, from opposite sides, appears in the one aspect physical, in the other psychical. Some activities of life can be seen clearly in the physical aspect, but dimly, if at all, in the psychical; and *vice versa*. 'Reflex functions,' for example, appear as physical, but lack a psychical explanation; logical or reflective thinking is readily followed from the psychical viewpoint, yet is but faintly to be traced from the physical. What we see from either side, however differently it appears, is at bottom one and the same process. If this be so, then inevitably the physical and the conscious in experience march together. A dualistic philosophy, on the other hand, takes it that life represents *two* processes, a physical and a spiritual, but allows that these, in the world of earthly experience at least, run concurrently and somehow in parallel. If that be so, again the physical and the spiritual march in experience together. In the one case they go together like the upper

and nether surfaces of a plane; in the other, perhaps, like the two hands of a man.

Assume, then, that every physical function has its psychical counterpart, whether discoverable or not, and that every 'conscious event' has its physical base; and still it seems past dispute that the physical *values* of life and the spiritual *values* do *not* march together in the order of their weight. Behavior which, from one standpoint, appears to have high value may, from the other standpoint, appear to have less, or little, or none. Already so much is evident with the shift from a physical to a psychical view of behavior. But the principle is most clearly manifest when we compare the higher levels of biological utility with their spiritual counterparts.

"Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth." That commandment is the first laid on the biological man. From his contribution to the persistence and spread of his kind he derives his most significant justification for existence. But the spiritual value of propagation does not rank correspondingly high. The onmoving of mankind toward a perfection of spiritual manhood, or the continuing evolution of a norm of personality and character, demands, no doubt, that men should persist on earth to actualize, enlarge, and enrich human experience. But development, or growth, of the sort goes not exactly in step with increase of numbers and increasing mastery of earth's resources. No man, probably, can develop far his potentials for spiritual manhood without much dealing with his fellows and with the creations of men; but there is no evidence in history, and no support in reason, for a conclusion that spiritual progress among men is directly proportional to population or to the progress of material civilization. Obedience to the command, "Be fruitful," would appear to forward personality

and character only in this wise, and indirectly: by propagating and rearing those potentially most capable of creating and profiting from spiritual resources. If, without sacrifice of their own manhood, nobly spiritual men and women may mate and procreate abundantly, that they should do. But fecundity, by and large, has no special merit. Since, at the lower extremes, certainly—the imbecile and the feeble-minded—marked limitation of physical capacity implies similar limitation of psychical capacity, the eugenic principle finds support from the spiritual standpoint. On the other hand, success in procreation among the brilliantly exceptional—the genius and near-genius—counts more toward spiritual progress, probably, than any other biological function.

Survival likewise, the continuance in life of individual men, shrinks in importance with shift to the spiritual view. 'Self-preservation,' so far as it has a spiritual significance, points to a sustaining or strengthening of the integrity of manhood; and that, plainly enough, may demand on occasion the surrender of life itself. Much more frequently it may mean risk to the body, injury, lessened health, privation, a shortened life, bodily suffering. Greatest, by common consent, among the heroes of history are those who have died 'for a cause' or for an ideal, have laid down their lives for the good of mankind, for their friends, for the sake of honor, in pursuit of truth; and those who, holding fast to the right as they see it, have suffered much. These, we say, are truly men.

By the same logic the virtues of the man animal, health and efficiency, fall to a lower level of value on the scale of manhood than on the scale of success. Both, beyond doubt, are aids to enlargement of personality and character, but they are not so significant here as to success. Milton,

Stevenson, Steinmetz, were men, and great men, despite blindness, ill health, crippling; men of a stature never reached by swift Achilles.

Length of life and material prosperity may count as resources in developing spiritual manhood, but they serve not at all to measure that development. Wealth of experience, strength and beauty of character, go by no necessity with wealth of years or wealth of possessions. Indeed, it is hardly unsafe to say that a life easy, comfortable, prosperous, is likely to be a life neither full, nor rich, nor ordered by humane standards. One who lives a life thus 'successful' knows little of the free striving and purposeful seeking without which experience lacks scope and quality and discipline, or of the generous expression and giving of self without which virtue is an empty name. *Per ardua ad astra*; there is still something in that.

IV

By taking 'a good bath' one may exhibit a measure of virtue. Wisdom, justice, even charity, may demand that course of him. One may show in his love of the fine arts a discerning taste, wherein, of course, he plainly gives evidence of humane personality. If the bath be good, then the tub, the warm water, the soap, have value therein, as well as the rubbings and rinsings of the bather. If one's taste in art be good, then the art objects to which his taste gives order of preference are good in that order also. All of which is to say once more that a man and his environment are inseparable. 'Standards of living,' for instance, must be found in living, not in surroundings. A scale of values for environment corresponds with that which applies to a man.

Taking first the most inward objects of experience: The spiritual in experience is to be found at its purest in the interaction of meaning with meaning; as when a man reacts with idea upon idea. Many of us live from time to time in momentary approximation to this pure spirituality, when in 'a state of reverie' or of 'the detachment of concentrated thinking.' Sense takes part, so to speak, only in the fringes of present experience; focally we live for the moment in the meaning of a meaning, in disregard of things present, of men, and of events in the physical world.

A mere 'onstreaming of consciousness,' however, lacks the integrating discipline of purpose. In this it contrasts with that critical thinking upon which philosophers place so high a value. The 'adventuring in ideas,' which is reflective thinking, has purpose, and the consequent orderly integrity of style. Yet one who lives 'in reasoned contemplation' only, is not therein quite the man that he might be. By his 'withdrawal from the world' he denies himself the full realization of character in those virtues which must include practical dealings with men and things and events. His withdrawal restricts his personality, especially as to scope; for, to grasp all the meaning of any particular, one must grasp the meaning which is given by sense—and to limit the range of perceptions is to limit the breadth of experience. One 'lost in thought' loses, in proportion to the continuance of his 'abstraction,' that touch with the outward which both extends appreciation and opens the way to new depths therein. Life has its foreground of meaning in the human, no less than its background in the humane.

With maturity of spiritual manhood goes a relatively increasing independence of material resources. A man so depends less and less upon the company and support of other men—upon entertainment provided, sympathy ex-

pressed, approval won, and the like. His virtues become more and more comprehensive; their outlets less and less particularized. The affairs of life take on order and proportion, in which the immediacies sink more and more to a subordinate place. The man grows, as common usage has it, 'philosophical.' 'Little things' worry him less; 'successes' seem to him less important than once they were. The spiritual in his environment plays an increasingly greater part than the material.

With such maturing goes, as Socrates did not fail to note, a danger of withdrawal from the practical world; for the whole man is a useful man, and fails of wholeness if he foregoes his usefulness. Integrity demands the casting out of no good from life, but only the ordering of goods in life—and usefulness is good. Completeness of manhood, therefore, forbids completeness of withdrawal from the common world of men. With this, the Greek notion, popular estimates of worth in men still sometimes fall in line. The recluse, the indifferent, lack something of full manhood, whatever their stature. The college professor, for example, is likely to be looked upon as 'not quite human.' Tradition has it that he is so much given to inner concerns that he neglects the outer. The amplest manhood requires an inclusion of the material with its meanings, and not a continuing consecration to ideas as such.

The material enters environment with the largest aura of meaning in the case of symbols. An environment of symbols ranks high in value to the spiritual life of a man. The most conspicuous instance is that of language. Language is not only the chief vehicle for expression of order, refinement, and moving quality in human experience, but, by the same token, most likely among all influences that partake of the material to evoke experiences rich, and deep, and

broad. At the same time, because it is the most far-reaching means to communication of men with one another, language offers outlet to virtue—in wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, charity. Not for practical reasons only, therefore, it is the chief medium of spiritual culture.

Literature, in the large sense of the word, ranks high as a medium to the realization of 'the universal' in man. In literature that which is "of the first order of worth" we call 'classic.' Its worth, in the first instance, is private—an expression of the nobly humane in the spirit that gave it birth. In the second instance, its worth is, as it were, public—belonging to its effect upon those who deal with it as a resource of life. In this instance 'the universality' of the classical appears in the consistency of its 'appeal' to the humane in man. For this reason the new-born classic must earn its title, often so becoming 'a classic' only centuries after its production.

Truth, beauty, and goodness, however, are ageless. Discovery and expression of them are not confined to any time or to any people. Some times have been rich in spiritual genius, or near-genius, and some peoples; others have not been so. But neither age nor accepted designation has anything to do with the classic value of a literary product; the measure of its value is the humanity it expresses and evokes. A book, a poem, a speech, may be a classic, whether produced twenty-four centuries ago under the shadow of the Acropolis, or twenty-four hours ago under the shadow of a barn in Maine.

The objective influence of language—that is to say, its 'humanizing value' in environment—hardly more than begins with word-meanings; it counts further to develop the finer discriminations of appreciation, when forms and structures have become familiar. One who reads easily, for ex-

ample, by possession of a large vocabulary and 'a ready command of syntax,' finds much that is written intelligible, and can expand and deepen his understanding and enrich the quality of his appreciation for many things, by reading; but still he falls short of profiting from the best until the style of language also has attained for him objective meaning. It is the style in literature, as in other things, that makes the classic; for, by way of style, not by way of words and grammar, the unity, the proportion, and the delicacy of appreciation that are most humane may be most fully expressed. So expressed they 'bring out' a corresponding spiritual reaction only in those to whom style has become itself meaningful.

For that reason profit in personality and character from writings of the first order of worth can come fully only to those who have made objective and familiar the modes of linguistic expression that belong to the classical. If the classical overlaps the vernacular, as it does in all present languages of the west, then, of course, mastery comes sooner than when the words and usages fall outside the pale of ordinary discourse. One may profit sooner from the classics in his own tongue than from those of another tongue. On that ground it has been suggested that the Scotch peasant* of the day of Burns, who knew not a word of Greek or Latin, often gained from literature a richer increment than did the schoolboys of Eton and Rugby passing through six 'forms' in the classical studies. His single classic came to exert upon him early and throughout life an influence of the first order of worth; whereas the boys of the public schools in large part 'dropped' their classics before those had become for them classic at all.

Men write, as they speak, of 'every subject under the sun,'

* Adams, J.: *Evolution of Educational Theory*. Macmillan. N. Y., 1912.

and write with appreciation in all degrees from the most delicate and harmonious to the grossest and most discordant. From the classic to the tabloid is a long descent, but the descent is gradual, and the steps thereof are short and many. Literature is of all kinds, and all degrees of merit. Never has it been so widely influential as now. But the sort of literature that enters most often the lives of most men who read distorts the order of values, even in the lower areas of experience with which it deals. It makes for a disorderly and superficial appreciation of the world. If men should live according to the scale of values that the most widely disseminated reading matter keeps to the fore, then the humane in life must be deeply buried beneath the sensual and the material. But men do not so live as a rule. That which makes news for the daily paper and 'interest' for the magazine tale has to be the exceptional, not the ordinary. Men, because they are men, must reveal by and large something of the humane that belongs to the pattern which makes them so. Nevertheless, the effect of a literature which depicts the life of men as a miscellany of spiritual abnormalities serves inescapably, so far as it goes, toward making the abnormal the normal. The 'spread of literacy' is no accomplishment of which to boast, unless with it go enrichment of appreciation and strengthening of virtues that belong to manhood.

The same valuation applies to 'the spoken word' as to the written. The converse that one holds with his fellows is potent to his spiritual development. But converse at a high level is rare—and few men find opportunities there. It is far easier to find a book of noble worth than to find a man who speaks in comparable utterances. In our country, at least, the mores are against the noble in speech. Many who read good books deny companionship to the man who

'talks like a book.' Speech from the pulpit and the public platform is seldom classic—though, again, men will listen to thought and feeling expressed in sermon or lecture that they turn from in conversation. The radio and the talking pictures bring us speech that ranges from the slang of the popular columnist upwards, if rarely to the classic level. The stage sometimes goes high, but it descends also to depths not yet allowed to 'the radio speaker' or the 'screen actor.' For the many, at any rate, the written word offers resources of a higher order of spiritual worth than the spoken word.

Symbols, obviously, are not exhausted in language. Language has been taken only as an instance for the spiritual valuation of environment. Music furnishes another example, to which the same commentary largely applies. Music, indeed, has been called 'a language of the soul.' Certainly it can express and evoke appreciations impossible to language, though the range of its possibilities is less. Painting, sculpture, and architecture belong to 'the fine arts,' celebrated for their humane expressiveness and their 'humanizing influence.' They have in them not quite the pure symbolism of language at its best—since in their most immediate perceptible forms they 'tell a story' as words do not. Their refinements go at times, nevertheless, beyond anything that language can produce. They reveal truth and beauty through a gradation from the classic to the vile, hardly less extensive. But in spiritual influence they neither do nor can be made to enter the lives of the many so abundantly as literature and music. Painting, to be sure, is mobile in its products. But the painting loses in the copy as the manuscript does not in the printing, or even the song in reproduction. Pictures of paintings and of statuary and of buildings may be given wide circulation, but not 'the orig-

inals.' Fulllest spiritual profit from the fine arts, then, is reserved to the comparatively few.

The products of the fine arts, for all their spiritual significance, remain material artifacts. They carry generally more of physical objectivity than do the productions of the writer and the musician. Further, the artist-painter must know his paints and oils and brushes, be skilled to select the materials with which he works; skilled in a variety of manipulations; paper and pen suffice for the writer, even the writer of a classic. The sculptor, likewise, is required to know the properties of materials as the violinist, say, is not, and the singer still less. The architect, too, concerns himself with 'the properties of materials'—otherwise he is no architect, but only designer or draughtsman. There is a great deal of material technology in the fine arts.

To pass from the fine arts to 'the practical arts,' so called, one need leap no chasm. Distinction of artist from artisan is a matter of shading. We are accustomed to make the distinction by the measure of ends sought. The product that is the purposed outcome of the artist's work is an expression of his conception of this that is true or beautiful, and not of what is useful; if, so happen, it proves a convenience for safety, subsistence, productive efficiency, comfort, well and good. But that is incidental. The artisan, on the other hand, aims at a product that shall be useful; if therein be expressed or thereby evoked humane appreciation, that is a secondary matter.

But the distinction is difficult, and often quite misleading with respect to cultural effects. Language, at the height of symbolism, has, as we know, a prime practical importance. Without it neither artist nor artisan could advance far in mastery of his work; without it most collective undertakings for material welfare could not be carried on. Even

music is sometimes useful to ends beyond the satisfaction of those who hear it, e.g., in military affairs. Buildings, however magnificently conceived and impressive, are seldom altogether useless. Art cannot be wholly divorced from practicality, or practicality from art. The history of artifacts shows the two not only compounded, but united. The ancients and the people of the Middle Ages, for example, embellished their ships and their weapons to add to their beauty. But in the making, no less, they expressed insights to truth and feeling for beauty apart from all embellishments, and found them in products unadorned. In the swift ship the lines that made for speed were lines of beauty; the 'true blade' of sword or scimitar was 'perfect' in its beauty no less than in its serviceability. It follows that there may be high art in artisanship, and that spiritual profit may come from an environment of useful things.

The tradition of separation between the cultural and the useful is so strong that rarely do we accord the title 'classic' to any product notably useful. But we grant to some such products the designation 'masterpiece,' which has come to name also notable classics in literature, music, painting, sculpture, architecture, and the rest of 'the purer arts.' We allow by implication sometimes that the workman's masterpiece, be he engineer, cabinet maker, breeder of horses, may carry with it a spiritual influence of considerable worth. Logically an order of spiritual values for useful artifacts runs the scale in a fashion similar to the rating of the purely artistic. There is no doubt, either, that the scales lap largely, and that some useful things rank higher as resources for the development of spiritual manhood than many others of which the sole meaning is taken to be spiritual.

This conclusion leaves room for the culture of manhood in an environment of the practical. The thing that evokes

a reaction of 'successful adjustment' may enter also an appreciative experience of refined quality. The work of the farm, the home, the office, the hospital, the shop, carries with it no necessarily complete exclusion from experiences that enlarge and enrich, or a denial of growth in virtues not purely social, expedient, and useful.

At no time have artifacts played so large a part in the lives of men as at present. By division of labor and use of machines the number and variety of material goods have been multiplied to such an extent that the people of the state of New York possess, probably, a greater quantity and range of them than did the people of all Europe a hundred years ago. Despite that, the spiritual effectiveness of this field of material influence has hardly kept pace with the enlargement of it. Artisan-ship, if not art, declines with increasing use of machinery. The machine tender, no matter what his appreciations and virtues may be, can put nothing of them into the product he turns out. With standardization of processes and products for the sake of pecuniary profit, only the inventor or designer of a new product has opportunity to express himself therein; and, since marketability on the large scale dictates the preferable form, that opportunity is strictly limited in many instances. One can hardly doubt that the environment of most men at work in a machine age is little conducive, as they find it, to elevate spiritual manhood in any high ratio to the potentials that men in most instances possess.

The natural environment, unlike the literary, artistic, and technical, does not supply a medium for expression. To make over a natural thing in anywise is to make it, in so far forth, artificial. Men add sometimes to the beauty of landscapes—as in the noble parks of England—but doing so they alter 'the naturalness' of them. But to find in

natural things something of truth, beauty, goodness, order, is at once to objectify their meanings, so that, in turn, like symbols and artifacts, they become spiritual influences. "To him who in the love of Nature holds communion with her visible forms, she speaks a various language," whether in the voice of poetry, of religion, or of science. A man may 'dwell in the midst of nature' with little more of insight and valuing thereof than his dog; or he may be 'inspired by the wealth of his surroundings' as by few works of man—the one or the other according to the measure of perceptual meanings enlarged and enriched in objectivity by previous experiences. Many 'classics' suggest the humanizing possibilities of nature. The highest in literature and art is not always a product of urban influences—and as to religion, some have said that it is never so. Wordsworth was not less a man than Whitman. The noblest conceptions of religion, philosophy, literature, and even of painting, have often found their origin in the effects of a natural environment upon the spirit of man.

Men express appreciations in their bodily actions as well as by what they make and say. By facial expression, gesture, carriage, movement, a man can show nuances of feeling and discernment quite impossible to language, the fine arts, or artisanship. No small part of the art of the theatre is founded upon this principle. Pantomime, indeed, is an art itself. The 'art of the dance' rests upon spiritual significances in carriage and movement. The Greeks, as we know, made much of it as a cultural influence. Manners, again, often show forth refinement and integrity—in their origin, at least. When taken for more than 'mere matters of form' they may have humanizing effect. The spiritual values of contact with men extend beyond the limits of converse; and

the scale of those values likewise runs from the rarely high to the commonly low.

V

Societies have value variously against the spiritual measure. They may be rated according to the influences they exert upon participants, and by those which they exert upon 'outsiders.' Judgment of them thus becomes difficult, since the standard is a double one. Quite confidently one may assert that the best of societies, from the standpoint of humanizing value, are those which count at the same time toward fullness and richness of personality, strength and integrity of character, among their members and all others whom the existence and functions of the organization affect. But, if asked to compare by the proposed standard this society with that, he will find himself generally at a loss. For all that, his difficulty is not one of logic, but of knowledge. If he could but know all the effects, his judgment, say, of this type of school as compared with that, this type of industrial concern as compared with that, this type of state as compared with that, would be sound by the measure of his understanding of spiritual worth in man.

Certain mediaeval societies, so tradition tells us, exemplify high worth by the double reference. They served at once to ennoble their participants, and by way of the functions they performed to influence others in like fashion. Among them are those forgotten societies which built the great cathedrals; societies in which, it is said, every member realized and expressed something of his own spiritual worth by his loving care in contribution to a magnificent harmony of the whole. It is probable that we conclude from the product too much as to the society which produced it. One

can hardly believe that the work, under a feudal system, was a labor of love in every detail. But surely a large measure of spiritual freedom did characterize the work of many participants.* An exhibit of the sort lies closer to us in the players of Oberammergau—at least, before the ‘profit motive’ was brought to bear upon the Passion Play.

In our own times and country, as elsewhere in the world, there are still societies wherein the dual sanction of spiritual service is well earned—societies of scholars, of scientists, of religious folk, among them. Some museums and libraries are more than mere instruments to public service; they are media, as well, for personal development of a high order among the staff. Expressive artistry finds here and there a place in the commercial field. Certain publishing houses are said to furnish good examples. In them, from the editorial office to the printing shop, every worker, or nearly every one, is free, so they tell us, to ‘put something of himself’ into the product of the house, and that product, typically, is of a high order of humane worth. Schools there are, in which spiritual values are to the fore; in which freedom prevails in harmonious relations among teachers and pupils and administrative officers; schools whereof the example and the efflux of graduates extend widely a humanizing influence.

Yet it is not to be forgotten that slaves under the lash built the pyramids, lifted the pillars of the Parthenon, laid the walls of the Colosseum. Men by the score and the hundred still work quite slavishly in many a prosperous and efficient concern to produce spiritually significant goods—such goods as bibles, for instance. To the spirit therein they contribute nothing; of the spirit therein they partake not at all. A society of ‘splendid efficiency,’ routinized, mechanic, uninspiring in its influence upon all, or all but a few, of its mem-

bers, denying them at every point outlet in expression, may yet produce products of a nobly humanizing sort.

On the other side, there are societies which serve their members well in a spiritual sense, while they offer nothing to enlarge and enrich the lives of others. Every member, it may be, finds within the society room to express measurably his own appreciations and virtues, and by doing so to evoke the like in his fellow members. But nothing comes out that is available to others than the members. Thus, a literary society, genuinely critical and creative, may publish nothing, or an art club spiritually profitable to members may reserve all exhibits to 'private view.' Associations of collectors join to gather for their own many precious and humanely significant things, but keep them sometimes wholly to themselves. Clubs of the 'well-to-do' have been known to 'buy up and preserve' certain 'beauty spots,' and not only to 'keep the public out,' but to go so far as to build high walls or plant thick hedges to shut off the spots from sight of harmless passers-by.

Enough has been said to suggest that major defects of societies, from the spiritual standpoint, are to be found in two characteristics: one, a denial of free purpose and striving and expressive outlet to their members; the other, exclusiveness. The one limits the spiritual growth of members; the other that of outsiders. Societies characterized by either defect fall short of being spiritually the best in types of human association.

The restrictive effects of exclusiveness in a society are not confined to outsiders. A society genuinely humane in influence upon its members may still limit the scope of experience for them much in proportion to its hold upon them. All associations, to be sure, are for the time they engage a man definitive of the influences that bear upon him. Even

the ephemeral associations of converse hold a man to the matter in hand, for the moment at least—I cannot attend to A while I talk with B. But most of the dozens, scores, or hundreds of different associations in which most of us take part daily can hardly be called exclusive. They do not hold us long. But some societies do so notably. The woman 'wrapped up' in her family duties, no matter how fortunate in family and home, so shuts herself off from many influences for spiritual development. Markedly restrictive in this way are those variously named or unnamed societies which maintain among their special mores a belief in superior 'standing,' which sets their members apart from other human beings. Though 'exclusive' societies of the sort do now and then exert influence truly humanizing so far as it goes, yet because they demand of members avoidance of certain associations with outsiders, they hold growth to somewhat arbitrary limits. It often happens in such cases that men and women of first-rate potentials become snobs, far less advanced in maturity of person and character than many less able persons among the folk whom they affect to despise. Put in another fashion, a society, be it family, club, school, or state, which tends to segregate its members from the world's wealth of spiritual resources, ranks, in proportion to its provincialism, below the level of the best. *

Shift in values with shift in the point of view has appeared once more. A society of high worth in biological utility may have by the spiritual measure, a low value; the two levels of value, at any rate, have no necessarily close correspondence. Consider, for example, a food-manufacturing-concern. It turns out at a low price savory, nourishing, wholesome products, of uniform standard. By doing so it serves directly to the satisfaction and subsistence of many people; indirectly it contributes to the successful rearing of

children, and so makes for still higher biological success. Its factory buildings are well lighted, well ventilated, properly warmed and cooled, neat and sanitary. The labors required of employees are in no case exhausting. Workers are protected from injury by 'the most modern safety devices.' Rest rooms, shower baths, and other 'conveniences' are provided for them. They are well paid, reasonably secure as to tenure, each assigned to 'a job' for which he is well fitted. The concern exemplifies both in its serviceability and in its care for all its workers 'the industrial ideal' of many a modern economist. It fulfills that ideal still further by 'the remarkable efficiency' of an organization 'highly patterned,' carefully systematized throughout. Every worker 'knows exactly what he has to do, and how to do it,' and each to whom he is responsible. 'The whole thing runs like clock-work.' It has, too, 'the flexibility of an eight-cylinder engine,' and can be 'speeded up or slowed down' as market demands require, with no alteration of the pattern and no injury to the societal mechanism. It is, in short, a very good society, by the measure of utility.

But, examined as medium for the development of spiritual manhood, it ranks low. There is ease in it, but little freedom, little striving, little in the way of creative outlet, little need for thinking, except by a few as accident or 'uncontrollable circumstances' may require it. The planning has been done and the routine established, habits perfected. The challenge of difficulty and the call for initiative have been, so far as may be, abolished from the whole undertaking and every part of it. Thus, clearly, if the human beings who take part therein are to develop in personality and character they must do so mainly in spite of, and apart from, this society in which so comfortably, safely, and usefully, they play their parts. This they may do, to be sure; but the 'ideal

concern' to which they belong helps them little or not at all to do so. 'The goose step' has its uses. It is an efficient means to ends not a few. But its relation to spiritual freedom and development is like that of 'the lock-step' to bodily freedom and development. Regimentation and routinization of the sort it implies deny, in general, freedom, on the one hand, and offer nothing or little to forward development on the other.

It is no doubt easy for the generous idealist to overestimate the spiritual possibilities of the run of men. It is no less easy, and far more common, I believe, to follow the aristocratic tradition and underestimate them. Most men, for all their ready subjugation to the mores of immediate success, are born with potentials not strictly moronic. Even a moron, perhaps, can rise to find meanings and significances in his work somewhat beyond what, too, often, an externally imposed routine affords. Work, for most of us, need not be, as so often it is, looked upon as a spiritual curse, from which redemption comes only in an all too scanty leisure. Work, no less than leisure, becomes a spiritual blessing proportionate to the scope and quality and discipline of experience that it provides. Any society, economic or other, which robs its members of opportunity to understand and value their places therein and the parts they play, to express in what they do something of what they are, remains, by the spiritual measure, a society unworthy of men, however good it be in effect upon material welfare. A society, therefore, family, productive concern, school, state, is likely to lack worth for most of its members very much in the degree that its functioning is planned, managed, and controlled by one man, or by a few, leaving the rest mere executants to the prescriptions of authority. For example, Fascism and Communism move, it may be, toward a material efficiency superior to that of

democracy; but, as supplying media to self-realization in spiritual manhood for the mass of men, they are immeasurably inferior to any democracy.

Summary. (I) The life of a man is to be seen, from the psychical side, as the process of his *experience*, as a serial continuum of "conscious events" or experiences not singular, isolate, severally complete in themselves, but only relatively so, flowing one into another, so to speak, like a chain of pools or lakes in a stream, through channels variously tenuous, obstructed, shallow, or broad, open, deep. Experience has, in the spiritual view, intrinsic value; taken in the large it supplies, too, the measures for valuing of its content. Every experience, as part of the whole, thus carries some worth in its own right; not all its meaning is referable to its antecedents and its consequences. Yet every experience has its effects, whether in learning, in 'adjustment,' or otherwise. These effects, except they be conscious, have no spiritual value in themselves. They owe their psychical significance to the experiences from which they spring, or to the further experiences to which, in turn, they open the way. Activity, then, which, in the physical view, derives its worth from the end it serves may have, in the psychical view, worth in itself. On the other hand, that which represents for the man animal an achievement and an end represents for the man person, in contrast, a means, a condition, a resource to the furtherance of experience.

That which makes a man a person is *personality*. Personality conceived as a 'universal' is a basic pattern variously differing in strength of its potentials among men, and still more variously, of course, actualized and exemplified in the conscious life of particular persons. This principle implicit in all spiritual manhood, though never clear and perfect

in exhibit, moves, nevertheless, toward fulfillment in particular much as a man's experience is deep and broad, filled with meaning, permeated with the discriminative refinement of quality called humane, ordered by the integrative discipline of free purpose so that "it contains the care of the past and the future in every passing moment of the present." * So deepening, broadening, growing in richness and integrity, experience appears as the conscious being-in-becoming which *is* the spiritual man.

(II) The principle of spiritual manhood is conceived also as *virtue* or *character*. In basic pattern character is constituted of traits of behavior consistently embodying a preferential distinction of good from evil, most notably in conduct affecting human relations. The elements of character, named in their turn the virtues, are catalogued variously and variously esteemed among men. But, in the history of civilization, a large measure of agreement is evident in respect of essentials. Those virtues which men have honored most widely and persistently may, without great straining, be connoted generally under the familiar heads of *wisdom, courage, temperance, justice, charity*.

Personality comprehends character. The man who as person sees and values, so far as his understanding permits, whatever is true, or beautiful, or useful, is one who sees too and values the good that lies in them—one who discovers his preference for the good not in his feelings only, or his thoughts, but in his acts as well. A development of human potentials in accord with the principle of personality carries with it development of character.

(III) Doings of the man animal and experiences of the man person go together as events in time. But values physical and psychical in the same instance of behavior have no

* Joseph Conrad.

necessarily close correlation. Many activities useful to success for species, race, or breed, and many effective to survival of the individual, involve little or nothing in the way of humane experience; many experiences rich in quality and far reaching as to intellectual and aesthetic significance end in achievements—if so they end at all—of small practical worth. Thus *efficiency*, *health*, possession of *wealth*, despite the sensed satisfaction, pleasure, ease, comfort, and so forth, that go with them, rank not so high by the spiritual measure as by the physical. The conclusion carries, however, no corollary that the outward and the inward values must be in every instance of behavior inversely proportional.

(IV) From the psychical standpoint the objects with which a man interacts, the particulars of his environment, are to be valued by the same standards as serve to measure worth in his experiences. As they influence him to appreciations of the humane order they rank in general from high to highest; but sensory perceptions and objective meanings of the useful have their import to scope and orderliness in the experience-whole which gives them value also.

Spiritual objectivity is at its purest in ideas and the products of imagination—as in speculation, contemplation, reverie, rhapsody. But at its purest it is not always highest. In the mind of genius, perhaps, the highest is often the purest. But with lesser men the stimulus of material symbols is like to produce situations more humanely influential than are the ideas and images which, unaided, they create for themselves. For this reason the material expressions of the humane spirit in literature and speech, in music, in the drama, in painting, in architecture, in the plastic arts, tend to rate high in 'humanizing value.' At the top stand 'the

classics,' and especially those of literature, because of its widespread availability.

The distinction of art from artisanship, however, is a matter of shading. In the production of useful artifacts expression of humane appreciations goes sometimes far and deep, so that the objective meanings and significances of things useful are by no means always less promotive of humane development than the products of purer artistry. For enlargement of scope in experience, too, the useful in man-made environment supplies a complement to the artistic quite as essential to wholeness of person as is the humane. But it can hardly be questioned that the machine, despite its contributions in material benefits, has, with standardization of a multitude of products and denial of expressive outlet for appreciation in the producers of them, diminished relatively the spiritual effectiveness of the products of workmanship.

'The natural environment,' as such, supplies no expressive outlet in creation of material forms. But it can become, and does become for many men, a source of influences primarily spiritual and nobly enriching. This it becomes increasingly as men confer upon it meanings beyond its uses. Men thus confer upon the natural world meaning largely in proportion as their learning has been guided toward appreciation of its stabler forms and its passing phenomena.

(V) The forms of intercourse and of collective enterprise are to be judged, like the activities of individuals and the objects of environment, by their bearings upon the welfare of men. Societies thus may be valued by reference to the good of their members, on the one hand, and of outsiders affected by them, on the other. By the spiritual measure a society ranks high in proportion as it evokes freely purposeful striving, each in his part, among members and at the

same time as it spreads, by way of its products, a humanizing influence among those who have to do with them. *Per contra*, a society rates low in proportion to its limitation of freedom, of initiative, originality, creativeness among its members, and to its restrictive or 'non-humanizing' influences upon outsiders. Between the extremes of the spiritually best and the spiritually worst, societies range through all degrees of worth. Midway, as it were, stand those of high worth to members, but of low worth to others, and those of small worth to members, but of high worth to others.

It is clear again that material value and spiritual value in the same instance have no necessarily close correlation. The army type of organization characteristic of highly efficient collective undertakings tends to rate low on the spiritual scale, in terms of worth to participants, and when devoted, as so often it is devoted, to ends purely utilitarian, still lower. On the other side, societies of high spiritual worth have seldom a commensurate utility. The principles of regimented routine and of freedom in search and creative striving are opposed. When the first dominates a societal pattern, spiritual worth in that society sinks low; when the second dominates, practical utility sinks low. In collective enterprise far ~~more~~ often than in individual undertakings efficiency in achievement conflicts with freedom of purpose. Initiative and expressive outlet for the individual, on the other hand, tend more or less to hinder or limit efficiency in the collective whole. On such grounds rest the chief ethical distinctions between autocracy, whether in the state, in industry, in the school, in the family, or in any other society, and democracy. The first, by and large, makes for superior biological utility; the second for the realization of spiritual manhood.

CHAPTER V

A SOCIAL VIEW OF VALUES

I

Men's activities and their environments may be valued according to their biological utility, and according to their meaning in experience. The forms, processes, products, influences, of society are subject to valuation by the same principles. A state, a family, a language, a conversation, a ritual, a cathedral, these owe whatever worth they have to their use for the man animal, on the one hand, and their meaning to the man person, on the other. To look upon life from a standpoint called social enables one to discover no standards superior to *use* and *meaning* for judgment of value in it.

Nevertheless, to invoke social standards by which to value the behavior of men and their environments is often wholly consistent with acknowledgment of standards ~~more~~ nearly ultimate than those which society affords. Men are at the same time social animals and social persons. By way of their societies they go further to achieve biological success than by other means; by way of them, too, they enlarge experience, enrich its quality,* and build up resources for the realization of spiritual manhood beyond what is possible in other ways. A society active to service of a success is likely to count further toward that success than the acts of any individual directed to the same end; a society effec-

tive to enlarge and enrich experience by inclusive sharing of it among numbers may provide a medium for development of personality and character that is superior to any that a member can provide for himself. In general, then, a society which is good for men physically and spiritually carries a presumptive value above the value of the individual member. Though society is a means to success and a resource of self-realization, and so subordinate to men, yet men, at the same time, are means to society, and so, for their own sake generally, subordinate to the major organizations, at least, in which they unite.

There is no paradox in a proper use of social standards to judge the worth of men and the world with which they deal. The man who behaves in a fashion to promote the useful, the enlarging, and the enriching in society is a good man, in so far forth, both as animal organism and as spiritual person. Not all his possibilities as a man, perhaps, can so be realized, for the social is not all of life. But the greater, and in the main the better, part of his human potentials move thus furthest toward fulfillment. One is most usefully a man in service to his kind; he becomes in spirit most fully a man by sharing himself with his fellows.

If this be granted, then social obligation upon the individual follows. It is laid upon him to do what he can to bring about ways of living and working together among men that shall serve best the requirements of manhood, physical and spiritual. To meet the obligation he must be, so far as his abilities and resources permit, socially efficient and socially appreciative. He is socially efficient in the measure that his conduct makes for the good in social forms, functions, and products; he is socially appreciative in the measure that he discerns and values the good in social processes and social effects. To be socially efficient he must be

ready to act toward his fellows, or jointly with them, in ways that count toward biological success and personal growth for those affected by his conduct. To be socially appreciative he must be ready in understanding of the forms, the processes, and the effects of society, so far at least as he is presently capable of taking part in or dealing with them. Beyond a mere understanding he must have standards for judging worth therein, among which his preference goes with the better as against the worse. At his best, then, the social man is a social conformist and a social critic, within the limits of his ability. He conforms variously to social requirements, but deliberately and not blindly. He selects and adopts those forms of social behavior which, for the occasion and under the limits imposed by custom, law, and the like, are the best that offer, yet moves as he can to promote better forms when opportunity allows. He works, that is to say, and lives with his fellows according to the dictum of Paul: "Prove all things; hold fast to the good." By holding to the good he helps toward *social stability*; by his readiness to adventure and his willingness to give over the good for the proved better he helps toward *social progress*.

II

Between what one does and what he would most prefer to do there is on many occasions a difference. In the 'give and take' of experience a man's conduct represents more often than not a compromise of sorts—in the first instance, at least, and before it has become fixed habit. He must give way to 'the demands of the occasion' in order to 'make the best of it,' proceeding on the principle that 'half a loaf is better than none.' He cannot control the situation wholly to his need, his purpose, or his taste, and yet also he cannot,

as one appreciative and critical, submit supinely to it. He yields something for the sake of gaining something. And nowhere in life is the necessity for this more frequent than in the situations called social. Indeed, it is not far from truth to say that compromise lies close to the base of social union.

The 'units' of any population—men, women, children—are, first of all, individuals, each living his own life, and having capabilities, resources, needs, and purposes not exactly identical with those of any other. To work together in any sense of fellowship these differences must be brought into harmony—for they cannot be abolished, even were it good to do so. This harmony is essential to union, whether it be in large groups or in small; and harmony demands a working acceptance of standards that are *common*. If I am to act in fellowship with you I must accept your standard, you must accept my standard, or both must accept a standard which, strictly speaking, is neither yours nor mine. Under this principle extend the number of those who work together into tens, hundreds, and thousands, and it comes out that few, if any, among them can act as members of any society each according to his own preference, or even always according to his own best qualifications for the work in hand.

Out of this necessity arise what are called social *conventions*. A convention is that by way of which men 'come together,' in terms of actional fellowship, of spiritual fellowship, or, it may be, of both at once. Thus there are practices that are conventional, ideas that are conventional, dispositions that are conventional—that is to say, suitable and variously acceptable as the common bases of union on an occasion of this sort or of that. In the broad sense of the word *convention* may stand for custom in action or be-

lief, for all laws, ordinances, rules, or other standards commonly regulative of behavior in the social relations of men. In short, it may be used to cover the whole field of 'the mores'—the accepted ways of a people in their intercourse with one another.

Conventions serve to articulate, as it were, the participant units in a social mechanism, and at the same time to lubricate and ease their interplay. A man who comes, or is born—as every man is born—into a world wherein the modes of association are largely established, finds himself an acceptable participant in this society and that, very much in the degree that he takes over and makes his own the established ways of dealing with one's fellows. In the measure that he becomes 'socialized,' in this sense, he subscribes in conduct, at least, to 'the mores' of whatever group or groups he enters. He can be depended on to do what he is expected to do. And this, of course, is a matter of great importance. That men can safely rely upon one another for this kind of behavior and for that is clearly fundamental to any sort of continuing communication or cooperation between them. If, for example, you ask me a question that I cannot answer, our converse in that matter soon lapses. I speak to you in English; you reply in Arabic. Our converse is likely to end just there. When I keep my side of the road as expected, and you yours, our cars pass safely; if either of us fails in that, they collide. When the nurse goes to sleep at her post, the work of the physician may go for naught. When the catcher refuses to take his place behind the plate, the baseball game comes to a halt. When the janitor lets the fire go out, the teacher must dismiss her class. When the workers go on strike, the factory closes. And so on, and so on, and so on. In any structure of human interdependencies created by collective undertakings, dependability in the social

man comes near to being the keystone. No man can become socially efficient in total disregard of conventions.

Many conventions have their origin, no doubt—and more often still their first rational sanction—in ‘a collective judgment.’ But the fact gives no assurance of their wisdom. ‘Two heads are better than one’ sometimes, but by no means always; and certainly wisdom in collective judgment does not increase proportionately to the number of contributors to that judgment. Among present established conventions, as many, probably, were, at their inception, standards imposed by force of authority as ‘joint judgments’; and the first sort were, perhaps, not generally inferior in wisdom to the second. The length of the king’s arm may serve to the measure of cloth, but, whether that standard be given by decree of the king or voted in solemn conclave by his subjects, the one fact no more than the other carries warrant that it is the best possible measure of cloth. Burial is one way to dispose of the dead, but that it was ever the best way may be doubted. To stand bareheaded in rain, or snow, or sunshine is one way of showing respect at certain ceremonies, but that it was ever a notably good way can hardly be proved. For all that, men can work together, be it awkwardly or easily, by accepting a common standard, and achieve their ends by doing so, so long as the standard points to behavior somehow appropriate to the occasion. This much, however, is sure: If they have not made the convention, but have merely accepted it ready-made, they are governed in following it by no wisdom of their own. A blind acceptance of convention may be expedient, though it not seldom implies a sacrifice of collective efficiency, and almost always some sacrifice of spiritual manhood.

A vast number of conventional standards still in use have their origins so far hidden in the mists of the past that we

cannot tell whether or not they were ever most fit for human needs. The measure of their worth must be found in the bearings of their usage upon us. If they serve to facilitate communion and cooperation toward ends humanly good, so far they are good conventions; if, at the same time, the use of them carries with it by-effects of good, then by so much the more they are good conventions. Measured in this way they will be found to range from the harmful, through the useless, to those that are nearly or quite indispensable. To illustrate, albeit somewhat uncertainly: The convention which forbids for so many the starting of a venture on a Friday stands as an obstacle to collective undertakings of a useful sort, frequently. The convention that opens a telephone conversation with the word 'Hello!' appears useless, but hardly harmful to anyone. Such conventions, however, as those that require the beginning of work at a set hour, and the payment of debts according to promise given, seem to be generally almost, if not quite, indispensable.

Standards established by 'collective usage' are not, let it be said again, ultimate measures of what men should do. They are instrumental merely, and properly subject to criticism. A blind acceptance of them ignores the capacity of living men to devise and adopt improved relations with one another. It submits the blind acceptor to control by forms to the meaning of which he has contributed nothing, and so of a sort not effective to develop his personality and character.

Some conventions affect behavior in many associations; some are proper to certain societies only. The conventions of language may serve for illustration. We have in America a number of regional dialects, but we find, despite them, little difficulty in talking with one another wherever we go. A 'State of Maine Yankee' makes himself under-

stood readily on most matters in Mississippi, and a Mississippian in Maine. At the same time a professor of English may be unable to follow the argot of a gangster. The custom of exchanging goods for money is almost world-wide; one can bargain with another for the purchase of a meal, a jewel, or a ship, 'in the language of money.' But, apart from differences in tokens, there are still men to whom the offer of money for this thing or that service is an insult. Certain forms of courtesy, like shaking hands, facilitate intercourse widely, yet point to discourtesy, in circumstances seemingly appropriate, among certain peoples and in special groups. Specialized and localized conventions are everywhere to be found: salutes in the army, for example, and certain formalities required by 'the ethics of the medical profession,' which, on occasion, rise superior to the dictates of humanity, so that the patient suffers while the amenities are upheld. The conventions of the saloon are here and there still distinct from those of the *salon*. The law courts are bound up in 'the red tape' of special conventions. The business office is full of them—different from those of the home. What must be 'done' and 'not done' on a ship astonishes the landlubber. And so on, and so forth.

When an individual takes on and displays the form of behavior that a convention requires, he has, as Sir Walter Scott put it, "a ticket of admission" to this society or that. Some such tickets admit him to a great many, others to but one or a few only. A friendly smile, not too obviously mechanical, will carry a man far in the matter of welcome to a host of associations. Adoption of widely prevalent conventions is essential to extend the range of one's social activities; to find an outlet for a special ability, the adoption of special conventions is often demanded. On the whole men rate dependability in many parts above dependability

in a few, and so tend to estimate the social fitness of an individual by his conformity to widespread rather than to special conventions. The 'good mixer' is, in popular esteem, 'a good fellow,' whereas the nonconformist, however dependable in his special department, is 'an oddity,' and, in no commendable sense, 'a real fellow.'

It is often argued that the existence of a social standard long established carries for it a presumption of biological value. Social behavior may be looked upon as a mode of 'adjustment,' and so subject, like all organic functioning, to the selective process of natural evolution. The determinant in the long run is fitness to the requirements of survival for the species. Slowly, thus, it may be, but surely, conventions inimical to biological welfare must be eliminated. Along with serviceable forms, of course, others innocuous may persist as well—much as hair has been preserved on the back of the hand in an evolution of that organ toward a long and longer thumb. The persistence of a custom, law, or institution from generation to generation must thus be taken for more than a 'social fact'; its persistence is evidence that nature through evolutionary process has declared in favor of its worth.

There is no disputing that standards of social behavior come into use and change by way of a process hardly distinguishable from that which has produced the fauna and flora of earth. Yet, looking about him, one doubts that fitness to survival of the species can account for a goodly number of long standing and widely prevalent conventions. Consider, for example, conventions long determinant to the practices of conviviality. Drunken orgies have had for several thousand years a popular sanction and wide usage in all lands of the west. One cannot readily discover that they serve to forward in any way the success of the man-species.

Anthropologists, to be sure, have made half-hearted attempts, now and again, to rationalize them in terms of procreative stimulation, but unconvincingly. The period of history is short, be it granted. But it seems fair to say that the argument to an evolutionary justification of conventional standards leads to no certain conclusion beyond this: A convention long established and widely adopted is unlikely to be sufficiently injurious to promote a rapid destruction of the species Man.

On the spiritual side it has been argued that customs, laws, and institutions develop in another sense of evolution. They are not mere 'variations' or 'mutants' in social behavior preserved briefly for long by 'natural selection.' They are rather expressions of essentials in the spiritual nature of man, making explicit and objective what is implicit and subjective in that nature.* The evolution of them is an evolution of emergence, not one of success and failure. Take it, for instance, that the patterns of justice are implicit in the nature of man. Imperfect variously though those patterns be in me and you and every other man, yet each of us is informed with something of them. The elements of justice within, strong or weak, point to two consequences. First, we can and must actualize some measure of justice in conduct; as outlet offers; no man who is really a man can be always and wholly unjust in all his doings. Second, we can and must recognize and approve some forms, at least, of justice in the world about us. We are, in a word, each of us, more or less disposed by nature to act justly and to

* This argument runs in harmony with the theory of Plato that the development of man finds its reflection in the development of the state. It follows that of Hegel and his successors who, starting from grounds somewhat different from those of Plato, argued to the conclusion that social institutions precede the individual in the advance toward the unknowable end and perfection of man, and so set the pattern and point the path for the individual's development.

find acts of justice acceptable. So must be built up in the externals of human society an image, as it were, of the features of person and character most essential to man's relation with man; in short, an objectification of man's social nature. The evolution of customs, laws, and institutions is thus a counterpart of man's spiritual maturing.

From this argument comes the conclusion that social conventions are the proper guides to manhood in social behavior. You and I are men. Men perish as man does not. You and I live briefly to realize in a measure our particular potentials; man has lived long to realize more fully than we can the universal in that nature which we share. What men have expressed as good and accepted as good is, therefore, far more likely to be good than anything you and I are likely to produce in our brief and particular lives. Accordingly we may model our living upon the evidences of social humanity which conventions furnish more safely than upon our own special and subjective estimates of what is socially right and wrong.

As with the biological theorem, so with this, much evidence can be adduced to support it. Suppose that the principle of freedom inheres in personality. Then in the course of an emergent evolution the reflection of that principle in the forms of social control should appear more and more clearly. The history of the British Constitution offers a case in point. There, so Tennyson declared, "Freedom slowly broadens down from precedent to precedent." When a law has become in this respect or that intolerable, another is enacted to take its place, still retaining acceptable features of the old and embodying in the reconstruction new elements to make the whole more fully expressive of 'the reality of social justice.' Thus, although slowly and pain-

fully, the pattern implicit in the nature of man grows toward perfection in the explicit forms of the law.

One may grant, perhaps, that in the long view Tennyson is right, and still have his doubts that emergent evolution supplies a foundation of 'natural rightness' for many conventions of long standing and wide prevalence. Take, for example, a 'basic principle in law,' *caveat emptor* ('let the buyer beware'). This, for all its age and wide acceptance, carries for few thoughtful men a solid conviction of inherent rightness. If it is truly expressive of virtue native to the spirit of man, it points, at any rate, to nothing notably humane in that spirit.

By way of one, the other, or both theories of evolution one can find, if ingenious, some explanation of any, or almost any, namable instance of convention, from wearing earrings and staining the finger nails to treaty making and war. But an explanation is not all one with a justification. One can explain war—albeit rather naively—among biological phenomena, as he might cannibalism, suicide, and slavery, but he does not thereby justify war, even by biological standards of value. One may describe the war of a people upon a people as a development of 'the spirit of combat,' first manifest in the battle of this man with that man. He may make plain that it shows forth virtues proper to a nature humane, such as courage and constancy and noble sacrifice. But, by the same token, he demonstrates in the image of man displayed by the phenomena of war a lack in his nature of wisdom, of justice, and above all of charity, as sources and measures of right conduct in the dealings of men with men.

So far the reference of conventions has been chiefly to their bearing upon the behavior of individuals. They have been taken to be standards more or less externalized, conditions determinant to the relations of men with one another

in a sense not merely physical. At the same time it has appeared that conventions are products of society no less than determinants of its modes. Carrying the implication one step further, they may be seen as determinants, too, of patterns in social organization. They affect what, for instance, a parent does, or a soldier, or a citizen, and, at the same time, the structure and functioning of a family, of an army, of a state. To conform to the conventions of parenthood is to strengthen the pattern of the family. To change the conventions of the citizen is to change in some degree, be it great or small, the pattern of the state.

III

A man must possess some social efficiency in order to take his place and play his part in the simplest or the most complex of societies. In order to act with another or others in the fellowship of a moment or of years, in order to count at all in a single association or a thousand, he must be in some part disposed and able to *do* what the occasion for collective action requires of him. By way of social efficiency, in short, the physical man becomes a social man.

On the other side, the human individual becomes a social man by way of the spirit of fellowship. Or, put in another fashion, the man person becomes a social person by the measure of his social appreciation; through his ability to find meanings not of self-reference only in his dealings with others, and in his outlook upon the affairs of men.

Empirical evidence indicates that social efficiency and social appreciation are not strictly commensurate in most men. A man may be genuinely efficient in many social matters, and yet possess, along with his notable efficiency, but meagre qualifications of social appreciation; and *vice versa*. "The

good mixer' type furnishes familiar examples of the first sort. Such a man may be 'tactful,' likeable, agreeable, 'easy to get on with,' even, as the Spaniards say, *simpatico*. Yet his 'social vision' may comprehend hardly more than 'a liking for people,' and a general desire to make their relations with him easy and comfortable. He is not rarely of the sort who violate a quarantine or the sanest of traffic laws without the least compunction. At the other extreme are to be found men of extraordinary social vision, who are shy, 'stiff,' distant, 'cold.' Immanuel Kant was distinguished for his social ideals, but hardly for his facility in the arts of fellowship. Woodrow Wilson was a man more than a bit 'hard to get on with,' but the extraordinary clearness of his vision of the state and the earnestness of his purpose to promote the democratic ideal in the world cannot be questioned.

Social efficiency begins in a ready-made world with conformity to conventions. The 'sense of fellowship' begins, too, with fitting into the established order. We learn, generally, to like those who approve us, not those who disapprove; and the price of approval is most often a living up to the conventions. The first modifications of the human being in the direction of social efficiency and social appreciation come with his subjection to 'the mores,' whether in language, manners, or otherwise.

A conformity, however, that finds its motive in approval sought, and its reward in approval won, has little of spiritual meaning in it. It rests on an acceptance made with reference to comfort in adjustment—much like that of the dog who obeys his master's commands because to do so brings a pat on the head, and failure to do so a thrashing. In this fashion the schoolboy still often comes to conform to the conventions of the schoolroom, and the guest to those of the 'reception.' He does as he does because that is 'the way

things are done' in school or at a party. He is concerned, very likely, to consider hardly more than the dog why this is done in this way instead of another. Allow, if you will, that his appreciation of the conventions is genuinely selective, yet it remains on an animal level. Intellectual discrimination and aesthetic preference of the humane order do not enter his decision—if decision it deserves to be called. Social appreciation is close to its minimum.

Many men and women grow in social appreciation not much beyond this point in all their lives. They conform, with no pause for consideration, to whatever conventions appear in their social relations. But, for all that, they become competent participants in numerous societies; by the measure of 'ability to get along with their fellowmen' they become highly 'socialized.' Like friendly and well-behaved dogs they can be depended on to do what they are expected to do. Their social efficiency is fairly developed, while their social appreciation remains rudimentary.

Social behavior is variously useful and significant to development of manhood. That may be discovered by examination of it from the physical standpoint and the psychical. In the narrower view, called social, however, it takes on special meanings and values by way of its relations to the structures and processes of society. The social efficiency and social appreciation of individuals derive their social worth from their bearings on the formation, the continuance, and the reconstruction of societies.

It may be noted once more that the behavior of a man can affect a society only as it involves action. What he feels and thinks about any form of society has no effect upon that form unless his feeling and his thinking find expression somehow in what he says and does. Social conduct on the part of individuals is the life blood of all communication

and collective enterprise in human affairs. Social efficiency of some sort is indispensable to the forming, continuing, or the modifying of every society, and so subject to valuation by social standards. Social appreciation, on the other hand, has no such value, except it be manifest in social conduct. The keenest and the most discriminative judgment of a state or of a family or of a form of etiquette counts not in the least to keep it as it is or to change it, unless that judgment guides the appreciator's doings in respect of the state, the family, or the code of good manners. Social values, then, are *practical values*.

To form a society two or more men must act, and the act of each must have some reference to service of another. Plainly enough social effectiveness enters at once. The act of A and the act of B must somehow *fit together*. If they are wholly incongruous they produce no joint activity. It is conceivable, to be sure, that acts purely mechanical—of the sort attributed to ants and bees—may fall together into a pattern to constitute a social function, so forming a society by accident, as it were. This society may prove its merit, and so be recognized—even rationalized—and preserved. Some forms of association, doubtless, are products of blind 'trial and error.' Social appreciation of them comes after the event, and had no part in their origin. Something of planning and valuing, however, must go with the institution of most societies—as in the laying down of 'a constitution' for a state or a club, the chartering of a school, and the like. Formal contract is not essential, as we know, but some man or men, in the majority of cases, must have a notion of aim and organization and of values to be found in or derived from the society to be formed. It is highly probable that preliminary consideration enters into the origin of forms of collective enterprise relatively more often than into new

forms of individual action. So far as this is true social appreciation may be judged by social standards. It may be rated good in the degree that it makes for the institution of societies which are good by the higher measures of biological utility and spiritual worth.

Constancy of pattern in a society that functions again and again to the same ends—as, for example, a ‘traffic court,’ the staff of a restaurant, a tire factory, a military school, a government bureau, or a ‘table at bridge’—depends closely upon repeated adherence to the same set of conventions. Habituation in conformity among members is not the outcome only of repeated adherence, but the surest warrant of it. By way of habituation to conventional requirements each participant becomes reliably consistent in fitting his part to the pattern of the whole. In this way the pattern is confirmed, and the society tends more and more to ‘run like a machine,’ operating on every fresh occasion quite as it has done before. By his readiness to fit himself to the requirements of the social machinery and to keep it running, the individual demonstrates a certain social efficiency, whether the social machine in the case be more than passably effective or not; and, by the same token, he helps to preserve the machine as it is. All this, of course, is a matter of degree. Variations from the customary are possible often without breaking up the machinery, and often, too, with advantage to it, if they do not go too far. But habituation, by its very nature, makes against variation. Thus it comes about that social efficiency through conformity counts for constancy in societal patterns.

Appreciation in an act tends, we have noted already, to diminish as the act becomes habitual. Other things being equal, the accustomed members of a routinized society are likely to find in their parts less meaning than novices to

those parts, and to see in the whole, perhaps, less significance than the freshly observant outsider. That this is not altogether an academic dream is suggested by the history of reforms in government, in industry, in sports, and so on. Recognition of need for change, when it comes from the inside, appears with the newcomer more often than with 'the old timer'; and demand for improvement comes more often from outside than from inside. One of the few merits of the modern 'school survey,' for instance, is that the outside observer is likely to see the system and the school as a whole more clearly than the insider, and even to 'note things' within that those immediately concerned have long overlooked.

Still, social appreciation is neither wholly excluded from routine in conformity, nor inconsistent with constancy in the pattern of a society. Conformity may be deliberate, not in the first instance only, but over and over again, provided the attached meanings or significances of habitual acts be sufficiently numerous, varied, and far reaching. Once more there is a bit of evidence to support the reasoning. Several 'studies' have shown that in machine tending the 'better-educated' workers 'stick to their jobs' for a longer time and with less complaint than the unschooled and ignorant.* They find the present 'set-up' acceptable, as the others do not, because they see further into its significances, and estimate its worth more generously.

TV

Social stability is not all one with the rigid maintenance of societal patterns. The relations of fellowship among men may be rather consistently dependable without being static.

* Eaton, T. H.: *Education and Vocations*. Wiley. N. Y., 1926.

Conventions, by and large, are not exactly prescriptive of forms in social conduct. In language, manners, styles, laws—probably in every category of conventions—this holds true to a greater or less extent. The ‘same thing,’ for instance, can often be said in a number of ways, all of which are ‘correct.’ The same word may be spelled in several ways or pronounced in several. One may choose to split an infinitive, or choose to not split it, and still be understood by most of his fellows. There are other ways of acknowledging an introduction courteously than by pumping the stranger’s arm and saying, ‘Pleased to meet you.’ At a ‘formal reception’ today the hostess is not compelled to wear a dress that displays unclothed her entire back. She may show seven-eighths of her back, or not much more than half of it, and still wear ‘the proper gown’ for the occasion. One man may drive his car at twenty miles an hour, another at forty, and both ‘stay within the law.’ What one does to fit the social requirement must fall, to be sure, within variously well-defined limits, but within those limits he has a measure of choice. Under convention *A* proper conduct may take the forms *a1* or *a2* or *a3*; by way of any one of a number of forms the individual may play his part, and still ‘fit in.’ But when choice really enters appreciation of sorts must go with it. A fixed habit of acting in just this way and no other tends, on the contrary, to defeat choice. A conformity that is deliberate may express appreciation within the limits set and still make for constancy in the general pattern. The result is a stable, but not a static, persistence of that pattern.

Social stability in this sense, as contrasted with social statics, is not opposed to social progress. There are such things as consistent ‘lines of progress’—of the sort observable in evolution through ‘variation,’ as distinct from evolution

through 'mutation.' To keep pace with 'gradual and consistent changes' in society a man must adapt himself continually to slight variations all pointing, as it were, in the same direction. This he is unlikely to do if his habits of conformity are mechanical. To make his adaptations he must govern his acts by some consideration of the changes, of their significances and of their worth. So he makes his contribution toward 'continuity in change' by dropping convention A in favor of A_1 , A_1 in favor of A_2 , and so on. In this way social appreciation appears quite consistent with stability in social progress—and, indeed, an important factor in it.

This may be true no more for social progress, manifestly, than for social regress. Something of effective social appreciation must go with consistent change in societal patterns, whether that change moves toward the better or the worse. To follow 'the currents' of society one must not be anchored by habit. But what currents he will follow depend upon the character of his appreciations. In the degree that his preferences run to the expedient, and his understanding to the provincial, he is likely to 'take the line of least resistance,' and to drift complacently. He 'keeps up with the times,' and accepts changes as they come by the standards of his own comfort, and their presumed effects upon that small area of the social world with which he is familiar.

Most men live for the greater part of their lives locally; and locally not in a geographic sense only, but in a social sense as well. The pressure to social conformity bears upon them most at the points of frequent 'contact' with others; and those contacts are predominantly confined to a relatively few, and made recurrently with the same people. In consequence they become confirmed preferentially in conventions

of a local sort, and most familiar with social patterns neither greatly complex nor comprehensive. By way of their accustomed familiarity these local conventions and structures become, in turn, strengthened. The result is that bonds of union among men tend to be stronger in local and special groupings than in societies greatly extended in membership and pointed to general service.

So far as these localized unions pursue special interests—and that is often far—they tend to come into conflict with others of the sort, and we have the spectacle, in most large populations, of a struggle between societies, each to maintain itself and serve its own interests, with but a secondary reference, if any, to the good of its competitors. Out of the struggle come victories, defeats, compromises, modifications within the competing societies, and in their relations. In this spectacle the sociologist is wont to see a process of evolution quite comparable to that observed by the biologist in the competition of species with species.

There are those who see in these changes nothing but progress. To them progress means no more and no less than process, an ongoing without reference to direction or end. But, by the measure of improvement both of means to biological success and of influences promotive to spiritual self-realization, not all, and sometimes not many, such changes do represent progress.* To make progress in society men must be moving consistently in some direction, and, more than that, be moving toward the better rather than the worse, in the forms and patterns of their society. It is quite probable, in the light of theories already sketched, that in the long run society does thus move toward better things. But it follows not at all that every change is in that direction; or even that 'the major social trends' of a decade

* Todd, A. J.: *Theories of Social Progress*. Macmillan. N. Y., 1918.

or of a century must take the line of an inevitable progress. One can assert with full confidence that such progress as does take place in 'the struggle of interests' is more largely a matter of accident than of constructive purpose. It is by no means unintelligent altogether, but it is far less intelligent than it might be were men generally to work together for the sake of progress.

V

To work together for progress men must be effectively appreciative of social affairs; possessed of what may be called a *critical sociality*, which disposes them to consider their social acts, to examine their societies, to judge and weigh the values of conventions and of larger patterns of organization. To forward a social progress that is purposeful, constructive, and general, a large qualification in critical sociality among men is a primary requisite. Men devise and construct new tools and machines to serve their purposes better than the old. They progress in material mastery of the earth much in proportion as they do so. Progress on that side does not move by keeping pace with changes; it moves rather by making purposed changes. In the same way, if not so readily, men can devise and construct new forms of society to serve them better than the old. By way of innovation and reconstruction in society the social critic plays his part to make the world better for men.

That seems plain enough. But a suggestion that the world lacks social critics may sound a bit preposterous. The American or the Briton, at least, looking about him, easily concludes that whatever the world may lack it faces no shortage of social critics. To find a man who has no fault to find with society, who is not eager to abolish this, reform that, or introduce this other, calls for a quest like that of Diog-

enes. So numerous, so vociferous, so active are our critics of government, of business, of schools, of churches, of laws and customs and manners and language, of every form and pattern and function of society, that many have grown impatient with it all, and lean a bit to sympathy with those firm dictators who have stifled the clamor and put in the place of the erstwhile critic an obedient conformist to a fixed regime.

One cannot deny the facts. But he can say this: Though all these noisy ones are, in a sense, social critics, yet they are mainly not so by standards proper to a critical sociality. Nine-tenths—to guess conservatively—of the so-called criticism levelled at this and that in the social order is made by the measure of standards not social. The child likes this game because it gives him a chance to 'show off'; he dislikes that one because it does not. He wants to change the rules if the rules appear to handicap him in any way. The manufacturer supports the tariff that raises prices on the goods he has to sell, and opposes that on what he has to buy. You and I are members of the same 'staff.' You are 'strong for' the present 'set-up,' because it gives you first place; I am eager for a reorganization that will set you down from your high place and put me there instead. Seeking each what he holds to be his own advantage most of us attack some form of society, defend or advocate some other, almost every day. So, too, by and large, we bring about a great many social changes. But I judge this desirable and that not so by reference to its effect upon me, you by reference to its effect upon you, and the next man by reference to its effect upon him.

A proper criticism of society must include some understanding of the form that is the object of criticism, and some standard by which to measure the value of the form.

One who has, for instance, but little notion of the structure and function of a high school or a town government is hardly in a position to criticize it, no matter how loud his words of praise or condemnation. On the other hand, one who understands reasonably well this or that particular form or pattern cannot judge of its merits except by a standard which the case itself does not supply. One can become a critic, then, in matters of human association only as he comes to perceive what the forms are, and conceive what the forms ought to be. Those who blame the university when the football team loses its 'crucial game' of the season, or praise the Baptist church for the excellence of a chicken dinner, are not true critics of the university or of the church.

Criticism by the measure of social standards begins when judgment rests on consideration of how this social form or that collective action may affect others than the critic himself. Such standards we all have and use, if less often than those of self-interest. Most often our critical judgment by such standards extends to include the interest of a special constituency or class—usually one to which the critic himself belongs. Thus even the supposedly liberal professor has been known to favor this or oppose that in university organization according to what he takes to be its effects upon his department or his college. University presidents, even, have made speeches advocating the repeal or enactment of a law, and have based their arguments on considerations affecting the university, its endowments, its enrollment, its researches, its teaching and its teachers. The standards in both cases are social, to be sure, but they are rather limited than greatly generous. Similarly, manufacturers' associations, labor unions, bankers' associations, medical societies, farmers' leagues, federations of school-men, and countless other groupings of men, maintain publicity agents, press

bureaus, lobbies charged to defend and propagate their special interests. The standards again are not individual, but they serve to estimate the good and the bad in conventions and societal patterns against the welfare of some only, not of all those whose lives are affected by them.

Whenever a man criticizes the actual or the proposed in society by the measure of the interest of any special group to which he belongs, be it family, club, business concern, clique, class, or state, he cannot be easily and altogether absolved from a certain 'selfishness' in his criticism. The principle is that which forbids the judge in a court of justice to sit upon the case of a corporation in which he holds stock or office. The smaller and more closely bonded the special group, the more difficult it is to absolve him of prejudice. Or, put in reverse, a man's critical sociality may be regarded as impartial very much in proportion to its human comprehensiveness.

One who loves his fellows in any concrete fashion can, perhaps, never be quite impartial in judgment of social matters. He may be, nevertheless, generously philanthropic, disposed to service of ideals without conscious reference to his own welfare or that of his known associates. Men of the sort are to be found in nearly every community. They desire to make the social world a better place to live in, not for themselves and their friends only, but for men whom they have never known or with whom they have never dealt. They seek to improve it, naturally, by their own measures of what is right. But their standards may be variously pinched and illiberal—and often are so.

Socrates noted that the watchdog welcomes his master, though the master be an evil man, and shows his teeth at the stranger, though the stranger be the best of men. Like the watchdog most of us prefer the familiar to the strange,

so that, even as critics, we are disposed to disapprove proposals and resist attempts of a novel sort, and to seek or sanction improvements by the measure of borrowed standards. The best we know, for the most part, is that to which we have become accustomed. The city man, for example, may deplore, in a spirit wholly altruistic, the 'backwardness' of country folk, and go forth to improve their local forms of government, their schools, their churches, their modes of recreation, even their dress and manners, by 'urbanizing' them. With quite unselfish sincerity good churchmen oppose the introduction to America of Buddhist societies, and support the establishment of Christian missions in China. Many generously humane Americans have sought to improve life in the Philippines, not by cleaning up filth, building roads, and the like, only, but by 'giving' the Filipinos better government, better schools, and other forms of social organization. And the better forms, as they see it, are, naturally enough, the forms under which they have lived at home. Now that the Filipinos have a legislature 'after the American plan,' a university like one of our 'state universities,' high schools in Manila like high schools in Detroit, rural schools more and more like rural schools in Iowa, baseball teams and leagues like those in New York, they have become, in the eyes of many benevolent Americans, nearly fit to take charge of their own affairs and to continue the upbuilding in the far Pacific of a brown man's copy of our Great Republic.

There are men who build in idea their own standards of the good in society. Not all of them conceive some Utopian state, or New Atlantis; they build, rather, conceptions of the school, or the home, or the factory, or the church, or the court of justice, or the bank or hospital that ought to be, and hold these up as guides to improvement in societies

of the sort. They are, in idea at least, social inventors, and in act sometimes social creators—men, to take modern instances, like Robert Owen, Horace Mann, Henry George, Samuel Gompers, Thomas Osborne, John Dewey. Known and unknown thousands of such men are alive today, buried variously deep among the millions whose sociality includes nothing new in the world, but only standards of preference acquired by custom and indoctrination. Rare as they are, these are the men to whom the world owes most of whatever constructive progress it makes in social affairs—of advance not the mere by-product of struggle. The man capable of creative statesmanship may be rare indeed, but men capable of a constructive altruism in affairs less comprehensive than those of a great state or a world of states are surely not so rare. The man of relative unselfishness in many matters is not a strange phenomenon in most communities. Given the social data with which to work, and something of encouragement to examine, select, and synthesize the elements of good therein, many men and women can form ideas of their own as to the desirable in organization of a business, family or community undertaking; though they remain incapable, perhaps, of conceiving for themselves of a better system of government, of industry, or of education than that under which they live.

A comprehensively critical sociality counts for progress in another fashion, too. Relatively few men, it may be, can become creative in their notions and beliefs concerning the more widely significant forms of society; but a large proportion of men can become reasonably intelligent in criticism of them—possessed, that is to say, of understanding and standards not furnished only by their customary associations and a piecemeal indoctrination. These are, obviously, likely to be more generous standards. So enlarged

in sociality these men are prepared to examine and weigh innovations, whatever their source, by a scale not narrowly provincial; by their sanction to support the good, by their rejection to lend aid in defeat of the evil. In political affairs, for instance, the spread of critical sociality among men means support for the true statesman against the partisan and the demagogue, an aiding of the general and abiding as against the special or passing interests.

The possession of standards other than those which prevail in an existent society, political, economic, or other, makes for discontent with this and that in the established forms of that society. The discontent furnishes motive and the standards furnish guidance toward changes in that society. Unless, however, the standards behind the discontent be higher than those which now prevail, the outcome may be disruptive without gain, or even destructive of the better for the sake of the worse. The net result is a regress rather than a progress. This, we know, has happened time and again in the history of schools and churches and industries and states. But, by the measures of human welfare, standards in social affairs rise to a higher level only as they become more generous, that is to say, as they rise from a foundation of more nearly universal human reference. With such rise and enlargement particular conventions and special societies must be viewed in a new proportion, wherein the broad significances of each tend to gain in value on the narrow. To wit: The ideal of the school as a happy hunting ground for children does not suffice of itself as a guide to improvement of schools, except as schools be taken to serve ends having no reference beyond immediate 'child needs.' It points to social progress in the large only if it be in harmony with the aims of collective living in the family, in industry, in the church, in the state. Awareness of the

importance of far-reaching cooperation of man with man and society with society marches with the rise and enlargement of critical standards; makes, in short, for an increasingly large 'common social denominator,' and so binds men together in more and more comprehensive societies.

VI

As many, probably, of our difficulties in living and working together arise from the dominance of special group loyalties as arise from the greed of individuals. Men make as much of their distinctions as of their fellowship; and the most potent of these distinctions, paradoxically enough, find their source not in individual peculiarity but in the fellowship of a special group.* Among obstacles to just and

* Conventions of distinction when once they have been generally accepted by a people, imposed by authority, sanctified by religion, or taken on by custom, give rise to the phenomena of caste or class. An individual who, because of birth, possession of wealth, or for other reasons than his fitness and his needs, is eligible to this society and denied membership in that, held to these obligations and exempt from those, is one of a caste or class. His part in social undertakings is prescribed and determined for him more or less closely, and by standards not of a genuine social qualification.

Conventions of the sort make for a static rigidity in social relations. They make against freedom in society and against efficiency in societies. They restrict freedom as they predetermine the place of the individual and the parts he may play; they defeat efficiency in the measure that they allocate him to a place that he is less fit to fill than some other man. Whenever such conventions are firmly established in the mores of a people one finds communities clearly organized and unified, but unprogressive. The Hindu village of India, for example (Wiser, W. H.: *The Hindu Jaymani System*. Lucknow Printing House, Lucknow, U. P. India, 1936), shows every individual in his destined place and abiding therein so long as he resides in the village. He lives as one of a class, owing defined obligations to others according to their class, and receiving from them according to his class defined services due him. He holds a settled place in a closely knit society, and plays the same part or parts consistently. An American town, in contrast, is seldom a society in other than the civic sense, and in that rather potentially than actually. The occasion is rare when all the people of the town join in one undertaking, or when the mingled societies of the community fit together for long in anything like a structural

efficient government, for example, family succession in office has been one of the greatest. Nepotism is an affliction of democratic states hardly less than of aristocratic or socialistic states. By the measure of social efficiency, to take no other, nepotism is a hindrance more serious than the 'much abused' 'profit motive' in the fields of industry, commerce, and finance. That men who are not the ablest are so largely charged with the direction and control of manufacturing concerns, commercial establishments, banks, and the like, is because the 'owners' thereof can, and do, pass on the control of a society as if it were a chattel to sons and nephews and sons-in-law. Mediocrity thus comes to the head in many important undertakings, while superior men are thrust into subordinate places. A study of kinship and the payroll in many organizations, even those not dedicated to pecuniary profit, would prove illuminating as to the strength of family ties. Fraternities have an enormous influence of the same sort. To secure 'an important position' in some of our 'great investment houses' it is very nearly essential that the candidate shall have 'made' one of the 'most exclusive clubs' in one of 'the leading universities.' In many an American community a 'lodge member' of third-rate abilities will win a school superintendency easily over a first-rate man who lacks that affiliation. Religious sects exert great power in similar fashion. In some of our states no man not a Bap-

whole. Individuals shift their places, take on new parts, abandon old ones, more or less freely and with varying rapidity. Classes exist, to be sure, and find a tacit recognition; birth, wealth, and other socially unmerited distinctions appear as features of community life. But rare is the inhabitant who, for all his 'pull,' can assume and fill for long a given place and a given part in any major enterprise without a modicum, at least, of qualification for it. The Indian village appears as a crystallized social unit; the American community as a mingling and flux of societies coalescing only at intervals and for periods of brief duration into anything resembling a purposeful and organized social entity.

tist or a Methodist has 'the ghost of a show' to become governor.

Among individuals a frequent cause of anti-social behavior is the sense of difference produced by membership in a certain society. Snobbery finds its source here four times in five, and snobbery is a prime cause of failure in widespread cooperation among men. It prevents innumerable associations for human good, and clogs the workings of as many others. A similar obstacle in matters of widespread fellowship is the assumption of privilege that goes with membership in this society or that. 'The minor official' is the classic instance. By virtue of his office, too often, he takes himself to be exempt from many of 'the common decencies' in intercourse with those whom he is assumed to serve. The 'big banker' takes it as a matter of course that he should be passed through the customs without delay, while 'ordinary passengers' wait for hours. The college student expects to be forgiven for 'pranks' which would send the ordinary workman of his age to jail. And so on, *ad infinitum*. The sense of difference and the assumption of privilege conferred by membership in this or that society are as little favorable to many collective undertakings as is sand in the bearings favorable to the operation of an engine. Any enlargement, then, of the scope of conscious social responsibility among human beings would seem to carry its own justification.

A critical sociality of the great scope to which some men attain may have an effect divisive rather than integrating. That has happened again and again, notably in times of war. Men of the most liberal social insight and generous sympathies are treated, at such times, as traitors, along with self-seekers and exploiters of the most contemptible sort. They are so far more socialized in spirit than the many that they become shut off from them by the breadth of their

distinction. They see, for example, something of justice in the cause of 'the enemy,' and so are declared themselves to be enemies of their own people. Similar phenomena appear in affairs of peace—affairs within the boundaries of the state. To illustrate: A Congressman opposes some measure of special profit to his 'home folks,' which is not, as he sees it, for 'the good of the country.' He is 'snowed under' at the next election. This is one reason why so many who go to the Congress are 'politicians,' not statesmen. If they possessed the sociality of statesmen they would seek no special benefits for their constituents, and so, as a rule, forfeit the following upon which depends 'a return' to the national legislature. By the same token, if diplomats are usually seekers each after his own nation's advantage and not for the advantage of a wider world of men, that is precisely because the sociality of those 'whose interests they represent' forbids—in expression at least—a more generous social spirit in them. No man leads in social affairs who has no followers. One who has followers cannot be too far more socialized in his effective beliefs than those who follow him.

In great societies, at any rate, we can hardly advance more rapidly than the sociality of the multitude permits. Yet we cannot advance, either, unless some men shall see and desire changes not comprehended within the social vision of the many. A stable and purposed progress depends, therefore, upon close fellowship of leaders with followers—they cannot be too far apart. Vast changes, to be sure, can be made, and are made—some of them, no doubt, for good—by revolution, conquest, authoritative imposition. But such can abide only while force abides, so long as they greatly outpace the sociality of the people. The regimes of dictatorship now ascendant in Europe illustrate the principle. There is not one among them that does not advance the material

welfare of many upon whom it imposes new patterns; there is not one of them presently secure, because it limits the spiritual freedom of thousands of able men and outpaces the sociality of millions. The dictators are well aware of that. They move to 'liquidate' the over-socialized in one fashion or another, and to indoctrinate the uncomprehending as rapidly as may be; all to the end of integration through a common sociality of the sort they themselves profess. By these means they seek to make secure the changes in the social order that they now enforce by tear gas and the firing squad.

The greatest breadth of sociality may represent an extreme too far from the norm to contribute much to the improvement of forms and functions in great societies. Men who possess it are often, in their own times at least, futile in their attempts to forward progress. By the same token, too, they live in discomfort. They are suspect, derided, hated, oppressed, brought in many instances to a figurative, if not to a literal Gethsemane. One who too generously loves his fellows is, as a rule, by few of his fellows beloved. He must forfeit the approval of most and the comfort that goes with it; for the more fully he becomes in spirit a social man, the more is it likely that he cannot accept the social world as he finds it.

Despite that, the man who makes no contribution commensurate with his own highest social ideals may not fail in the long run to change the social order in a direction toward improvement beyond both the conception and the desire of the many, or of the powers that be in his day. Soon or late some man not too generously socialized to lead may grasp and approve a bit of his conception, and act to inch the world forward in the way to which that conception points.

Summary. (I) Society and its influences, like other activities and forms of environment, are to be valued against the measures of human welfare. Nevertheless, because they rate so generally superior to other activities and influences, it is not illegitimate to look among them for secondary standards by which to judge the doings and experiences of men, and the objects with which they deal. So far as social process thus supplies standards they point to special worth in *social efficiency* and *social appreciation*; for the individual man can make his proper contribution to *social stability*, on the one side, and to *social progress*, on the other, only by way of his social efficiency and the social appreciation which lies behind it.

(II) Intercourse and cooperation imply something of give and take between man and man. Were the demands of one man to conflict *in toto* with those of another, the two could neither communicate nor act in any other way co-operatively. Something they must have, or accept, in common, that they may come together. From the requirements of give and take derive those standards of social behavior which we call *conventions*. These furnish the elements of form from which are built societal patterns; they articulate and lubricate the mechanisms of social process.

Conventions are variously localized, or regionalized, as to groups and occasions. Some hold, as it were, between *A* and *B* only, and for occasions strictly of the order *C*. Others govern the conduct of multitudes, and enter to determine behavior in a wide variety of situations. So they range through all degrees between the extremes. So, likewise, they have effectiveness in all degrees to the forwarding of intercourse and cooperation. And, again, according to the processes they determine, they run the gamut of values. Conventions are, for good or evil, facts to be faced. But they

are, like all other instruments of man's creation, never properly exempt from criticism in the light of human needs.

The ready objectivity of social standards gives them a favored place among educators, so that, very often, they are set up and accepted as the ultimate measures of worth in life. Support for their primacy may be found, too, in theories of evolution, and these are often advanced to confirm the easy conclusions of empirical observation.

Persistence and spread of a convention, for instance, can surely be taken as evidence that its requirements are not wholly inimical to success for man. The 'trial and error' process of biological evolution tends in the long run to eliminate the worst among errors. But the 'fit' forms of behavior thus selected are as often, perhaps, merely those not fatal to success as those most fit to promote success. The biological 'test of survival' proves no more concerning the worth of a convention than that it is 'good enough to get by with,' or not bad enough to destroy us wholly.

From the standpoint of psychic evolution a widespread and persistent convention may be taken to 'express' something of the universal in the spiritual nature of man. But the universal in man's nature, whether it be a fixed reality, a changing norm, or a merely necessary conception, still admits to human personality elements of likenesses with the beasts no less than those which distinguish man as man. A convention persistent and widespread may quite as well express the lower and the bestial in man's nature as the higher and humane. The test of 'emergence' is no proof of high worth in any social form, structure of organization, belief, custom, practice, law, institution, or other social product. The argument of evolution again leaves all social standards open to criticism and to valuation by measures of human welfare superior to those which they themselves supply.

(III) A man becomes sharer with others, in the functionally active sense, as he is socially efficient; he becomes sharer with them spiritually as he is socially appreciative. But the two sides of a man's social nature are seldom developed equally. Some men have a considerable social efficiency, and but little social appreciation. With others the reverse is true. Between the extremes men variously combine ability to serve their fellows with understanding and fellow feeling.

Social standards are, in the first instance, practical standards. Social conduct in a man is, by the measure of them, significant as it counts to the maintenance or modification of society in any of its forms. At second remove, social appreciation may be determinant of social conduct. As thus expressed it, too, may be judged by social standards, and so accorded worth other than that which belongs to it as inner experience.

Habit is a factor in social efficiency. In proportion as the participants in a social enterprise become habituated, each to his part, therein, the pattern of that enterprise becomes confirmed. With each, too, *ceteris paribus*, meaning in his part tends to fade with fixation of habit in performance of it. The result is an organization more and more 'dehumanized' and static in pattern, mechanically efficient, perhaps, but lacking in shared appreciation among its members.

(IV) Social stability, however, is not all one with social rigidity. A flexible pattern may make for stability; and a flexible pattern demands variation in the acts of participants. Variation in his part requires of the participant behavior deliberate, rather than strictly mechanical. Deliberate action calls for something of conscious discrimination and preference; it has, then, some meaning. So far as its meaning is

bound with a social context, it is socially appreciative. Constancy in a social pattern is thus not inconsistent with exercise of criticism by those who work together within the harness of that pattern. Social stability is by no necessity out of harmony with social progress.

If progress be taken to represent continuity in change, a going forward by consistent variations in the same direction, then stability—as distinct from statics—is wholly consistent with it, indeed a part of it. Conformities deliberate, not mechanical, with conventions not too rigidly prescriptive, meet, in a measure at least, the requirements of progress in society.

Changes in society are, more often than not, mere by-products of competitive struggle between societies. They may follow, as it were, a course, or they may not. But, if they do follow a course, it is rather by chance than by virtue of determining purpose. So long as selfish or provincial conceptions and sympathies dominate the behavior of men in social affairs, 'the currents of social change' are hardly more likely to flow toward improvement than away from it. But if progress be distinguished from regress, as advancing human welfare in the large, then the more generous the scope of effective social appreciation among men, the more likely is change to be in the line of progress.

(V) So far as social progress is purposefully guided, the design of changes intelligent and consistent, it requires of men social qualification of a sort that may be called *critical sociality*. A critical sociality implies understanding of the social form, structure, process, or end to be judged, and a social standard by which to judge it. Such standards may be borrowed ideas or 'original constructs' of creative thinking. But, either way, as they affect action, they count to

progress somewhat in proportion to their approach toward a comprehensive reference in human welfare.

They count toward progress (*a*) by creating discontent with 'things as they are,' (*b*) by furnishing ends in 'things as they ought to be,' (*c*) by moving men to institute innovations, (*d*) by aiding men to intelligent acceptance or rejection of changes proposed or appearing, and (*e*) by easing the way to larger social cohesions.

(VI) The major obstacles, probably, to biological success, and still more, perhaps, to widespread and full development of personality and character among men, grow out of conflicts between societies active to serve 'special interests.' Not all these obstacles would be at one stroke removed were all men, by some miraculous dispensation, to realize in full their varied potentials for critical sociality. But every step in such development among them represents a gain in resources proper to human progress. The spread and enlargement of critical sociality is the first means to orderly and consistent social progress in any great community, and in the world of men at large.

PART TWO
APPLICATIONS TO EDUCATION

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CHAPTER VI

EDUCATION AS A HUMAN ENTERPRISE

I

Passing experience leaves its trace through every turn of its course. Every accident and incident and enterprise of a man's conscious life affects in some measure the form and content of his further experience. Learning is a property of experience. It is a property, too, of behavior not represented by "the conscious events" of life. Exercise of the organismal machinery in doings of which one is quite unaware may leave effects to 'condition' the modes of his later behavior, whether briefly or for long. How far this property of self-modification extends through the realm of behavior we do not know.*

By way of heredity man is possessed of certain relatively determined modes of interaction with factors constant in environment. The liquid property of water, for instance, varies little the world over, and we find man equipped with a

* It was long assumed that certain 'involuntary' forms of behavior were quite unmodifiable through exercise. 'Reflexes,' indeed, have been defined as 'unmodifiable connections.' But the studies of Pavlov and others following him have shown that many reflexes can be 'conditioned'—that is to say, the response can be attached to another than 'the original stimulus.' Thus the pupil of the eye can be made to contract at the stroke of a bell; the salivary glands to secrete at the flash of a light; and so on. 'The facts,' it would seem, are these: Some behavior is largely self-modifying, some less so, some still less, and so on until in the area of reflex processes we arrive, perhaps, at 'fixed connections,' in which the property of learning is wholly lacking.

quasi-automatic mechanism for drinking. 'The pull of gravity' over the earth's surface is much the same everywhere, and man is supplied with a ready-made mechanism for maintaining his balance and upright postures. Stability in relation to environment, however, is far more largely acquired than given. Men have worked to make many influences less variable than they are in nature. Wind and temperature in many regions vary widely; there is daylight and darkness successively everywhere on the earth's surface. To reduce these influences toward steadiness men have built houses, have heated and lighted them, so that the conditions of air movement, of temperature, and of light in a house from day to day and from season to season are far more constant than outdoors. In countless thousands of ways men have altered things in a manner to make them dependable. By modification of themselves, too, men have stabilized no less extensively their relations with the world. I, a grown man, swallow water from a cup quite as my neighbor's baby swallows water. But I reach for the cup, grasp it, convey it to my lips, in a manner not his, yet hardly more variable than the manner of my swallowing. I write these words from left to right. I proceed in the writing from the top of the page toward the bottom, through successive lines. I hold the pencil in much the same fashion throughout the writing. But no baby, given this paper and this pencil, will do these things. Beyond that, a great number of things that I could do with a cup, a pencil, a sheet of paper, I do not do. Like a creeping infant I can clap the cup to my ear, pat my head with it, pound it on the floor, chew the edge of it. Like him I can wave the pencil, or poke it in my nose; I can tear the paper, rattle it, thrust it in my mouth. But I am far less likely to do any of these things than he. He has few dependable preferences among

the acts that he can perform with cup or pencil or paper. I, on the contrary, have very firmly established preferences among the greater number of acts that I can perform with them. As compared with him, I can be relied on to do this in these circumstances and not that. By way of learning I am become, as adult, both less flexible in certain particulars than the youngster, and in general far more versatile than he.

Life moves more smoothly as a man comes to familiarity with the world, and to habitual modes of dealing with it. But any stabilization of its interchanges appears at first glance to mean a slowing down and a restriction, not a quickening and an enlargement of it. If effects of learning be toward prevention of change—as they must be to mean stability—then, it would seem, learning dams and confines the flow of life; makes it to march by a succession of completions.

Cases suggestive of such a result are not uncommon. One meets a man, now and then, whose complacency seems hardly less than that of the proverbial clam at high water. He has made for himself and fitted himself to an environment in which little of disturbing novelty or difficulty remains; his behavior in what he does, what he says, what he believes, is almost as predictable as the behavior of the happy clam. But, we know, learning may make for discontent as well as for complacency; for aspiration and rebellion, as well as for subjection. Habit 'frees attention,' which may go to new matters. Men cannot establish preferences without making distinctions; can hardly find similarities without discovering differences. For this reason learning may make for order in life, yet at the same time quicken and enrich it.

As to education, one can conceive of it as 'broadly' or as

'narrowly' as he chooses and his ability permits. Writers have used the privilege with great freedom and the result is a confusion which provokes, in its turn, controversies avoidable were the adversaries clear each as to what the other is talking about. If one, for instance, takes 'education' to be synonymous with 'development' or with 'learning' and the other takes it to mean only the work of the schoolmaster, their arguments lead to different conclusions, and the validity of the one conclusion may not affect at all the validity of the other. For this reason, and despite the fact that education has been defined times without end, it remains incumbent upon one who would write intelligibly upon matters of education to make clear, if he can, what *he* means by it. That, accordingly, is the task just here, and to be dealt with as briefly as may be.

The noun *education* is cognate with the verb to *educate*—a fact on occasion overlooked. That verb, unlike the verbs to develop, to grow, to learn, is always transitive. Education thus points, it would seem, to a life process determined by intelligence active at both poles, and not at one pole only. If that be so, then education is always purposeful; never merely accidental. The 'bi-polar conception' * of education admits, of course, at its 'broadest,' the possibility of a cosmic purpose directive of all learning, as of everything else. I venture here, however, to restrict the conception to that of a process directed by human purpose toward human ends. Further, I would exclude from education all developing, all

* Adams, J.: *The Evolution of Educational Theory*. Macmillan. N. Y., 1912. No one, so far as I know, has defined education with a more admirable lucidity than has Professor Adams. My limiting of a conception which, at base, is his, to the special instance of a human undertaking would seem, however, to justify the use of the personal pronoun at this point. I would not have him blamed for a definition which some will find, no doubt, deficient and disturbingly at variance with more grandiose forms to which, in these days, we are becoming accustomed.

growing, all processes of change, which are not at the same time learning processes. I would hold, for example, that the work of the careful nurse in feeding an infant, though a purposed and determinant factor in growth of the child, is not a work of education. In short, education, as here defined, includes any and all learning purposefully directed toward desired effects upon behavior in the learner; it excludes all other forms of nurture and modification whatever.

Education, under this definition, falls at its extremes into two categories. In the first, the purpose directive of learning is that of an "external educator,"* one who acts to promote learning in another or others than himself. In the second, the purpose is that of "the educand" himself, active to direct his own learning toward desired effects upon his own efficiency or appreciation. Here the educator is self-educator, and the process self-education. Between the extremes much of education goes on as a collaborative process. The external educator acts to provide resources hopefully provocative of the sort of learning that seems to him proper to improvement of the educand; the educand, on his part, acts purposefully to avail himself of those resources, using them selectively—and supplementing them, perhaps, also—to promote in himself learning of the sort that seems to him desirable. At the first extreme examples are numerous in teacher-pupil relations common to the first days, at least, of the first grade of the elementary school, and persisting, some of them, well into the high-school years, or even into the college. At or near the other extreme, an example may be found in the undertaking of the researcher seeking to learn this or that through experimental use of his own resources. Between are cases innumerable, wherein the student seeking to learn cooperates with the external educator who acts to

* Adams, J.: *Op cit.*

help him learn what to both it seems proper that he should learn.

When A acts to cause B to learn what A would have him learn, then A is an educator, for the moment at least. When A acts to educate B, he can do so only by bringing to bear upon B stimuli to learning effective toward the ends he has in view. That he may do directly by providing, so to speak, the proper stimuli himself. Miss Jones in the schoolroom writing on the blackboard a lesson assignment is active in the presence of her pupils directly to produce situations in which they may, she hopes, react in a way to learn what she would have them learn. The preacher in the pulpit, exhorting his congregation to Christian charity, acts again in the presence and directly to guide the learning of others toward forms of behavior held by him to be desirable. The traffic policeman, though hardly interested, perhaps, in the final outcome, acts, nevertheless, to educate in the presence and directly the passing motorist, when he gives him 'directions' for finding his way to the Iroquois Hotel. On the other hand, Lord Chesterfield writing to his son in France himself prepared directly an influence to move his son not present to learn this or that in behavior proper to a gentleman. The newspaper editor writing in his sanctum 'a blast' against the extravagances of the government is acting himself to produce an influence upon learning to affect the views and actions of readers remote from him. The 'honey-tongued' announcer at the microphone brings, and intends to bring, to bear upon distant and unknown listeners an influence produced by him directly which shall cause them to learn to behave as purchasers, say, of 'Uplift Cigarettes.' The writer of a text in geography by what he does produces directly an influence effective, soon or late, upon school children to cause them to learn certain things that he would

have them learn concerning 'the world as the home of man.' Everyone almost every day of his life, after infancy at any rate, is thus an educator, by what he does producing influences of a purpose to promote learning of this sort or that in others. *

A may act to educate B, however, not directly, but at second or further remove.* He may, for instance, act to cause C to act to educate B; or to cause C to cause D to cause E to educate B. Cases are familiar enough in the professional field. The school superintendent acts rarely to educate directly the school children in his district. He acts, rather, to educate teachers to act in this way or that to educate the children. The 'State Commissioner for Education,' who knows not even the name of the place, may have a part as educator in the schooling of children at Pony Hollow. His, perhaps, has been the final word in choice of the textbooks they use, in approval of the syllabus the teacher follows, and the like. He keeps active, too, in his part. He

* Some educators are teachers; some are not. When A acts directly to educate B, we often call him B's teacher. When A acts through C to educate B, then C may be the teacher of B, but A is not. Educators at second remove, or beyond, from the educand, are not his teachers. It seems clear that teachers fall within the first class of 'external educators,' and not in the second. But usage does not accord the title teacher to all educators of this class. The writer of a text, though he acts to produce himself an influence referable to the selective guidance of learning in school children, and to fairly definite ends in acquirement among them, we seldom regard as a teacher of the children; nor are we likely to allow that the editor of a popular weekly, however effective in his propagandist efforts, is a teacher of his readers. On the other hand we have no doubts that Miss Jones writing her assignment is a teacher, or that a mother may teach her small son to wipe his feet on the mat and close the door without slamming it, or that Lord Chesterfield stood in the relation of teacher, as well as of parent, to his son. That educator is, probably, most deserving of the name teacher who designs his acts of guidance with particular reference to particular needs for learning among particular persons known to him. But custom, far more than any clear conception of their meanings, governs use of the words *teacher* and *teaching*. An educational 'No Man's Land' remains wherein one cannot always and easily be sure that this educator is a teacher and that one is not a teacher.

acts to cause his deputies to cause the supervisors to cause the district superintendents to cause the local principals to cause the teachers in the grades to act in this wise or that to educate the children in their charge. And the principle extends far beyond the school system. The bishop has a part to determine education in the local church and Sunday school. The newspaper publisher writes, it may be, no editorials, but too often he determines what editorials shall be written. The advertising manager, very likely, prepares no copy himself, but what advertisements shall go forth, where they shall go, and to whom he largely determines. School superintendent, college president, bishop, publisher, political party chieftain, advertising manager, mother-in-law, these and scores, hundreds, or thousands of others act in every large community, either characteristically or from time to time, as educators at second or further remove from the educand in the case.

The bi-polar conception of education, let us say once more, admits of the reflexive movement. It allows that a man may take charge of his own learning, so that he need not be wholly or forever dependent upon other men for guidance to desired acquirements. It is likely, indeed, that the earliest learnings of many skills and knowledges to which men now educate one another were guided by purpose to learn within the learner himself, and were, by no necessity, either accidental or merely incidental to the pursuit of other ends than learning. It is possible, to be sure, that the first man to learn to swim learned to do so by accident. He fell or was thrown into deep water and happened in his struggles to make the right motions to keep him afloat and land him ashore. Thereafter he served as an example or an active teacher of swimming to his fellows. It is far more probable that he set out deliberately to learn to swim, say like a deer

or a frog, and used the animal's example to guide him in his efforts. It may be that the first savage who learned that bears 'den up' in winter learned it by hitting upon a den in course of his search for food or a place of shelter. It is possible, too, that he set out deliberately to find out where bears go in winter; followed tracks in the snow, watched for signs, pried into possible hiding places in his search. At any rate, a will to overcome certain obstacles, to emulate certain accomplishments of others, to know what this is and what that, why this happens and why that, rests upon 'urges' in man as close to native, probably, as are the 'tendencies' to struggle in deep water and to pursue things that flee. Urges of the sort do not, of course, involve in their first activation a definite purpose to learn, but the implication of such purpose lies in them, and appears very early in life. When it appears, the process of self-guided learning—that is to say, the man's education of himself—begins.

It is an old and a wise saying that the highest function of the teacher is 'to abdicate'; to make himself unnecessary, not because he has taught the pupil everything that the pupil can learn and ought to learn, but because he has taught the pupil both to wish to learn and how to guide his activities so as to learn what he seeks to learn. The saying suggests the high importance of self-education. It gives sanction to a belief that in the ascending scale of schooling, for instance, the pupil should become increasingly a student, should more and more be thrown upon his own responsibility to educate himself. In such a view the university professor, though an intelligent agent in selective influence upon the learning of students, need hardly concern himself to make sure that Smith and Johnson shall learn just this or just that. He may serve properly, rather, as does a library, a laboratory, or a book of reference, to provide resources wherefrom stu-

dents may undertake to learn to their own ends, and at their own intelligent election.

II

When a man has learned anything he is, for a time at least, changed in his readiness to deal with this or that in his environment. He has become, with respect to certain things, events, meanings, as the case may be, differently sensitive, differently percipient, differently disposed as to the forms of his responsive behavior, whether in action, in understanding, or in feeling. The effect of the learning may be small or great, passing or persistent, but in every case the man who has learned is not now in all potentials of his behavior exactly the man he would have been without the learning. Whatever account the physiologist or the psychologist may give of learning process, every effect of that process, however produced, is an effect upon readiness for further behavior. From this comes the corollary that the human undertaking of education is always in some measure *preparatory*, a making ready of sorts.

Education may prepare for the instant future, or for the distant future; it may—and does in many an instance—prepare for both. But whether the behavior-potential at which the undertaking aims be actualized within a pulse-beat of its acquirement, or, instead, lie latent for a long, long time, the end of education is realized with the sought effect of learning, and not in the learning process guided to produce it.*

* It is often true that a particular educative undertaking may be looked upon as no more than a step forward in another more comprehensive. Many effects sought through education are effects proper to the forwarding of further education. Thus undertaking *a* may be designed to acquirements necessary to undertaking *b*, and undertaking *b* in turn aimed at readiness in forms of behavior

Education, in those enterprises at least wherein the external educator has some part, takes three general forms which, though neither independent nor wholly separable from one another, are yet in character distinguishable as to methods and objectives. The first two are those known familiarly as *instruction* and *training*; the third is that exemplified most clearly in the stimulation of 'problem solving and research,' to which the name *liberation* may be applied, perhaps not improperly.

Instruction begins with 'methodical presentation' of stimuli to learning. It proceeds by way of orderly learning toward ordered effects upon the learner. Order in the doings of the educator, order in the learning of the educand, order in the effects produced by that learning—all this is implied by instruction. The Latin derivation of the word still supplies the core of its meaning in a discriminative usage. Lexicographers support, too, the view that instruction aims at knowledge, at effects proper to rational appreciation. It is concerned characteristically to promote the acquirement of meanings, especially ideas; and, more than that, the acquirement of meanings in orderly systems of relation, so that in the actualization of acquired knowledge one meaning may serve to complement the other. Instruc-

essential to education through undertaking *c*. All three, *a*, *b*, and *c*, may be taken as parts of the larger undertaking *A*—for example, 'a series of lessons in a course.' When such is true, the effects of *a* are actualized in *b*, the effects of *b* in *c*, and so on, or all these several ends, if you will, are realized in undertaking *A*. In that sense education may fulfill in process its own ends. But, if one takes education to be a purposeful human affair, its ends cannot be confined to itself. One may teach a child to read for the sake of the educative uses to which his reading may be put; but one may also teach that child to brush his teeth not at all for the sake of any educative uses to which that action-habit might conceivably be put.

See, in contrast, the famous statement of Professor Dewey in *Democracy and Education*, Chapter IV.

tion represents as a rule, too, 'a transmission of knowledge';* it is a mode of education in which the external educator plays usually a leading part.

Training † as a mode of education aims characteristically at action-habits; finds its ends in ability to do this in this way or that in that way. It takes the form of practice in performance after a chosen pattern, and moves toward its ends with habituation in behavior conforming to that pattern. Training takes its start, obviously, with some perception or idea of the performance-pattern which serves to

* By way of instruction one man 'imparts his knowledge' to another. He acts, that is to say, to cause the other to learn what he himself already knows; to arrive, as it were, at ideas like his held together in an order like that in which he himself holds them. In this view instruction is at once a transmission and an indoctrination. The Greeks held that it could be nothing else. One man, said Socrates, can instruct another only in what he, the first man, knows. No man can instruct himself. To do so he must possess at the start the very ideas and system of ideas which it is the end of instruction to produce in him. The points, like most points made by Socrates, are hardly to be passed over as insignificant; yet one may entertain about them certain doubts. As to the first, it seems clear enough that a given educator in a day of abundant resources, written and other, can direct a given educand to acquisition of ideas beyond those which he, the educator, possesses. If that be so, then the educator is not bound by instruction to indoctrinate the educand with his own ideas and beliefs. The second point seems incontrovertible, so far as 'first knowledge' is concerned. But self-instruction, in terms at least of a reorganization of ideas already learned, is plainly possible. Suppose, for example, that one has acquired here ideas *a*, *b*, and *c* in the order of relations *A*; has acquired there ideas *m*, *n*, and *o* in the order of relations *M*. He can, without external guidance, set about a reordering of *a*, *b*, and *c* into the system *M*, or of *m*, *n*, and *o* into the system *A*. Self-education of the sort is common enough, and seems to involve all the essentials of instruction without implying either a transmission of knowledge from man to man, or an indoctrination of one man with the ideas of another.

† The word *training* has a legitimate usage which gives it a larger scope than can be accorded to education. Taken as a purposeful promotion of development, for instance, training may point to nurture by other means than learning—say, to the dietary regimen of a prize-fighter, which belongs no less to his training than does his guided practice in 'footwork' and 'boxing.' But training is used quite as legitimately also, as I have used it here, to name a mode of education distinguishable from instruction.

guide practice and to give form to the habit which is the purposed product of the practice. It may be initiated, therefore, by instruction—say by verbal exposition or visual demonstration on the part of a teacher. But the ongoing of training is not dependent upon a maintained external stimulus. Once the educand has 'caught the idea,' he may proceed to learn by practice without further aid from another. By the same token training may be self-initiated. A man may hit upon or devise for himself a 'way' of doing this or that; then go ahead to make that way of doing his way by practice which follows the pattern which he has set for himself. Though training represents, by and large, a passing on of behavior forms from one man to another, yet it is not so predominantly a transmissive mode of education as is instruction. Whereas instruction gives of necessity considerable emphasis to the work of the educator, training, in contrast, tends rather to emphasize the activities of the educand.

Instruction may produce or improve ability to appreciate this; training ability to do that. A man may thus be made ready in a measure to understand or to do something which before he was unready, or less ready, to understand or to do. Such preparation will affect his behavior actually, however, only as he meets occasions calling for an appreciation of this or a doing of that. Preparation means readiness of the educand for dealing with situations of this sort or that. Every intelligent and effective undertaking of education by way of instruction, training, or the twain conjoined, must, therefore, be predicated upon the assumption that the educand *will* meet and have to deal with situations of a given kind. In teaching swimming, for example, we take it for granted that the pupil is going to enter the water.

Schoolmen, at least, are fairly wont to recognize this prin-

ciple. In recent years, certainly, they have given no little attention to techniques of prediction useful to determining 'curricular objectives' in 'education for citizenship,' preparation for vocation, 'education for the worthy use of leisure,' and so on. They have attempted more and more extensively to substitute 'the study of facts and trends' for blind assumption and variously intelligent guesswork as to the probable requirements of the future.

So far as educators, in their wisdom, can foresee the future of any educand, they can proceed hopefully to prepare him to meet its requirements. By instruction they can help to give his life ahead orderly meaning; by training they can help to stabilize his interactions with many features of environment. They can, indeed, go further to produce a considerable versatility in adaptation to environment and control of it.* By combining instruction in facts, principles, and

* If, as in Chapter I, a man's life be taken for an active interchange between two polar, but inseparable opposites, the man and his environment, then this conclusion follows:

Every end of education must be an effect upon the relation of the educand to his environment. Education cannot aim to produce change of a man only, or only to change environment. The educator's objective must include both the man and that with which the man has to deal; include the influence that is to bear upon a man, and the man upon whom it is to bear. It must center upon the relation between a man-subject and an environmental object, neither of which is a datum altogether fixed and independent of the other.

The principle, of course, does not forbid emphasis upon change in the educand as compared with change in his environment, or *vice versa*. It allows for objectives in *adaptation*, wherein the physical form of an object, at least, may be looked upon as constant, and the man as modified to meet the requirements of 'equilibrium.' It allows, no less, objectives wherein the modification of physical forms producible by men's doings, individual or collective, is dominant—objectives, that is to say, in *control* of material things and events.

On the side of meanings, the principle implies that education can modify the influence of material things and events, and so enlarge or enrich the environment of a man, however restricted his life may be in the matter of 'surroundings.' It implies, too, that education can go further to build up objective ideas, and thus create environmental resources which are, so to speak, portable, and which enable a man to be, at times, more or less independent of the locale in which he finds himself.

theories with training in variously perfected action-habits, they can help to develop reaction patterns of great comprehensiveness and flexibility—as, for instance, they have done again and again in the preparation of physicians, lawyers, engineers, teachers. For all that, instruction and training can prepare for the future only in the measure that they promote ability to deal with things, events, ideas in one degree or another familiar, supplying the educand, as it were, with ‘a good stock in trade’ of knowledge and action-habits. Beyond that they cannot go. Instruction and training, at their best, leave a man unprepared to deal with the new and the strange very much in proportion to its newness and its strangeness.

In the future of almost every man there remain areas of the highly unpredictable, wherein may arise from time to time situations largely novel as to pattern and detail. Such situations the man may meet, of course, by way of fresh insights, by creating new ideas and new forms of action, or he may struggle with them blindly, or he may evade and pass them by as best he can. No more can be said of them with certainty than this: They will demand of him who essays to meet them originality, initiative, inventiveness. Except it be by chance, then, instruction and training do not prepare for the unpredictable future. If education is to fill any part of the gap so left it must do so by other means.

Among the modifiable potentials of man are ‘sets of mind’ or dispositions relatively general, not specifically determinant to this form of appreciation or that form of doing, but rather widely effective, nevertheless, upon behavior. A disposition to explore, to master, to create the new in one, or several, or many fields, can be promoted. It represents, like any other objective of education, an acquired readiness. General dispositions of the sort support originality, initiative and

creative invention of ideas and acts. To develop such a 'set or tendency' one must face difficulties, must adventure, experiment, devise, and not too often fail in resolution of them. The so-called 'problem method' supplies an instance of education which, at its best, involves little in the way of instruction or training, yet is clearly a helpful promotion of dispositions to creative activity, whether aesthetic, intellectual and critical, or severely practical. In this self-education plays, no doubt, the major part. But the external educator is not altogether excluded. He can bring to attention, if he be skillful, occasions for 'research and problem solving' of a sort entirely genuine, situations in the face of which the educand must become explorer, adventurer, experimenter, creator, master in control of his own thinking and doing. So far as a teacher, for example, does just that, he acts to produce and strengthen in the educand originality, initiative, inventiveness, and, in so far forth at least, to prepare the educand to deal with opportunities and requirements unforeseeable now. The mode of education thus suggested may be called, for want of a better name, the method of *liberation*.*

III

Education exhibits frequently, but not always, the characteristics of an enterprise in one sense or another *social*. The behavior of the external educator is, in general, social be-

* A great deal has been said in recent years about the importance of 'freeing the intelligence' of the educand. Something of the Froebelian notion of peeling from the expanding bud all hindering integuments persists here; there persists, too, something of the Platonic notion that the work of education is to remove the fogs of ignorance which blind an intelligence immanent and pure. These traces leave one confused as to what, exactly, the much-repeated phrase does mean. But some who use it seem to imply by it that very mode of education over and above instruction and training, which has been here vaguely suggested.

havior. His acts in the guidance of learning are moved by a purpose of service to another or others. The teacher, for one, chooses his objectives and determines his methods in the light of an appreciation of the needs and resources of his pupils. The advertiser who believes in the merits of his goods seeks through promoting the sale of them not to profit only, but to serve his customers. Even self-education is as likely as not to involve social behavior. To learn what he desires to learn the self-directing educand must very often seek directly the aid of others. To secure that aid he must deal with them as human beings like himself, with some consideration of their rights, their sensibilities, their needs, putting his inquiries, for example, courteously rather than rudely, speaking their language, framing his questions properly to their understanding, in a way to enlist their interest—and the like.

Education becomes a joint undertaking when educator and educand unite in pursuit of a common aim. Teacher and pupil, for instance, cooperate as educators in the measure that the pupil becomes in fact a student following his own purpose to learn, and directing his own learning, so far as his abilities permit, toward results of a sort desired both by him and his teacher. Cooperative enterprise in education, however, extends far beyond that. No small part of the education of most men in civilized countries is conducted by societies organized for service of education. Obvious examples of such societies, if by no means always the most effective and important of them, are schools and systems of schools. When Miss Jones, in the schoolroom, teaches Susie Brown to spell a word, not Miss Jones alone supplies the guiding influence. The school superintendent, the writer of the spelling book, the school board, and other individuals and social groups have had a part in purposed

contribution to the resources used to teach the child the word. Similarly, at every step in the growing youngster's advance through 'the grades' the high school, and the university, more than one educator and more than one group of educators are likely to have a share in guidance of her learning.

So long as educators act individually and without reference to the work of one another, the opportunities of the educand are limited and consistent growth in the culture of a people is unlikely. So far as instruction and training serve as the modes of guidance, the acquirements of a man are likely to go but seldom beyond those of such particular educators as may happen, from time to time, to be in charge of his guidance. The principle was discovered long ago. To educate a prince, for example, it was early found advisable to call in several masters, one to instruct him in respect of these matters, another to train him in respect of those. Thus, before Machiavelli and Castiglione wrote their famous treatises, the education of the prospective ruler had become rather commonly a joint enterprise of masters. Aristotle, Alcuin, Abelard, thousands of others, as we know, took all knowledge to their province, but seldom did those whom they taught have guidance from them alone in matters of learning. Even among primitive peoples the work of educators was early divided. The mother taught the child these things, the father those, the priest or medicine man still others. Collective enterprise of sorts in education has a very ancient standing. Though educators, in early times, co-operated to the education of individuals on no such extended and finely divided scale as now, yet cooperate they did.

In the matter of objectives, again, education is largely social. It aims at *socialization* of the individual, undertakes to develop modes of appreciation and efficiency helpful to him

as participant in societies political, economic, recreational, and the rest; in brief, to make him ready, so far as may be, to deal in a fashion proper to his own good with social influences that bear upon him presently, or that will come, presumably, to bear upon him in a future more remote.

The individual socialized * for his own sake, however, appears to be very often a secondary, or mediate, objective. Education aims rather to accomplish through him ends of confirmation or change in the forms of society. By way of education men are variously active to promote the elimination of certain conventions and societies, the perpetuation of others, the reconstruction of still others, and the introduction of new forms.

* The major propositions of Chapter II are three:

1. Social behavior is, in the first instance, behavior of the individual man. It is psychophysical behavior, having an other-serving reference both in a moving purpose and in the direction of an act.

2. Social behavior is, in the second instance, collective behavior. Society is joint activity, a process compound of complementary elements in the social behavior of individual men.

3. Societies are products of society. They are collective mechanisms formed and used by men to the service of common ends; mechanisms made whole by organization of the harmoniously purposed doings of individuals.

So far as these propositions are sound they would seem to carry for education the following implications:

(a) The educator who aims to produce in an educand behavior essentially social must seek to develop in him both purpose to serve and ability to act in service of others than himself. He cannot be content to promote mere will-to-serve without regard to means of making that will effective, or, on the other hand, to promote merely modes of other-serving action in disregard of social motive in or behind them. The principle allows, however, the seeking of objectives in social appreciation at one time, and of social efficiency at another, provided the twain be joined ultimately as a basis of social behavior on the part of the educand.

(b) Education can promote society, or social process, so far as it serves to develop among different individuals forms of social behavior mutually complementary. It can hinder social process so far as it is effective to produce among men purposes inharmonious, and modes of action antagonistic one to another.

(c) Education can promote in varying measure the destruction or the conservation, the reconstruction or the creation of human societies.

In its use as a means to *social control* some have found 'the supreme function of education.' This function goes forward by 'selective tradition of the cultural heritage,'* by passing on to every child, for instance, according to his capacity, the tested and promising beliefs, standards, modes of thought, and conduct of his fathers, education, figuratively speaking, lifts him to their shoulders at an early age, and so enables him to 'carry on' at the level to which they have climbed, or from that level to climb, as otherwise he could not do so readily, to a level still higher.

Education as selective tradition takes two forms: (1) the form of purposeful 'transmission' from A to B of habits, skills, knowledge, ideas proper, as A sees it, to the socialization of B; (2) the form of purposed acquirement by way of self-education. The first form is so much to the fore in discussion of social control through government, schools, churches, the home, the press, and other agencies of education, that the second is often overlooked. Beyond doubt, however, self-education plays a large part in selective tradition. Purposeful imitation of speech, manners, posture, dress, feats of skill, and the like, is a familiar phenomenon not peculiar to the behavior of children. The child, the youth, or the grown man, among his own folk, like the alert traveler among strangers, often sets out deliberately to learn by

* Simple tradition of the *mores* is still in chief part a matter of learning incidental to the experiences of everyday living, and not a matter of education. The young 'pick up' modes of speech and manners and customs by mere mingling with and earning the approval or the disapproval of their elders. The stranger learns some of 'the ways of life' of a community as the mere by-product of living among its people. The immigrant entering 'the land of the free' frequently becomes proficient in use of American expletives before his English is otherwise readily intelligible; yet no one has sought to promote in him an early mastery of them, nor has he himself sought, perhaps, such mastery. Even the college graduate has picked up many of the ordinary lubricants of intercourse in a fashion of the sort, without intent on his part or that of anyone else that he should acquire them.

observation, by direct inquiry, by the reading of books, and otherwise, how others are accustomed to act, what things they use and how they use them, how they deal with one another and work together, what commonly they think and believe, and much else sometimes. Thus he tends to take over something of 'the cultural heritage' of those with whose mode of life he so concerns himself. The 'breaking in' of freshmen, for example, is hardly more a process of purposeful transmission by upperclassmen and 'campus organizations' than it is a process of purposeful acquirement by the freshmen themselves.

Summary. (I) A man's behavior in every experience of his life and many of his unconscious activities, too, leave upon him effects to condition the modes of his further behaving. Activity effective in this way may be looked upon as *learning* activity.

Education is learning purposefully directed to produce desired effects upon forms of behavior. Considered as a human enterprise education implies an educator with a purpose that someone, be it another or himself, shall acquire through learning this or that behavior-potential. It implies an educator who acts somehow to bring to bear upon the educand, or educands, in the case influence to evoke learning appropriate to produce the effect he desires. One man may act to educate another. He may do so directly by way of what he does to guide the learning of that man, or indirectly by way of what he does to cause others to act to guide that man. Or, a man may act to educate himself. When the educative purpose, the directive action, and the directed learning are those of the same man, then education appears as learning self-guided, or self-education.

(II) Education is *preparatory*. It undertakes to make a

man ready in this respect or that to deal with demands of life ahead, whether but a moment ahead or in a future more distant.

In the form of *instruction* education aims at knowledge, at an orderly acquirement of meanings. Its function here is a 'transmission' of known facts, principles, theories, and the like. The external educator thus plays, generally, a leading part. A self-directed reordering of knowledge is, however, not rare, and this may deserve, on occasion, the name of self-instruction.

In the form of *training* education aims at action-habits, at dependable efficiency in doing this or that. Training, again, is largely transmissive. The objective pattern of performance is set by one and followed by another. But self-training, that is to say, practice for the sake of forming a habit in accord with a pattern supplied by the practicer himself, is common enough. The external educator is not so much to the fore in training as in instruction.

In the form of *liberation* education moves toward an end not of knowledge or skill, but of disposition favorable to original and creative thinking and acting. In this form the external educator plays but a secondary part; a part suggestive and in nowise prescriptive. He can bring the educand to face situations of a problematic order. From that point on the educand takes charge. External direction is out of place; its use defeats the end of liberation. Research self-initiated and self-conducted contributes largely also to promote initiative and inventiveness.

(III) Not always, but in general, education reveals *social* characteristics. (a) The behavior of the teacher, for example, appears as social conduct; he acts with a purpose and to an end of service to the educand. Self-education requires, as often as not perhaps, something in the way of social be-

havior. (*b*) Education represents, over a vast range of cases, collective rather than individual enterprise. There is, in the main, cooperation of sorts between educator and educand. Education is often, too, a joint undertaking of educators—as in a school, of the modern type. (*c*) Education aims, by and large, to produce a socialized individual, promoting in the educand acquisition of behavior-potentials proper to dealing with his fellow men. Looking beyond him it aims to maintain or improve conventions and patterns of society. (*d*) In this, its function as social control, education operates chiefly as a 'selective tradition' of customs, laws, institutions, beliefs, ideals, etc., produced by society. Thus it appears as a means to stability and progress in the structures and processes of collective living.

CHAPTER VII

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY OF BIOLOGICAL SUCCESS

I

Chapter III argues to an ethics of material utility. It points to a valuing of men's activities and resources against the measures of biological success.

Most definite, perhaps, among the implications of this argument for education are those bearing upon the nature of its objectives and the order of their worth. As to their nature these objectives are *practical*. Taken as modifications of the educand they are ends-sought in behavior-potentials such as make for achievements on his part which shall count toward biological success. They consist, then, first in potentials immediately directive of action; and, second, in potentials mediately effective to direct action by way of affective preference—or motive—and by thinking. Put in another way, the objectives of education appear as ends-sought in *practical efficiency* and as ends-sought in *practical appreciation*.

Looked upon as modifications of environment, the objectives of education appear still to be practical. They represent things conserved or made over in a way to forward success for the species, race, or breed, or, for men as individuals, in terms of survival or of satisfaction. They are ends-sought, that is to say, in material resources available to men's uses.

Order of values among the objectives of education corresponds, of course, with order of values in the activities of life which they affect. Thus, in general, educational objectives in practical efficiency and practical appreciation which make for success in propagating and rearing fit offspring rank at the highest level of worth. Educational objectives effective upon behavior in a way to favor security and persistence of life rank at the second level. In the lowest category of value fall those objectives which have their outcomes in immediate satisfaction for individual men. Among these, however, differences in value are considerable. Highest of such objectives are those that count toward 'substantial comforts' by supplying wants widely shared among men. Of lowest worth are those which supply wants confined to the single individual or to a few men only.

Consistently with the generalizations just made these qualifications should be added:

(1) An objective which, as accomplished, makes for the forwarding of success at all three levels has the highest justification in utility. An educational accomplishment serviceable at the first and another level has greater worth than one useful on the first level only; if it be useful on the first and second levels, it has greater worth than if it be useful on the first and third, but not on the second. And so on. The way in which combined values bear upon the rating of educational objectives hardly requires further elaboration.

(2) Of two modifications produced by education and effective, each by itself, to enable achievement of the same end, that one is the more valuable which represents the more efficient means to the given end.

(3) By the same token, and because, too, men working together can achieve many important successes which working severally they cannot achieve, objectives proper to the

forwarding of collective enterprise tend to rate in value above those determinate of individual doings only.

By and large the logic of success suggests that the aims of useful education will center, on the one side, upon contributions toward health, temperance, prudence, thrift, and social efficiency among men; and, on the other, upon contributions to the production and conservation of wealth in material resources.

II.

Content in education should reflect its objectives. Reasoning from conceptions of biological success a proper content of education is a *useful content* making, as mastered, for useful behavior. Content serviceable to practicality should, rather obviously, supply on the side of actional efficiency definite patterns of performance for useful acts; supply on the side of practical appreciation 'facts,' principles, laws, standards, applicable to the guidance of useful action. It should be, that is to say, mainly a *technical content*.

The content of useful education, however, must go, on occasion, somewhat beyond the limits of the technical, and in some instances far beyond those limits. The mastery of technique or technology appropriate to a successful doing of this or that is not of itself sufficient to ensure the doing. Producing a will-to-act is quite as important to assurance of useful doing as is producing technical qualifications for acting usefully. A biologically serviceable education should include, accordingly, some content favorable to producing disposition-potentials of a sort to move the educand to perform the useful acts for which his technical qualifications make him otherwise ready. To develop such dispositional factors in behavior the educand may often be called upon to deal, in learning, with a content other than technical.

Such content may be of a persuasive sort, 'appealing to the emotions,' as is common in hortatory undertakings and propaganda. It may be of a sort designed to enlist for motivation of an act some predicated interest, as in vocational education for employed adults. Or it may be of a sort designed to rational conviction, to show *why*, for instance, this mode of action is the logically desirable mode of dealing with these conditions. And the like, variously. At any rate, content productive of a motive-potential proper to bring it about that the educand *will* do what, by virtue of technical qualifications, he *can* do, need not be a content directly referable to the pattern of a performance. Such content, non-technical though it be, remains, nevertheless, a *useful* content.

It is perhaps unnecessary to add that an extension of scope in content beyond the technical is implied for any undertaking to educate men to deal successfully with the unpredictable. In the nature of the case such an undertaking can have no objectives in definite forms of behavior. The most it can seek usefully to accomplish is to promote within this area of life or that dispositions favorable to activity in discovering, devising, testing new forms of action serviceable to dealing with changed conditions.

III

In order to make clear the tracing of implications for general modes of education that is *useful* it seems worth while to repeat a bit of what has been said already. Education proper to biological success aims at producing (1) useful behavior on the part of the individual man, (2) useful behavior on the part of societies of men, (3) environment useful to individuals and to societies. Modifications in collective be-

havior and in environment are producible through education only by way of modifications in the behavior of individuals; neither societies nor the physical environment can be educated. Hence every undertaking of education to forward success, whatever its remoter ends may be, must seek first ends in useful behavior on the part of the individual.

Such objectives represent modifications made in useful action, in useful judgment, in useful motive. Only useful actions count in direct contribution to the persistence and spread of man on earth, and to the preservation and maintenance of life among individuals. On the third level of success they count too, if not quite exclusively, toward immediately 'satisfying adjustments.' At the higher levels, and mainly also on the lower level, useful judgments and useful motives have worth only as accessories to the direction and impelling of useful acts.

Practical efficiency in dealing with the more stable features of environment rests upon habituation in direct and economical modes of action. Practical efficiency in dealing with variable, but still predictable, conditions in the physical world rests in no small part, again, upon elements of actional habit such as can be compounded into new acts and systems of action determined by practical judgment, and moved by a will to act. Habituation enters once more as a factor in the secondary functions of useful thinking and discriminative preference that operate in practical appreciation. Thus it seems clear that objectives in *habits formed* must be very much to the fore in education designed to the service of biological success.

If the last conclusion be a valid one, then it follows that the mode of education called *training* must be very much to the fore also. As training takes the form of activity externally directed to the forming of habits, and not the form

of self-training, it must be, most often, initiated and controlled by some measure of *instruction*—instruction sufficient at least to provide in image or idea a pattern of guidance in exercise of the function to be made habitual. Beyond that, instruction is a chief means to transmission of technology, of known facts, principles, laws, standards proper to practical judgment. Instruction plays further an important part in amplifying practical judgment with dispositional preferences sufficient to make of it practical appreciation, effective both in the choice of useful acts and in determination of their forms. Instruction, therefore, is a mode of directing learning widely characteristic of undertakings in useful education. By the logic of success, however, *liberation* would seem to be not so generally a mode of useful education as either training or instruction. The need for liberation is correlate with the need of preparation to deal successfully with the unpredictable.

The area of the unpredictable is still large in the physical world, but diminishing. For man as animal, fortunately, the physical world is in 'basic essentials' relatively stable, and amenable to control and stabilization throughout a vast range of its particulars. Its phenomena are subject to laws of causation consistently operative, so that by way of science, of historical record, and of statistics, the main 'trends and cycles' of change are observable, and supply grounds for prediction extensive and fairly dependable. The educator is in a position to 'forecast the probabilities' in many lines of requirement, and thus to 'set up' objectives known to be useful in effect, with varying degrees of certainty and definiteness. Liberation, of course, can aim at no certain and precisely definite objectives. It represents to the educator, generally, an enterprise of hopeful aspiration rather than of useful achievement, and so tends, quite reasonably in the

view of 'the practical man,' to a subordinate place among the modes of education. For all that, those dispositions to adventure and create at which it aims, though they carry with them risks of failure undesirable from the biological standpoint, yet carry also possibilities of such successes as point the way to increasing man's mastery of the physical world.

IV

Under any mode of education, it may be noted, the present behavior of the educand in learning may be valued in two ways: (1) As an attempt at immediate adjustment, useful or not useful in the degree that it produces satisfaction or fails to produce it; or (2) as a process of modification useful or not as it produces or does not produce the effect sought upon his future behavior. The first may be called, for convenience, its *present life value*; * the second its *educational value*.

Present life value and educational value are by no necessity commensurate; the first may be low and the second high, or *vice versa*. Neither are they by any necessity out of har-

* On the grounds set forth in Part One, it is safe to assert that every learning activity is a part of life and to be valued, like any other part, for its utility or its meaning.⁶ Every enterprise of education enters the life of an educand, and is subject itself to judgment by the same standards as apply to his other doings and experiences. From this premise it follows that:

(a) One who directs a process of learning should take into account its worth, both as means to an end in modified behavior, and as behavior itself. From the standpoint of the educator the directed learning process is a means, and properly to be judged against the ends it serves; but for the educand it is an action or experience wherein, for the time being, he lives, and so, in some measure, good or not good itself.

(b) One who directs a process of learning should regard the activity of the educand as part of a developing whole, continuous with and not discrete from other parts. Thus he must consider it not only as an event in the life of the educand and as a means to affecting his future living, but also as an act or experience to be joined with acts or experiences already parts of his life.

mony. But the demand for valuation against two measures presents very often a difficulty to the educator. The requirements of satisfaction on the part of the educand may point the teacher, for instance, to a 'method' notably less efficient to the attainment of his objective than another which, if invoked, would yield little or nothing in the way of immediate satisfaction to the educand. Though there is no good reason to doubt the present-day belief of many psychologists that activity is effective to learning much in proportion to the sense of satisfaction that goes with it, yet it still remains true that the most satisfying behavior possible at this moment of life is not often behavior most appropriate to produce effects sought by the educator at this moment.

By the ethics of utility one should choose—when he can choose—that one of two forms of behavior which counts toward success at the higher level. Activity of educational value has, therefore, no inherent superiority to activity which lacks educational value. A child may frequently behave more usefully out of school than in school; the student, no matter how able and earnest, can often be better employed than in study. The principle applies even when the measure of value is that of immediately satisfying adjustment. Play, for instance, in which a child engages *now*, for the delight there is in it, may well rate not inferior, or even superior to work undertaken to make him ready for this or that kind of recreative enjoyment at a later time. By the same ethics, again, one should choose that which is the more efficient of two means to the same end in education. In the classroom, for example, a teacher seeking to promote mastery of number combinations in multiplication should, probably, choose exercises with flash cards rather than exercises in chanting the multiplication tables to a musical accompaniment on the piano.

Under the first principle an activity directed to produce skill, knowledge, disposition favorable to the forwarding of propagation, of the proper nurture of children, of bodily safety and health, of efficiency in producing goods of subsistence, or of any other among the higher biological functions of men, rates above any activity devoted to present satisfaction only for the individual. Hence it is the duty of the educator to subordinate the present satisfaction of the educand in learning, whenever the higher end he seeks requires it. In order to learn that which for superior usefulness he should learn the educand may be held, quite justly, to a course of activity by no means immediately satisfying to him. The second principle gives added sanction to that duty. If an educational objective of high utility can be reached more efficiently, say, by method *a* than by method *b*, then method *a* should be invoked, even though 'the act of learning' in that case is less satisfying to the educand than would be activity proper to his part under method *b*. So far as objectives in the higher categories of value are concerned, the path of advance for the educand must be, on many occasions certainly, variously steep and hard to climb.

In contrast the principle of efficiency points also to an obligation toward smoothing the path of learning, when that can properly be done. So far, at least, as directness and orderly succession in details of advance are consistent with efficiency and satisfaction in the process of learning—and that is doubtless far in many cases—the educator is justified in seeking 'short cuts' and systems of 'step by step achievement.' Thus he may make useful in some degree at the moment that which is ultimately useful by a higher measure than the satisfaction it now yields.

When, however, one considers objectives useful only because they represent new or increased abilities to find satis-

faction in the future, it becomes more doubtful that present life value should be kept subordinate to educational value. Unless the future satisfaction to be gained by way of the sought acquirement is clearly higher than that which may be found in an effective—albeit not an efficient—mode of learning, then it is not just to sacrifice a present certain value to a possible future value. The point is, or should be, of some significance to the practice of teaching, particularly in fields devoted to the use of independent leisure.

NOTE. The modern—and evidentially well-supported—belief that no behavior, however appropriate in form to produce a desired result in habit, skill, knowledge, or other mode of response, can be truly efficient in the absence of satisfaction therein or—not too long delayed—therefrom, would seem to make legitimate the bringing in of variously extraneous motives and rewards. It does not permit the educator in any case to neglect altogether the factor of satisfaction in the learning process which he assumes to guide.

V

An ethics of biological success carries, patently or obscurely, a multitude of implications for the organization of education. It points, first of all, toward institutionalized collective agencies for education—to wit, toward schools and school systems—for the accomplishment of many widely important objectives, at least. It points, in the second place, toward characteristic patterns of organization, both administrative and curricular, within schools and school systems. One sufficiently capable might well develop in orderly fashion a host of ramifications; but no more can be offered here than suggestion of main directional bearings.

It seems clear enough that so far as successful living requires of many individuals the same, or closely similar, functional abilities, the objectives of education may be standard-

ized; and, of course, following the objectives, both content and methods may be standardized likewise, within the limits set by 'individual differences in the human material' to be dealt with. Whenever a consistent demand is made for a closely definable educational product, it becomes possible and profitable for some men to specialize in undertakings to produce it. Standard demand for a given form and level of ability points to specialization among producers quite as clearly as does a like demand for a given form and quality in a manufactured product.

Living that is successful by biological measures does require, beyond doubt, that the individual man be much like his fellows in many particulars of his behavior; like most of them in this respect and that, like some of them in other respects. 'Minimal standards' of qualification for meeting certain obligations of parenthood, for meeting others proper to 'good citizenship,' for meeting others proper to usefulness in vocation, and so on, do obtain, and should be met for the sake of biological success by most, by many, or by some few only, in every population of men. In 'the same line of ability,' too, there may be several 'levels' of qualification, one a minimal, the others higher, and proper to full usefulness not for all, or nearly all, but for successively superior 'grades of human material.' Much as demand for the goods of commerce calls for standard products of many kinds, and for different grades in products of the same kind, so do the requirements of biological success call for 'minimal' abilities in a wide variety of useful functions, and for different grades of ability in the same function, among men.

In the measure that education is called upon to produce standard qualifications in mass, the principle of efficiency points to collective enterprises in education organized by

division of labor among educators, each having some special contribution to make, whether in teaching, in sorting and routing the human material of education, or in general direction of the enterprise. In that measure—and the scope of it is wide—an 'industrial pattern' fits the requirements of useful education. The 'modern school system,' with its teachers of this and teachers of that, its elementary schools, its high schools, its special schools, its colleges and universities, its 'specialists in measurement,' its 'guidance counselors,' its executives—principals, deans, superintendents, presidents, commissioners, and the rest—has an ethical sanction in the logic of utility. The same logic suggests, too, that school systems tend to increase in usefulness more or less commensurately with increase of refinement in division of labor among specialists, and with centralization of directive authority. The exalting of the administrator and subordination of the teacher so notable in state and city school systems have the same justification in utilitarian theory as have, in industry, the magnification of the executive and minification of the workman, which are so prevalently manifest in modern times.

On what is called 'the curricular side' the logic of utility lends support to organization on the basis of 'constants and variables' in 'the program of studies,' whether that program be considered for a particular school or for a school system. What every educand whom a given school or school system assumes to educate can learn and should learn, like all the rest, to make him useful to his kind, to his fellows, and to himself, that he should be held to learn. Studies devoted to such ends are 'constants' properly to be prescribed in every curriculum of any given school; schools devoted to such ends are properly schools to be attended at some time by all educands in a school system. Studies, on the other

hand, and schools designed to advance usefulness for educands of variously subnormal or supernormal learning capacity or of special aptitude in one direction or another should be prescribed only for those 'of the proper stuff to profit from them.' These are the 'variables' justified by an ethics of biological success.

In the matter of order of studies implications are clear as to order of values; dim and uncertain as to order in time succession. It is plain enough that studies should rate for usefulness correspondingly with the order of usefulness in the objectives at which they are aimed. But in the matter of temporal order logical conclusions are not so readily to be made.

It would seem that the principle of efficiency (or educational economy) points to a succession of completions, cumulative to a total of desired useful acquirements, and permitting a 'horizontal stratification' of studies, say 'grade by grade,' or 'term by term,' such as may be found more often than not in schools and school systems. Master *a*, then master *b*, then master *c*, and so on. But even if the conclusion be wholly sound—a matter somewhat dubious—it supplies no guidance as to what should come first in a succession of useful studies. In regard to that, however, a negative generalization may be offered with some assurance: The most useful order in time succession of studies is not always—and probably not often—the order of their values. We cannot 'put first things first' in many cases. The school, for instance, cannot begin work most usefully by undertaking to produce in the six-year-old those practical efficiencies and appreciations which shall count most to make of him a successful husband and father. It cannot most usefully begin with him, either, by seeking to develop those potentials most significant to his worth as a member of the govern-

ing state; or even by attempting to guide him to acquirements of first importance to his part in economic enterprise. It must begin with pursuit of objectives lower on the scale of worth than these, because there only it *can* begin.

On the positive side two things, perhaps, may be said:

(1) Among a number of objectives possible for a given educand at a given time, that should be sought first which has the highest usefulness. For instance, it is for the most part probable that of all the things which a pupil entering the elementary school can learn and should learn in the first months—or even years—of his attendance, none have a greater usefulness than certain habits proper to his own health and to the health of his fellow pupils. The school, then, which fails of attention from the very beginning to producing those habits in him, no matter how effective it be in other ways, follows an order of studies, or ‘activities,’ out of accord with the requirements of highest biological utility.

(2) An ability to learn what is useful is itself useful. Ability to learn a new mode of behavior is in most instances largely dependent upon what has been learned before. The educator, rightly often, may call upon the educand to learn *a* in order that he may become able to learn *b*. Pursuit of the study proper to acquirement *a* represents a first step on the way toward acquirement *b*. Ability *a*, the product of the first study, may have other uses in life, or it may not, but its use here is to forward accomplishment of the end *b*. In so far, then, as *b* is useful, the study to learn *a* is a useful study, and in its proper place when first in the time succession. No principle is more widely operative to the ordering of studies. Its logical foundation in utility appears firm, though the application may be often erroneous.

Roughly classified, useful ‘preliminary and prerequisite

studies' fall into two groups: (*a*) Those which supply *instruments* to the mastery of useful acquirements, some, of course, to many, some to a few—reading and arithmetic, for example, in the first case, statistical methods, laboratory technique, in the other. (*b*) Those which supply *foundation*, or 'background,' in elements of skill, data of knowledge, etc., upon which—or more accurately, perhaps, out of which—useful forms of action or appreciation can be built. Instrumental and foundational studies, so far as they are genuinely instrumental and foundational, have unquestionable utility and a general sanction for time precedence over those to which they open the way.

Summary. (I) In the light of a theory of biological success the objectives of education appear as desired modifications of the physical organism, a man, in the direction of readiness to act usefully. They represent, by and large, acquired readiness which may be summed up under the heads of *practical efficiency* and *practical appreciation*.

These objectives, and the resources of environment proper to them, have an order of worth corresponding exactly with that which holds for all human activities and resources by the measures of success. They centre, as to behavior, upon the virtues of health, temperance, prudence, thrift, social efficiency, and the like; as to environment, upon wealth in material resources available to men.

(II) Education aimed at useful objectives should carry a *useful content*. A useful content is, in the main, a technical content of a sort to supply patterns of performance for useful acts (techniques) and ideas and systems of ideas operative to selection and combination of techniques (technology). But a useful content may pass the bounds of the

technical. There are many matters for study not useful to the learning of techniques, or of technologies, which are, nevertheless, useful to produce motivating dispositions toward practical doings.

(III) Since habits of action, and elements of habit in functions behind and directive of action, such as those which belong to practical thinking and judgment, are of first-rate importance to success in dealing with relatively stable features of the physical world, it follows that in education to useful living methods appropriate to habit forming should be to the fore. Those methods fall under the head of *training*. To initiate training with a pattern for the habit to be formed, *instruction* is widely useful. It supplies, too, the most evident means to producing qualifications of practical judgment; namely, to the acquirement of technology. And, again, it often serves well to promote attitudes favorable to exercise of practical judgment and the performance of useful acts. *Liberation*, as a mode of useful education, is significant to the forwarding of creative usefulness, of originality and resource in dealing with the unforeseen.

(IV) *Educational value* in a learning activity has no inherent superiority over *present life value* in it. Nevertheless, whenever the objectives of educational enterprise are such as belong to the higher levels of usefulness, the educator is justified in subordinating present value to educational value, if any conflict between the two appears. The principle of efficiency adds sanction to such subordination; the more efficient method should prevail over the less efficient, albeit the less efficient may involve for the educand the more satisfying activity. On the contrary, when the end sought is on the lower level of utility, a sacrifice of present satisfaction in learning has no certain justification;

educational value should, perhaps, take second place as often as not in consideration of such cases.

(V) Men, as individuals of the same race or species, are largely alike. They live, too, under physical conditions to a notable degree the same for one as for another. Success at any level demands of them that they behave alike in many matters. So far as this is true it becomes possible, and useful, to standardize many objectives of education. Standardized products in education, as elsewhere, can be produced, in the main, with greater efficiency by social than by individual undertakings. Increasing efficiency of 'mass production' in education, as elsewhere, goes in general with increasing refinement of distributive specialization in collective enterprise. Hence 'highly patterned' organization in schools and school systems, as in industry, follows logically upon effort to serve ends of utility on a large scale.

This study or that has, *ceteris paribus*, a 'right' commensurate with the utility of its objectives to a place in 'the program of studies.' The principles of 'adjustment' and of efficiency seem to sanction (if one allows to the factor of lapse or forgetting no great weight) an organization of studies by way of successive completions, or 'mastery units,' such as is common in our schools. Further, the implications of success point to organization by 'constants' and 'variables,' as is common again. But principles of utility are not greatly illuminative to the question of time succession of studies. Right of a study to a place in the program has no close relation with its place in time order. Indeed, order of value cannot be the order of succession in most instances. Since, at the higher levels certainly, the activities of adults are mainly more useful than those of children and adolescents, it is not possible to provide a succession of studies in elementary and secondary schools which shall parallel

the order of values in useful living. In respect of time succession no suggestion beyond this seems clear: Studies genuinely instrumental or foundational to learning aimed at objectives highly or widely useful should have an early place.

CHAPTER VIII

SOME BEARINGS OF THE THEORY OF SPIRITUAL MANHOOD

I.

Without some conception of what man is and ought to be, that is to say, without some predicated 'universals' proper to the spiritual nature of man, no rational undertaking to guide the development of personality and character is possible. That, for education, is the first and most certain implication of any argument to a spiritual ethic in human affairs. Were every man in spirit *sui generis*, in all respects peculiar and a law unto himself, then education in terms of the human spirit would be robbed at one stroke of all possible aim.

The conceptions of personality and character hereinbefore suggested represent by no necessity the final truth, or even a very close approach thereto. It may be, for instance, that man has been more truly depicted for what he is in the lineaments of a supraesthetic, but indomitable, Freudian tomcat; and for what he ought to be in those of a Nietzschean egoist. But from the conceptions offered, whatever their validity, and the ethical conclusions toward which they point, it is the task here to trace some general bearings upon education.

(1) If personality is actualized in experience broad, deep, rich, and ordered by the discipline of purpose, then the

typical objectives of enterprise to promote personality in men must be found in *appreciations*, *intellectual* and *aesthetic*. If character dwells in expression of personality, and especially in its social expressions, then the typical objectives of education in virtue must be found in *moral appreciations*, and those, for the chief part, of a sort to govern social conduct.

(2) As education is concerned to modify the spiritual in the environment of men, its objectives lie mainly, too, in the field of *meanings*. Here education aims to produce influences which, as they bear upon men, shall favor experience broad and deep and rich and orderly, and conduct, in its turn, expressive of insight to the good and preference for it.

The objectives of education designed to forward personality and character represent, on the one side, human potentials for meaningful behavior, and, on the other, environment potentially stimulative to such behavior. Order in spiritual worth among the objectives of education corresponds with the order of values in human experience. Any change in a man or his environment which makes possible or assures to him experiences on the humane level rates above another which furnishes a basis only for experiences of a sensory sort; a change which forwards honest dealing with other men rates above a change which makes for deceitful dealing, however expedient and presently gratifying the latter may be. And the like.

All that is easy to say, and a logical conclusion from the premises. But the application of it in particular cases is not so easy as is the application of the principles of utility. One can, for a given educand, determine his practical objectives often readily enough; decide, for instance, that ability *a* is certainly more useful than ability *b*. But he may

be hard put to it to decide that appreciation *a* is surely more valuable to the man in the case than appreciation *b*. Functional ability is observable and analyzable in a way that appreciation is not, even such appreciation as would seem to be expressed in outward conduct.* Hence objectives in useful behavior are more readily to be cast in definite forms than are objectives in intellectual, aesthetic, or moral appreciations. Then, too, the categories of the useful in life are, in general, more easily distinguishable than are the categories of spiritual worth. Habit *a* and habit *b*, for example, may both be serviceable to health in the individual, yet *a* be clearly the more useful of the two. On the contrary, appreciation *a* and appreciation *b*, both, let us assume, of the humane order, cannot be judged for relative worth in the same ready fashion; both are enlarging and enriching modes of experience, but which, for the educand in the case, is the more enlarging and enriching one cannot say with certainty. In short, objectives in meanings and standards of judgment for worth in the particulars of experience, lack, as a rule, the definiteness of objectives and standards in utility. Proper choice and ordering of objectives are correspondingly more difficult.

For all that, attempts at logical application of psychical principles are not altogether hopeless. The educator can say this at least in many cases: An appreciation of this *kind*, although I cannot describe its anatomy precisely, promises more, commonly, to the enlargement, the enrichment, or the integration of experience than does an appreciation of that *kind*—although I can't make no 'job analysis' of that either.

II

The kinds of content which, as dealt with, make most effectively for increasing readiness of appreciation are obviously of the sort to evoke reactions of interpretation rather than of 'impression,' to evoke responses deliberate and selective rather than immediate and 'satisfying' at the first flash of attention; content, in other words, of 'the thought-provoking genus.' Such content does not by instant appeal to sense, to instinct, or to habit tell all its story at once. It offers 'a challenge' to discovery of meaning below the surface and significance beyond the presented stimulus. It consists, therefore, not so much in 'things known and understood' as in things to be known and understood only by way of looking into and beyond them.

NOTE. An unexamined 'impression,' particularly in terms of feeling, cannot be denied spiritual value; but quite clearly content stimulative to responses of that kind only is not likely to aid development very far.

Stimuli most widely apt to the presentation of a content thus challenging belong, manifestly, to the class of symbols. Accordingly one may expect large emphasis upon the literary and artistic in 'the subject matter of education.' By that emphasis the technical and 'the phenomena of Nature' are not excluded. But the technical, at any rate, has no commanding position such as it holds in education dominated by aims of utility. 'The useful' in the content of education has, as such, no merit above 'the useless'; the one, like the other, is admitted only as it may forward the realization of spiritual meaning in life.

In the measure that the educator cannot know precisely in what the appreciation he seeks consists—and that is, by

and large, a considerable measure—he cannot know precisely the content most appropriate to produce it. He should be cautious, then, not to prescribe just this or just that as the one content suitable to develop a chosen kind of appreciation. The best he can say is that this kind of content is more likely to produce this kind of appreciation than is content of another kind. Study of the music of Brahms, for instance, may be no more certainly effective to develop ‘taste in classical music’ than study of the music of Beethoven; but either is probably more effective to that end than would be study of the compositions of Irving Berlin.

III

Appreciation expands and deepens in a given situation much in proportion to the extent and penetration of analysis exercised in dealing with it; and comes into order more or less commensurately with the scope of synthesis involved. Meaning comes with seeking and striving; discipline with pursuit of purpose. Learning of meaning, therefore, marches somewhat in step with the facing of difficulties. Education to develop personality and character thus will centre in the process of *liberation*.

• With lack of resource in the educand, however, and failure too often repeated, wholly self-guided attack upon problems may end in defeat for the spirit of adventure and creative endeavor. For this reason *instruction* becomes a legitimate accessory to many a focal enterprise of liberation. Instruction may be necessary to make possible, or desirable to facilitate, the solution of a problem otherwise insoluble, or of a difficulty so great as to make for ‘let down’ or abandonment of effort on the part of the educand. It may serve to recall pertinent data, and so help ‘to clarify the situa-

tion'; it may supply ideas applicable to a possible solution of the problem; and so on. So long as it remains accessory, and not in effect an externally made analysis and synthesis sufficient to resolve the problem *for* the educand, it has a justifiable place in education for the sake of spiritual manhood.

The same reasoning admits *training* to a place. There are objectives in habits relatively meaningless in themselves, which are proper auxiliaries to the liberative process; proper because, while offering little in themselves to enlarge or enrich the flow of meaning in experience, they do, nevertheless, serve as instruments to acquirement of meanings. Masteries in habit of the mechanics of language, of calculation, of dissection, furnish examples. So far as objectives of the sort do, as accomplished, facilitate or make possible the growth of meaning, so far training is a mode of education appropriate to the liberation of personality and character. It is an accessory mode not always less significant than instruction, but one, probably, less widely and often to be invoked.

IV

From a psychical standpoint the sacrifice of present meaning for the sake of future meaning is always questionable. Some * go so far as to suggest that in education no sacrifice at all is permissible. That with which the educand now deals must yield to him all its meaning *now*, in the moment and process of this very experience through which he learns. But argument from our premises does not permit so extreme a conclusion. If experience be figured as an onflow of awareness in living, one of its essentials is continuity. Ex-

* Whitehead, A. N.: *The Aims of Education and Other Essays*. Macmillan. N. Y., 1929.

periences proper to realization of manhood run in series, not in mere succession; no "conscious event" admits of a full cloture. Thus never can an experience, brief or prolonged as we may choose to call it, yield all its meaning here and now. Its meaning, whatever the present scope and quality of that may be, flows on into another experience to affect meaning there, and there itself to be affected. The present moment of learning has value accordingly, not as a capping off to a series of meaningful events but as an increment in a series not ended. With what it owes to the past and what it brings itself, the present event does not realize all the potentials of its meaning. It must be judged not only for what it is, but also for what will come of it and what it will become. In this view educational value and present life value remain, to be sure, inseparable, but the one is not exhausted in the other. The educator must still look ahead, and not backward only, to see realization of his purpose to forward spiritual development. To estimate the worth of this, the educand's experience now, he must still take into account its effects in the future. So reasoning one comes to this: Education as an enterprise of spiritual development must proceed always through conscious activity. The purely mechanical in directed learning has no place, whatever the end sought may be. Not all the possibilities of the moment either can be or need be exploited; but never should the educand be guided to learn by way of doings wholly meaningless to him.

Education for spiritual manhood is a process of self-directed learning. The principle, here reasserted, would seem to leave the teacher, or other 'external educator,' without a job. No man can pass on to another the appreciations that make for personality; no man can supply for another purpose effective to the discipline of character. The point

has been made before,* many times. And yet the conclusion is not quite convincing.

On the contrary, it appears not inconsistent with the principle that a teacher, or other 'outsider,' should enter as a factor to condition the environment of the self-directing educand; to condition it, that is to say, in a manner favorable to self-education. Assume, as one can safely assume in most cases of the young educand at least, that the teacher is one of greater spiritual maturity than his 'pupil.' If that be so, he, the educator, can see, as the educand cannot, certain areas of experience within which self-educative enterprises are likely to yield more for the growth of meaning in life than in others. So far as he can, by what he does, promote genuine adventures in learning there, rather than in fields of smaller promise, he justifies his intervention and his place, and justifies them, too, under the very principle which seems at first sight to exclude him. All this does not signify, of course, that it is the proper work of the teacher to make easy the path of the adventurer in learning. As he does so he tends to rob the venture of meaning, and, in general, also, of fullest effect to advance the further growth of meaning. Yet to play his part he must not seldom act to leave certain gates ajar, as it were, a blaze at a critical turning, a marker at the quagmire, and the like, figuratively. If he does not so act the enterpriser may be brought shortly to a halt, become lost, or bog down. As that happens the venture fails as surely of full profit as if the path of it had been made smooth and straight and level for him. The question most often is how far is it necessary that the teacher should intervene, rather than should he intervene at all. And the answer is determinate only by consideration of the particular

* E.g., Adams, J. *The Evolution of Educational Theory*. Macmillan. N. Y., 1912.

case; an examination, especially, of the history, the capability, and the resources of the educand in that case. One generalization, nevertheless, would seem to be permissible: With every advance of the educand toward spiritual maturity the educator should make a retreat; move, so to speak, to 'fade from the picture' and to 'abdicate' his place.

The educator must be no less cautious in the making of difficulties. As he would have the educand learn to deal meaningfully with 'the realities of life' he must avoid 'injecting' into 'the learning situation' that which makes it 'unreal.' To make a puzzle of that which is no puzzle may be one way 'to cause the pupil to think,' and so to find more meaning, perhaps, in the present moment than otherwise he might find. But thus to falsify the picture is to take from the learning experience much, if not all, of its just effect upon further development. The teacher who 'makes things too difficult' errs in that respect exactly as does the teacher who makes them too easy.

But if the educator be so limited in the matter of removing and imposing difficulties, what can he do to keep the self-directing educand to his course, a course which must be held if the ordered fruits of discipline are to come from it? To the question there is probably no final answer. Yet this seems fairly clear as a rule: Once the educand has chosen and launched himself upon an enterprise of promise in self-education, he should be held to 'see it through.' He only, of course, can really hold himself to seeing it through. But the outside educator has, for all that, a real concern in the matter. He can and should lend aid variously to the educand to maintain a resolute pursuit of his purpose to master what he set out to master. He can offer 'encouragement and approval for earnest effort,' speak and act to 'revive and strengthen his purpose'; so vaguely are suggested

aids of a genuine sort on the positive side. On the negative side the educator may often rightly stand firm to block a departure from the chosen way; for, after all, whenever he enters the learning situation as a factor essential to characterize it as real and representative, he becomes a rock of circumstance as stern in its requirements as any other. Much as deep water forbids the swimmer to cease his strokes once he has launched himself to swim therein, so the educator may forbid the educand, for his own good, to give over his purpose and quit his efforts. One who is held by force of accepted and masterable conditions to a course he has chosen is not so made a slave. The old-time school-master was not always wrong.

V

Education of a sort to admit the external educator finds a sufficient reason for being under the theory that the worth of life abides in the continuing and consistent growth of its inward meaning. It is fairly evident also that the theory gives sanction to unions of educators jointly active to forward self-education of the same persons. But, if schools and school systems be so justified, implication points to them as free societies flexibly organized to provide promising resources for self-directed learning, and not as machines for making standard products in human behavior. As for the authoritative director of collective enterprise in education, his importance does not leap to the eye.

An assumption of universals in the nature of man is, we have said, predicate to any purposeful part in the process of educating a man. Whatever in terms of principle the predicated universals may connote, they do not point to particulars; they suggest a pattern, but they do not indicate the

content of experience required to develop manhood in A or in B. A may be helped to become the man he can become by way of experiences different, at the higher levels especially, from those which help B to the realization of his personality and character. *

From this it would appear that the self-directing educand needs for every considerable advance in spiritual development a range of aids and resources not exactly determinable by any outsider. It is possible in a given case that a single outsider may be qualified to supply all that are needed by a single student. But even a man of the most extraordinary qualifications—one, say, like the traditional Mark Hopkins—could rarely so meet for long the requirements of a dozen superior students. If opportunities abundant in extent and variety to advance his own manhood can be provided for the educand, then in all but the rarest cases outsiders must work together to provide them. Herein lies the justification for societies of educators, for organization of schools and school systems.

No less clearly it seems to follow that attempt to standardize objectives in education for spiritual manhood is a mistake. One who considers with this the point that appreciations cannot be precisely defined may justly conclude that a standardization of objectives is not only uncalled for; it is also, in any strict sense, impossible.

In the measure that the demands upon him are not recurrently the same an educator cannot become a specialist in meeting them. Without standardization of objectives there can be no proper standardizing of content or of methods. Nevertheless, there are categories of appreciation and kinds of content and method variously appropriate to forward appreciations in this category or that. A single educator can thus take upon himself the task of supplying not all, but

some only, among the aids and resources required by self-directing educands. He can devote himself quite properly to supporting students only in enterprises of a certain class; and so doing he becomes, naturally, a specialist of sorts. But his specialization in such case must compass a much larger scope than would be necessary were his ends always the same or very closely similar. He must be master of a manifold content and versatile in his procedures, not confined to routine presentation of 'the same subject matter' to group after group of students.

Organization by division of labor is therefore appropriate within broad limits. But the pigeon-hole departments and the regimental coordination of specialists so useful to 'mass production' of standard equipment in human behavior are out of place in a collective promotion of personal development.

In a school or school system dedicated to liberation of the human spirit the industrial pattern of organization is a false pattern. As the school becomes a free society of teachers and students, and the school system a free society of schools, the school administrator sinks to a secondary place. In the school the principal is a servant of the teachers and students, not their master; in the school system the superintendent is agent of the schools, not dictator of their functions by will of powers external to them. The school administrator, in this view, works to supply conditions helpful to the work of teachers in their turn assisting students with promising enterprises in self-development. So, manifestly, he plays a variously important part, but never the part which is first and most essential to the significance of school or system. He is neither cornerstone nor keystone in the social structure to which he belongs.

So far as the less patent implications have been here cor-

rectly traced, the argument runs in summary thus: For self-development in any enterprise of learning the educand must be essentially free to direct his own efforts. From this it follows that the student-assisting educator, or teacher, must have—not for his own sake only, but for the sake of the students whom he is called upon to assist—a like freedom within a field of no small scope. Educators of the sort have need, again, of opportunity to work under conditions favorable to the free employment of their resources. Accordingly administrators may have a place as assistants to them in the collective enterprise of aiding self-development. That enterprise, viewed as a whole, represents a free society. A free society is one flexibly organized, not regimented; one controlled by generously shared purposing among its members, not by authoritative command of one or a few.

Logically, it seems fair to say, the social organization of a school or school system should reflect that of the student enterprises which it is designed to foster. At any rate, curricular organization and organization of students, staff, and material resources, are not independent the one of the other. And yet, by the very nature of its objectives, education to spiritual manhood permits no exactitude as to curricular organization. Prescription, without reference to other values than spiritual, has no sanction either as to specific studies or specified order of time succession among them. There are, nevertheless, generalizations safely to be made, and suggestive of practice in accord with the ethical argument.

First, the opportunities for student enterprise offered by a school should be opportunities of promise to the realization of personality and character. In what fields they shall lie can be determined not by present and particular interests among the immature educands for whose profit they are opened, but in the light of worth revealed for them in the

broad and deep and rich and disciplined experience of those who have lived to become men in a full spiritual sense. Among offerings, then, those whose value is most humane are most justly to be placed in the program. From 'the classical' studies at the top worth descends the scale to those studies which gratify a passing interest.

Order of worth in studies, however determined, certainly does not indicate a corresponding order in time succession among them. Certain studies, broadly and profoundly enlightening and enriching, should be undertaken only by the few, and relatively late in the school career of those few. They demand exceptional capacities, and beyond them notably superior matured capabilities. The principle holds for every educand, no matter how high or low his capacities, that studies first in worth for him can seldom come first in time; he is, until he reaches a proper stage of maturity, unready to profit from them.

Clue to the time order of studies must be sought, as Socrates suggested, in the process of development itself. That process involves a serial continuity of learning experiences more and more challenging; a meeting of situations demanding continually greater range and penetration of analysis, and corresponding scope of synthesis. The idea is suggested also, if not accurately described, in the familiar admonition: 'Proceed from the simple to the complex.'

Challenge inheres neither in subject nor in object *per se*, but in the relation between them. What for you may be simple and easy may be for me complex and difficult. Ordering of studies in time by level and scope of difficulty in them cannot, therefore, be made with specific assurance for a given educand by any teacher or other outsider. Answer to the question, which is the less difficult for A, study *b* or study *c*, can be given, in the end, only by A himself.

Let that be granted, and still it is probably true that a general rating for fields of study by order of difficulty can be made with greater confidence than can be established the order of their worth. In major fields of study at least, long fostered in elementary, or secondary, or higher schools, the educator's conclusion that for most educands *a* and *b* will prove less difficult than *c* and *d*, *c* and *d* less difficult than *e* and *f*, and so on, is likely to be fairly dependable. Trouble as to appropriate time order comes with introduction of new 'subject fields.' That is shown, for instance, in the history of the sciences in secondary schools, and in the history of 'economics' in the colleges. By providing for brief adventures, 'preliminary samplings,' 'exploration and self-testing,' over fairly wide areas, a reasonably sound determination of order for this or that group of students can doubtless be made in most instances.

A second factor widely operative to affect proper time order in fields of study appears—as it did in the case of *useful* education—with recognition of 'background' and instrumental values in certain studies. The acquiring of appreciations through study *b* is often predicated upon qualifications acquired through study *a*. Such qualifications are, in general, of two sorts: the first a store, so to speak, of meanings and elements of meaning, out of which new meanings can be built. The second a 'supply of tools' serviceable to the acquirement of new meanings. Backgrounds for new appreciations, intellectual, aesthetic, or moral, are not, of course, identical with backgrounds supporting merely practical appreciations, but the two often overlap. Instruments useful to acquirement of useful meanings are, perhaps more often than not, also serviceable to the acquirement of 'useless' meanings. To wit: Ability to read a language enables one to discover a host of meanings, some significant to his

success, some having little worth or none to promote a useful functioning on his part. At this point, it would seem, schoolmen are wholly reasonable in insisting that certain 'fundamental processes' must be mastered early, because they make for qualifications essential to advancement both in functional efficiency and in personality and character. Studies of the sort have sound claim to an early place in the program of studies.

In corollary to the theorem of spiritual development it appears that a program for the individual educand should meet the requirements (a) of serial continuity in learning enterprises focally self-directed; (b) of continual (if not continuous) broadening and deepening of scope in studies; and (c) of increasing strength of integrative connections between meanings discovered in the several studies. This, plainly, is 'a large order'; one probably to be filled, so far as it can be filled, more nearly by the student himself than by any organization of assistants and resources in a school or school system designed to aid him.

The corollary, for all that, is not without suggestiveness; and two, at least, among its possibly traceable implications may be worth a brief examination here. The more plainly discernible of the two is this: Curricular organization may exhibit the pattern of a single expanding series of studies. The other: Curricular organization may follow a pattern of multiple but converging series of enterprises in learning. The result in either case will represent a structure proper to a continuing ascent, and not one, like a brick wall, of piece by piece completion of successive strata in achievement.

Under the plan of a single expanding series the educand entering any school, be it elementary school or college, begins with an enterprise of promise suitable to his matriculant capabilities, and follows that through to the opening out

therefrom of a second enterprise of greater scope. That in turn he follows through to its larger outlet into a still more expansive enterprise. And so on. Thus he advances (a) through an unbroken series of learning experiences, (b) through a series continually expanding in scope, and (c) from study to study through channels broadening and deepening one after another to strengthen the unity of connected parts. Under such organization lines of division between school and school in a system become, manifestly, lines of distinction, and not of separation. The last study of the educand in the first school opens the way to his first study in the second school; his last study in that to his first study in the next, etc. So too, of course, through whatever 'grades' on the way it may be convenient to distinguish. Be it slow or swift the process of education from entrance into the system to the leaving of it thus becomes *one process* for any individual.

By the plan of multiple converging series of studies the educand entering a school system, or any school therein, undertakes at the start a number of studies, to him at the time most likely not recognizable parts of one whole. He pursues these severally upward through the series in which each is the first enterprise. As he advances each series expands so that the bounds of one approach, and touch, and cross the bounds of others. Learning can no longer be confined to this field, but penetrates that field also. So, for example, three series started, say as studies *a*, *c*, and *e*, respectively, converge, like brooks into a stream, to become study *A*; another three series, beginning as studies *b*, *d*, and *f*, respectively, converge to become study *B*. New series beginning again with studies *A* and *B* converge in turn to become study *C*. And so on. Here once more curricular or-

ganization provides for serial continuity, for continual enlargement of scope, and for continually strengthening connection of meaning with meaning.

Attempts at organization by the principle of a single expanding series of studies for the individual educand are not common. Most frequently, perhaps, they are to be observed at two 'levels' of schooling far removed from one another: first, and most conspicuously, in the work of 'the graduate student' in certain universities; second, and more rarely, in 'the nursery school' or the early work of the elementary school. Since the plan, quite obviously, puts teachers at command of students, not students at command of teachers, it fails to fit with established tradition in the schools. A school in which a student may hold, as it were, 'classes' for his teachers, one or a dozen as need may dictate in the prosecution of his studies, suggests to many an unheard of abnormality, despite its faint appearance here and there in the seminar rooms of universities, and in 'the fanciful experiments' of enthusiasts working with small children. There is no doubt, either, that the scheme does not lend itself well to working out in a school system, or in any school dealing with large numbers, whatever may be the theoretical commitment of system or school to the notions of spiritual development and 'individualized education.' ..

Various remote approximations to organization of studies under the idea of multiple converging series may be found by search among existing schools and school systems. Curricular structures of the sort depart not so far from plans of 'parallel vertical sequences' with 'correlation of studies' and 'comprehensive examination' as to appear shockingly abnormal. Allowing for a probably inescapable 'slowing up' in the progress of the more capable students, the plan can,

it would seem, be managed fairly well under group teaching by classes on 'regular schedule' without serious violation of the principles of 'individual education.' Student A may have to wait for the aid he needs while student B is securing his; but he will get it soon or late if his resolution to see his enterprise through be sufficient. Where it is necessary that a few educators serve many educands, as in the existing public schools, the idea of converging series looks more promising for the collective promotion of self-development on the spiritual side, than does the idea of a single expanding series. In well-manned schools professing a function of liberation, such as some of our colleges and private schools, the structure of studies can be fitted quite closely to the requirements of steadily advancing development of personality and character. The 'individualization of education' in this respect, as in others, can be carried further, obviously, when the ratio of teachers to students is one to five or six or seven, than when it is one to forty or fifty or sixty.

In a long-sustained school career the one type of organization would seem, logically, to be about as effective as the other. But for a brief schooling—as in the case of a student who can avail himself of the school's assistance only for half a year, a year, two years, as against four years, six, twelve, or more—the first plan shows disadvantage in one essential to development, the second in two others. Assume two students of like capabilities following for the same brief period the one a single expanding series of studies, the other initially discrete studies in series eventually converging. The first will come out of school with less varied, but deeper and more fully integrated, potentials of appreciation than the second; the second will come out with acquired potentials in appreciation more various and of wider range, but less penetrative and less thoroughly integrated.

Summary. (I) Aim in education for development of personality and character is impossible without notion of some properties universal to spiritual manhood. Assuming universals of the sort suggested in Chapter IV, education aims properly at objectives in *human appreciations* and in *meaningful environment*. It aims to develop in men potentials of readiness to appreciate the world with which they deal intellectually, aesthetically, and morally; to produce in that world object-influences proper to evoke such appreciations.

An order of values for appreciations of the sort, and their objects, corresponds, of course, with an order of values defined by the universals of human experience; and for that very reason cannot be laid down in detail. But, though we lack assurance in particular, we can reasonably order appreciations as to *kind*. Some kinds are quite certainly to be assigned superiority over others as factors in the enlargement, enrichment, and integration of personality and character.

(II) Content in education to ends in appreciation would seem logically to be effective somewhat in proportion to the 'challenge' that it offers. Content of the most meaningful sort is that which calls for examination and deliberate interpretation, not in the instant, as it were, conveying all its meaning. In reflection of this principle large emphasis upon the symbolic and figurative in the presented content of education naturally appears; a dominant recognition by educators of studies literary, artistic, and the like, rather than technical. So far, too, as ends in appreciation cannot be closely defined, content proper to appreciation cannot be closely prescribed.

(III) If personality and character develop in and through meaningful dealings with the meaningful, education to promote that development may be expected to center upon self-

directed searches for meaning in and beyond the immediately stimulating data of experience, as in things and events perceived, ideas presented, and so on. It may be expected to provide opportunities for the meeting of challenging situations, for attack upon and resolution of difficulties, for inquiries, investigations, researches, experiments, adventures in the prosecution of significant studies. All of which is to say that methods implied for education in promotion of spiritual manhood belong to the mode of *liberation*. This is not to deny that *instruction* and even *training* have a place. Their place, however, is secondary and accessory. Their function is to contribute to the resources of the self-directing educand for dealing with focal problems in learning. Instruction, plainly enough, is widely serviceable to supply data of fact and idea; training, not seldom perhaps, to provide tools necessary or advantageous to the forwarding of the student's enterprise.

(IV) Value in the learning moment and educational value in the learning process of the moment blend, the one with the other, more fully in education to spiritual development than in education to material success. Inseparable though they are, they yet remain distinguishable, if not so readily as before. This (despite the contention of certain 'humanists') because continuity is a property of experience, and no conscious event or particular experience therein can yield all its meaning now. Fulfillment of its meaning is not to be seen in what it comes to at the present peak of its history, but depends, as well, upon what shall come of it in the future. The first view reveals its *present life value*; the second and more comprehensive view, its *educational value*. So, the latter value is seen to include the former, not the former the latter. Accordingly the question of preferring one value to the other can hardly enter. Realization

of the first is a means, to be sure, to realizing the second; but the means here belongs to the end also, as part of it, but not the whole.

From this argument one conclusion only seems possible: All learning proper to enlarge, enrich, or unify the life process of experience must be itself experience, conscious activity having, so to speak, meaning in its own right. Mere exercise of organic function to an end in modification of behavior, whatever the value of such outcome, is learning of a kind not admissible to education for the sake of spiritual development. Drill, for example, without purpose or perceptible significance to his ends for the educand, has no justification here, as it may have, at times, when the end sought is one of biological utility.

The conclusion already offered, that instruction and training are proper accessories to a mode of education through liberation, cannot be valid unless a conclusion that the teacher, or other 'outsider,' is admissible as a factor in the enterprise of self-guided learning is also valid. That the external educator is thus admissible, and to be valued like any other factor of environment proportionately to his influence in favoring fruitful search and resolute purpose in the enterprise, seems clear enough. He becomes objectionable and a hindrance only to the extent that the purpose which governs his acts of influence is effectively out of harmony with the central purpose of the student.

(V) Self-development is an individual process, but the social promotion of it is possible and important. Schools to provide resources in aid of the student may be justified in the name of 'individualized education.' Since objectives in appreciation not referable to practical ends cannot be standardized, nor aids to individual self-development closely prescribed, it follows: First, that the society called a school

should be a *free society*. Second, that the cooperating educators therein assisting cannot be specialists in any narrowly functional sense; each must be versatile in command of resources from a field of relatively comprehensive scope. In such a society the school administrator may have a place, but a place at second remove, as it were, from the focal processes of education. His work is to aid the student chiefly by aiding those who act in the first instance to aid him in the prosecution of his studies. The highly patterned and authoritatively administered school or system is out of harmony with the requirements of 'individualized education' to spiritual self-development.

Only in general and as to kind can order of spiritual worth among objectives of education be determined by the external educator. In consequence the offerings of the school can be ordered as to worth in like fashion only. But that order, quite evidently, calls for a place at the top for studies most humane, and at the bottom—if anywhere—for those which find their justification only in the passing gratifications that they afford.

Order of studies, however vaguely determinable by the measures of value, gives no clue to order in time succession. The key to that order must be found in the process of self-development. The process suggests, in general, an order of increasing difficulty, on the one side, and, on the other, of upbuilding—a study of this which is instrumental or foundational to that which follows. Thus it would appear that studies low on the scale of difficulty and, at the same time, widely instrumental or foundational to further and more difficult studies have first claim to first place in time order. Behind all this, order in self-development implies a reflection in organization of studies to represent (a) serial continuity, (b) enlarging scope, (c) increasing integration.

From these implications two suggestions are further traceable: (1) organization by *single expanding series* of studies; (2) organization by *multiple but converging series*. The one plan of organization meets, it would seem, the requirements of self-development about as well as the other, in a prolonged schooling. In a brief course in socially aided self-education, however, the first plan has advantage over the second in effect of depth and integration; the second over the first, in respect of provision for breadth.

CHAPTER IX

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOCIAL VIEW

I

The argument in Chapter V points to emphasis upon *social objectives* in education. Society is a process through which, by and large, men achieve their most important successes and realize most widely their spiritual potentials. The forms of intercourse, consequently, and the patterns proper to societies are matters of great importance to the forwarding of life that is useful and meaningful. Since men build the social machinery through which they carry on their joint enterprises, the education of individuals is obviously a means to making that machinery serviceable to human welfare. Education, therefore, which aims at social objectives must seek first objectives in behavior that is individual—behavior of a sort to contribute, as joined with the behavior of others, toward producing the forms of intercourse and the patterns of organization which are the ultimate objectives of such education. In this view the educator may deal with the educand as instrumental to the end he seeks, educating him to social efficiency of this kind and social appreciation of that kind primarily for the sake of the effects which such behavior may have upon society, and secondarily only for the sake of the educand himself. Thus the coach trains his players to meet the requirements of the team he would like to produce, rather than for the benefit of each player as an individual. The school educates 'the

prospective citizen' to the requirements of a proper state, and with only a secondary regard to the special welfare of the particular educand.

In this view, again, mediate objectives in the social behavior of individuals derive from social objectives; that is to say, from ends sought in collective behavior. Once an educator is clear as to a chosen social objective, he may find in it clues to appropriate individual behavior. One who analyzes closely the functioning of a successful team may discover therein the special requirements imposed upon each player. Similarly also, the educator may sometimes determine lesser social objectives by examination of larger ones. So, for example, the educator who conceives clearly the large social objective of 'an-army-built-on-the-American-plan' may discover in it secondary objectives in properly-organized-divisions; in them again objectives in properly-organized-brigades; in them objectives in properly-organized-regiments; and so on down to the humble military unit called a squad. If he now analyzes clearly the structure and functions of the squad, the structure and functions of the company, the structure and functions of the battalion, and so on 'up the line,' he has the keys to behavior called for in the squad member, in the company member, and the rest, and can act intelligently to build up an army of the desired pattern by education of soldiers.

But grant all that, and still the theory of social values does *not* reveal what the social objectives of education should be.* To select and set them up by reference to their worth

* An order of values among social objectives is, to be sure, suggested by survival and emergence in evolution of customs, institutions, etc., and of functional structures in society. But such an order, so far as it is valid, is valid either because it rests upon selective test of utility or upon expression of universals in man's spiritual nature. Thus it goes back to the grounds of utility and meaning; and those grounds are not social grounds.

for human welfare the educator must revert to measures of utility and of meaning. Until one finds some ethical sanction for an army he has none for brigade or regiment or company. As educators prefer biological success to spiritual manhood, or spiritual manhood to success, their social objectives will differ. Those to whom material success supplies the primary measures of worth in life will seek, naturally, to promote through education *useful societies* of an efficient sort, wherein the individual participant is a useful functionary, one to whom freedom is necessary only so far as his freedom counts for success of the whole joint enterprise. Those to whom the universals of spiritual manhood supply the primary measures of worth will seek to promote *free societies* wherein efficiency has place only as it is consistent with freedom for the individual participant to purpose, think, and act in the light of his purpose and his thinking. Others will seek to produce forms of association and social groupings of a kind to combine in various measure the elements of collective efficiency and of individual freedom.

Whether the social objectives of education be determined by criteria of utility or by criteria of meaning, it seems safe to say that such objectives should be, in general, significant to *social progress* and to *social stability*. So long as life for any people is less than perfect by either measure there is room for improvement in their society. Any change in forms or patterns that counts to make collective enterprise among them in total more useful is a change in the direction of social progress by material standards. Any change that makes society among them in total more favorable to development of personality and character is a change in the direction of social progress by spiritual standards. Both success and self-development, however, imply, as a rule, con-

tinuity of life, and continuity implies, in turn, a relative constancy in the modes and conditions of it. From this requirement social process is not exempt; indeed, its high general utility and spiritual significance point to emphasis on constancy. Especially on the large scale abrupt change reduces, for the time at least, total collective efficiency, or total of spiritual resources, or both together, and so tends to break for many the continuity of their usefulness or of their self-development. Accordingly education should seek ends of a sort to reconcile constancy with improvement in social matters. So far as it aims at steady consistency in transition toward the better in forms and patterns of society it makes both for social stability and for social progress.

The surest means to constancy in the pattern and influence of a chosen society is to habituate men to the conventions which articulate the parts of its structure. Such habituation eases the way of the individual to enter and sustain his part in that society; and, if the conventions to which he is habituated belong also to other societies, eases his way variously in many modes of collective activity. Though he be reduced, in proportion to the range and fixity of his conventional habits, to the part of a cog in social machinery, yet those habits may often, by increasing his leisure and releasing a measure of his attention, free him to deal usefully or meaningfully with other matters. Conventions and societies are facts to be faced by every man. The simplest, and no doubt sometimes the best, way to face them is to take them as they are, and to become habituated as promptly as may be to the behavior requirements that they impose. The influence of the mores is strong to produce habitual conformities, and a large part of the work of schools and other educative agencies in all countries is devoted likewise to producing them. Mediate objectives in routine social be-

havior have not a factual place only, but a justifiable one also in education to ends in social stability.

Objectives in fixed habits of social conformity are, as accomplished, nevertheless, inescapably conservative in their effects upon society. In the measure that they dominate education they stand in the way of social progress. Such progress must come, if it comes at all, in spite of education rather than because of it. Reconciliation of the demands of social constancy with those of social improvement calls for educational objectives in *critical sociality*. If progress be measured by collective efficiency in service of utility, then *some* men, at least, must be possessed of critical sociality; if it be measured by collective service to the enlargement, enrichment, and discipline of experience, then *every* man must possess something of it. No implication of the social view of life is more plain and certain than this: Education should serve to develop men who will be effective social critics.

II

Under the principle that content reflects objectives it is clear that education aimed at social objectives should have a content characteristically 'social.' If the educand is to become 'socialized' in a fashion to affect the modes and structures of society as desired, he must deal with matters pertinent to the desired forms and patterns of intercourse and enterprise. So far as habits of social conduct on his part are mediate to a chosen social objective, he must deal directly and repeatedly with social situations demanding exercise of conduct in conformity with requirements proper to it. There is no way short of actual participation sure to produce the conduct habits desired. So far, however, as appreciation effective to determine social conduct is mediate to the main

end—whether or not such conduct becomes ultimately fixed habit—dealings less direct may serve well; observation, for instance, of actual or depicted types of collective behavior, and of the parts played severally by individuals therein. More remote from the actualities of social living than observable collective doings lie matters descriptive in account and interpretation of the forms and significances of conventions, the structures, processes, and ends of society pertinent to the social conduct which it is the aim of education to produce. To deal with such is to learn of social matters vicariously, of course, but informatively, nevertheless, and through a range and to a depth beyond, in the main, the possibilities of participative and observational learning. Here, for the most part, are to be found 'the subject matter sources' of 'the social studies,' so called.

In proportion as objectives in behavior mediate to chosen social ends belong to the category of efficient conformities, the school, plainly enough, should provide for learning through participation in representative forms of social intercourse and enterprise, and through observation of such, with complementary informative study of descriptive and interpretive subject matter. In the measure that critical sociality becomes the mediate end sought, implication points to increasing enlargement of the area of informative study, to enable discovery of meanings and pursuit of significances unmasterable within the limits of available participation and observation. So come to emphasis studies in history, sociology, economics, politics, ethics, and the like; in short, accounts and interpretations of social process in its bearings upon human welfare.

Much in the way of content effective variously to the promotion of social ends lies outside the subject areas commonly assigned to 'the social studies.' In religion, folk-lore, fiction,

poetry, for instance, are to be found many sources of beliefs, ideals, prejudices, fears, and other potentials of affective preference, which supply motive to social conduct. Their use to reinforcement of social indoctrination is familiar. So, for example, the Christian's bible has been made to give sanction to monarchy, feudalism, socialism, and democracy; to war, slavery, polygamy, industrial regimentation, censorship, and free public schools; to a host of social doctrines supporting conduct of a sort to sustain this, to destroy that, or to introduce this other social form or pattern. Music and poetry have been used throughout history to give solidarity both to conservatism and to revolutionary social enterprise. In the degree, however, that education aims at progress on the foundation of critical sociality, emotional appeals to the support of special causes and indoctrination in provincialism should give way to impartial studies, to a content suitable to enlarge social intelligence, to develop appreciation wherein feeling follows the paths of understanding rather than those of dogma.

III

The purposed use of social participation to promote habits of social conduct belongs clearly to *training*—whether it be training externally directed or self-training. The part of training in education to social ends should vary according to the ends. When the aim is to produce or to maintain a closely patterned or relatively rigid social structure, as will often be the case if service of success determines the social objective, training will be much to the fore. So it is, for example, generally in Germany, Italy, Russia, and so it is specifically in military schools of our own country, in certain vocational schools, and here and there even in schools and other educative agencies devoted, as they proclaim, to

'the making of good citizens.' When, however, the aim is to promote a free society, be it on the large scale or the small, training in social behavior becomes a minor and subsidiary mode of education.

Instruction directive to training has a part in education to social ends, as elsewhere. Its function in this respect is, by and large perhaps, more important than in training to habits not social. Initial and repeated errors in dealing with one's fellows as partner in this or in that are, as a rule, more costly in effect and retributive in consequences than are mistaken forms of action purely individual in their reference. 'Ignorance of the law,' for instance, 'is no excuse,' and failure in good manners, sometimes in a single instance only, often results in ostracism. Exceptions, as we know, are innumerable. 'You cannot monkey with a buzz saw'—even your own private buzz saw—except at your peril. But the generalization seems a reasonably safe one, for all that.

When for the sake of social ends education works to promote social appreciation, instruction plays an important part. It fits to the requirements of indoctrination and special sanction for a given pattern in state, church, industry, family, sport. It supplies the simplest and most direct methods of ensuring group solidarity in preference for that pattern; a preference that is appreciative and, despite its provincialism, not wholly out of harmony with gradual improvement of it. Instruction, even in such case, does make for social intelligence as training does not, and so permits some reconciliation between the demands of stability and of progress within doctrinal limits. No less, instruction serves to present 'social facts' through a wide range, divers accounts, different interpretations, even conflicting doctrines. Thus it furnishes data and conceptions for analysis, comparison, and contrast, and helps the educand toward qualifi-

cations as a social critic. Whatever the ethics may be that determine its objectives in social progress, education must resort to instruction as a mode of guiding learning for the few, or for the many, as the case may be.

A disposition to examine and weigh social phenomena and proposals is essential to social criticism. This disposition may be 'carried over' at times from another field of development to a social field. But educators cannot too greatly rely upon such 'transfer.' It is a fact too familiar—and disappointing—that scientists and humane scholars not erudite merely, but genuinely 'superior in endowment and capability, are often narrowly prejudiced, illiberal, and given to 'snap judgments,' like other men, in matters political, economic, and the like. They exhibit in such matters no disposition to the careful and dispassionate consideration which characterizes their attack upon problems in their own fields. These men are, possibly, exceptions to the rule, but they are sufficiently numerous to suggest that a disposition to criticism developed in one field cannot safely be trusted to function in another remote from it. For this reason education should promote such disposition in respect to social matters.

To that end neither training nor instruction will serve. Only through a process of *liberation* can this qualification of the social critic be developed. It is true, probably, that liberation of powers in social criticism cannot go far with the many. When collective efficiency to the service of utility dominates the social aim in education, logic points to a need of extended liberation only for the superior few; when, however, the aim is progress in free society, then liberation to the full that his capacities permit is desirable for every participant in social affairs. Either way, *liberation* is a mode of education that finds some sanction in the social view; and

for qualification of the creative leader in social progress it is a mode indispensable.

IV

A conception of education as designed to affect society yields no new principle for deciding the question of relative worth in the present moment of directed learning and in its educational effects. At first sight it appears to license an exploitation of the educand at this point, making him a tool to be fashioned for service of an end of which his own welfare is not a necessary determinant. But the appearance is misleading. Exploitation finds a sanction sometimes under an ethics of utility, as we have seen; by the measures of spiritual worth in life, no sanction ever. The social conception neither affirms nor denies a license to exploit; and any exercise of that license must find its justification on other grounds than social.

The social conception, however, does posit the perennial question in a special way. Since certain forms of behavior proper to social intercourse and enterprise are to be learned only by participation in social intercourse and enterprise, the process of learning such forms may be regarded, not unreasonably, as a social process. The question then becomes one of comparison between collective behavior in the present and collective behavior in the future. A score of educands, for example, join now in society A in order that they may be so made ready to take part in society B, say next week, or next year, or ten years from now. The question is, how does society A compare in worth with society B, to the production or maintenance of which it is a means.

The point has no notable general application, but might, if considered, help sometimes to clarify discussion of matters of 'school policy,' such as the place and relations of 'intra-

mural' and 'extra-mural programs' in sports, dramatics, music, and the like.

V

Much clearer and more significant to practice is the first implication of the social view for organization of human relations within any educational enterprise designed to affect society. To provide for participations and observations effective to its ends the enterprise must in its own organization conform in part or wholly to the social forms and patterns which it aims to produce or sustain.

The school designed to promote a certain type of army, for instance, should be organized to reflect the organization of that army; and, in fact, a very complete application of the principle is exhibited generally in military schools. From entrance to graduation the cadet is held to act as a soldier in an army that is, as nearly as may be, a counterpart of that in which one day he is presumably to take his place. He studies, drills, dresses, eats, goes to bed—even plays—under conditions regulated to resemble those of the army. The school is not in structure only, but in many activities also, like an army. It parades, it maneuvers, and so on; does, in short, about everything expected of an army, except to fight, kill, and destroy—and even here it 'goes through the motions' in 'skiam' campaigns and battles. Whatever faults may be found with them otherwise, it seems safe to assert that no schools as a class have a social organization more exactly appropriate to their main social objectives than have the military schools.

Not often probably, does a school for nurses list among its objectives one of hospital efficiency. Yet, stated or unstated, that is an objective obviously suitable to such a school; one rather taken for granted than unrecognized by the

medical profession. At any rate, the school for nurses frequently exhibits organization in harmony with that objective. The school is incorporated, so to speak, in the hospital organization, as arm or adjunct to efficient functioning of the hospital. Thus it provides for 'student-nurses' observation of the hospital society at work, and participation in the functions of hospital service. The case illustrates a type of organization found also in vocational schools for employees established by industrial concerns and mercantile houses.

A third system appropriate to social objectives appears sometimes in the education of industrial engineers, foremen, salesmen, hotel employees, and the like; and not far removed from it is the plan of organization widely in use nowadays for educating farmers and 'homemakers.' Here the school, so called, is a 'unit' separate from manufacturing concern, mercantile establishment, hotel, farm, or family home, but so associated with it that the resources it offers for observation and participation are available to educative use. It becomes in the social sense, as in the material, an adjunct of the school.

Military and other vocational schools, it may be said, are special cases. Their objectives, social and other, are relatively particularized, not to say predominantly utilitarian, and neither so various nor so large in scope as those of schools designed to perform functions of 'general education.' Manifestly it is easier to reflect a special social objective in the organization of a special school than to reflect a multitude of social objectives, or even one of greatly comprehensive scope, in the organization of 'a general school.' It is, therefore, natural enough to find a clear reflection in such cases. The principle holds, nevertheless, for the 'general school.' Its application is not less exigent when social objectives are many than when they are few; not less, but perhaps even

more demanded when the aim is civic than when it is vocational. If, as we are wont to proclaim, it is truly a major aim of our public schools to forward democracy in 'the body politic,' then social organization, in something more than mere semblance democratic, should appear in those schools.

Probably no school superintendent, principal, or school board member in this country but takes it for 'self-evident' that to build a football team boys or young men must observe and take part in the playing of football by teams. Yet there are still school administrators who proceed confidently to the performance of their duties on the apparent assumption that autocracy in the school makes for democracy in the body politic. There are schools still shut off, as it were, by high walls from any view of civic enterprise; schools that within those figurative walls are organized to every detail of human relations, from those of the assembly hall to those of the area designated—with no intended irony—'the playground'; organized after a pattern that should bring the smile of warm approval to the stern features of Il Duce. From extremes of the kind our general schools range through all gradations to that now increasing number in which democracy holds a genuine and characteristic place. Such schools are not isolated from those enterprises of the community, governmental and other, which work on democratic principles to service of the commonweal. In them pupils share with teachers and administrators government of school affairs. In them pupils, teachers, administrators take active part in civic affairs 'outside' the school, observe the form and manner of their conduct, examine and discuss their workings together. These are schools, in short, whereof the major social objective is well reflected in organization.

More numerous our schools reflect in organization their minor social objectives, particularly in respect of social forms

of recreation. Most notably—and reasonably, too—they do so in organization of ‘extra-curricular programs,’ rather than curricular.

On the question of curricular organization the social view throws little light. Two probable implications, however, may be worth notice:

First: As to ‘correlation and integration of studies’ it seems fairly clear that ‘the social studies’ should fit with and into one another much as those structures and functions of society with which they deal interpenetrate and depend one upon the other. Thus, for example, studies of government, of economics, of industry, and of public health should not be isolated and independent, but brought together in focus upon certain common problems, invoking for their solution appreciation to be gained not by study of one field, but of several that belong to the social category.

Second: As to time order of studies implications are foggy. But one discerns dimly a suggestion that ‘activities’ or ‘subjects’ proper to acquirement of the tools of intercourse and the keys to a wide range of human associations should have an early place. Here, once more, language offers the most evident instance; this time with emphasis, perhaps, upon its spoken forms. Behind language manners appear; manners that represent ‘the common decencies’ of behavior, not the prescriptions of a narrow etiquette, designed rather to the badge of caste than to facility in human association.

One implication of a general and negative character may have, to end this brief discussion, a certain pertinence. The argument outlined in Chapter V⁶ does *not* support the panacean doctrine that education moves, *pari passu* with advance in ‘socialization’ of it, toward fulfillment of all its obligations. Social objectives belong, by either measure of human welfare, to a category of prime importance, but they are not

all-inclusive. Socialization of the schools is a first means to social objectives, to social stability and social progress in human affairs; but it is neither the sole nor best—or even always a proper—means to promote in every way the growth of men in well doing and well being. „

Summary. (I) A social view of life tends to bring out the importance of *social objectives* in education; objectives represented by desired forms and patterns of behavior that is collective rather than individual. The view does not justify a final determination of social objectives by reference to social values, but leaves them to be judged in the ultimate by standards of material and spiritual worth. It does, however, point to social determination of educational objectives in two ways. (1) A social objective once set up furnishes clues to the steps toward its accomplishment, to mediate objectives in *social efficiency* and *social appreciation* operative to produce or sustain the social structure and process which is the end sought. (2) A social objective may be justified or condemned on social grounds by reference to its bearing on *social stability* and *social progress* in the large. Since, at extremes, social constancy and social improvement may stand opposed, so that gain for one means loss for the other, education should aim, in the main, to promote them together. As means to this promotion it must, in general, seek mediate objectives in *critical sociability* among men.

(II) Social objectives point back to a *social content* in education. That content spreads, roughly speaking, over three zones of subject matter: first, social forms, patterns, functions to be dealt with first hand, by participation in social intercourse and collective undertakings wherein they have a place; second, matters of the same sort to be dealt with at second remove, by observational study of them; third, con-

tent of 'the social studies' and allied fields to be dealt with vicariously, by informative study. In one aspect matter in all these, and matter, too, extending on occasion beyond them, may be called 'motivating content,' suitable to develop dispositions toward social criticism.

'Activities' or studies in the first zones call for emphasis chiefly in relation to mediate objectives in social conformity. Studies in the latter zones reflect characteristically objectives in social appreciation, and increase in scope as such objectives include more and more fully the attitudes, insights, and abilities implied in a comprehensive *critical sociality*.

(III) Means, so far as they are means devised by intelligence, vary with ends. As mediate objectives in individual behavior vary with the social objectives of education, so methods in promotion of those mediate objectives vary with them in turn. Social objectives in rigid social organization carry back to methods for fixation of social habits; methods that fall under the head of *training* to social conformities. Social objectives in flexible social organization imply *instruction* to ends of adaptiveness in social behavior among individuals. Social objectives in harmony with the requirements of consistent social progress call for methods both of instruction and of *liberation* to qualify men as social critics.

(IV) The social view of life reveals no new principles for determining preference between present life value in educative process and educational value. It does suggest, however, that comparison, in education to social ends, should lie between present collective activity in learning and its consequences in future joint activities; and so presents a special instance for judgment.

(V) The first and plainest implication of the argument to social values is that educative enterprise should reflect in organization the forms and patterns of society that it aims

to produce or sustain. This reflection may appear as a replica within a school—as in military schools—or it may appear variously in junctions of the school with organizations providing for observation and participation of appropriate social type. Both the replicate and the adjunctive systems of organization are exhibited more frequently in special schools designed to special objectives than in general schools. But the reflection of the social end in organization of the educative means is no less significant for enterprises of general education than for those of special education; and the principle finds increasingly wide application in 'the schools of democracy.'

For curricular organization implications from the social view are not conspicuous. But two suggestions possibly appear: (1) that social studies in the school program should be 'correlated and integrated' to reflect the interrelations of the social forms and patterns with which they deal; (2) that studies proper to acquirement of 'social tools' and 'tickets of admission' serviceable to a part for the individual in a large number and wide range of associations should be given an early place in the program.

Finally, one general and negative implication is fairly evident. The argument set forth does *not* point to attainment of the millennium by 'complete socialization' of all 'educative enterprises.

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